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VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.-
A LAWYER'S LAW PROFESSOR
By THOMPSON G. MARSH*
N a day when it was believed that law students should be
taught by well-educated lawyers who had had years of successful
law practice, Vance R. Dittman came to what was then the Denver
Law School with the best possible qualifications: A.B., Yale, LL.B.,
Yale, several years of really successful and first class practice in New
York and Denver, and an independent income which made it possible
for him and his wife (also of Yale) freely to choose an academic
life.
It happened to be at that brief period when the law school was
in the center of the university campus at University Park, an attractive
residential community six miles from the courts and law offices
of downtown Denver that the Dittmans bought a home there in the
shadows of the ivory towers and the prospect was pleasant.
Within two years, Vance was in the Navy, and when the war
was over he still had his home in University Park, but the law school
was back downtown, where it had been for half a century, and where
it is now - near the courts and law offices.
In spite of this, the Dittmans developed in University Park
and on the university campus broader and more intimate friendships
than were enjoyed by other members of the faculty. Mrs. Dittman
was President of the Women's Faculty Club, and Vance was Presi-
dent of the University Senate. He was so well educated and well
informed on everything from literature to science and he had so
many friends in so many different fields of learning, that in his
person he was able to achieve to an unusual extent, that interdis-
ciplinary synthesis of which so much has been written.
Withal, he remained a lawyer's law professor. He taught con-
tracts and evidence and civil procedure with teaching loads that
in the early years ranged from 15 to 20 hours per week, and yet,
with the habit of a good lawyer, he complemented the casebooks
with annotations and citations that practically constituted briefs. His
*Professor of Law, University of Denver, College of Law.
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students learned not only contracts, evidence, and civil procedure
but also thoroughness and accuracy, which might be considered
among the sine qua non of professional responsibility. Furthermore,
he singlehandedly administered a program by which students were
given academic credit for actual practice, under a special rule of
the Supreme Court of Colorado. His supervision was close and
exacting and the standards he set must have helped many of the
school's graduates to set similarly high standards for themselves.
When teaching loads were diminished, Vance seemed to work
harder than ever. He prepared his own materials for new courses in
Civil Procedure; he collaborated with Harold Hurst in the preparation
of a book on procedural due process in which every relevant dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court of the United States was considered;
and he prepared a manual for use by the Denver Police Department
when law enforcement officials first began to be aware of questions
concerning the legality of their own procedures.
Recognition of him as Colorado's outstanding authority on
civil procedure caused the West Publishing Company to request him
to prepare a three-volume work on the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure. With typical thoroughness, he refused to rely upon the
digests, but instead, with the help of a student assistant, turned
every page of the Colorado Reports. No case was overlooked. Nor
was he content merely to express his own first opinion with respect
to unclear and ambiguous language in the rules or in the opinions
construing the rules. In such cases he would argue it out with some
other member of the faculty who might have a different point of
view. He even prepared the index for the Colorado Rules of Pro-
cedure. In order to meet the contract deadlines he worked early and
late at the law school and even during the summers at his mountain
home, Sky Meadow.
No wonder he is now retiring, years before the age limit. He
has earned freedom, and again he is in a position to choose the
life he wants.
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CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO
By J. DAVID PENWELL*
In recent years there has been a heightened interest in the field
of civil rights. The impact has been especially significant on the
legal profession, nevertheless, many lawyers have limited working
knowledge in this important field in that they are unfamiliar with
the practices and procedures of the civil rights commissions and are
unaware of the full ramifications of current civil rights legislation.
In this timely and well documented article, Mr. Penwell examines
civil rights law in Colorado. He discusses the development as well
as the present state of Colorado law relating to the Public Accom-
modations Act, the Fair Employment Act, and the Fair Housing
Act. He also compares Colorado law with federal civil ri hts law
and with that of other states. Furthermore, he explains how the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission administers the law and the
procedures established by the commission for handling a civil rights
case. Finally, Mr. Penwell notes the shortcomings of the existing
civil rights laws and gives suggestions for their improvement.
INTRODUCTION
C OLORADO has had a long, if perhaps sometimes undis-
tinguished, history in civil rights. It is only in the last 10 years
or so, however, that there has been any legal significance attached
to this subject. It is presently receiving a great deal of attention and
the purpose of this article is to explain the civil rights laws presently
existing in Colorado.
Except for the larger employers, few clients of an attorney will
have had much experience or contact with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, the agency administering the state's civil rights laws.
For this reason the number of lawyers who are familiar with the
commission and its statutes is relatively small. However, the pro-
fessional tools needed for civil rights cases are neither involved
nor difficult, and it is hoped that the information contained in this
article will save the attorney a certain amount of time in appraising
and understanding a civil rights case if he should receive one.
Colorado presently has three civil rights statutes: a public ac-
commodations act,' a fair employment act,2 and a fair housing act.'
As with most regulatory and enforcement statutes, there are other
*Assistant Secretary and Counsel for the Golden Cycle Corporation, Colorado Springs,
Colorado. B.S. University of Montana, 1955; L.L.B. University of Colorado, 1962.
Former Assistant Attorney General, State of Colorado and Legal Counsel - Colorado
Civil Rights Commission.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-1 etseq. (1963).
2 Id. §§ 80-21-1 et seq.
3 Id. §§ 69-7-1 ei seq., as amended (Supp. 1965).
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limitations, prohibitions, and restrictions relating to civil rights
to be found in other laws. With one exception,4 however, these
other laws exist and operate outside of the statutory jurisdiction
of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. This article will be
limited, therefore, to a consideration of the three major laws ad-
ministered by the commission and the procedures followed in
carrying out its duties.
I. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
Early in Colorado's history a civil rights policy was built into
the structure of the law. The Enabling Act laying the foundation
for the adoption of a constitution, the creation of a state, and its
admission to the Union provided that "the constitution should be
republican in form, and shall make no distinction in civil or political
rights on account of race or color ... [and] that perfect toleration
of religious sentiment shall be secured and no inhabitant of said
state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of
his or her mode of religious worship ..."' These requirements were
later incorporated in various forms into the Colorado Constitution.6
In 1885, only five years after the adoption of the constitution,
the general assembly passed its first civil rights law - a public
accommodations act.7 This law remained unchanged until 1895
when the initial act was repealed and reenacted in its present form.'
The 1895 law was substantially the same as the one it replaced,
except that the later statute deleted churches as places of public
accommodation. To the possibility of incurring a fine of $300.00
upon being convicted for a misdemeanor,9 the 1895 law also added
4 The Proprietary School Act of 1966, id. § 146-3-5(1) (Supp. 1967), gives the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission authority to investigate discriminatory practices
in proprietary schools and report the same to the State Board for Community Colleges
and Occupational Education. Most of the other civil rights laws involve a general
prohibition against discrimination (e.g., "There shall be no discrimination shown
toward any teacher in the assignment or transfer of that teacher to a school, position,
or grade because of sex, race, creed, color, or membership or nonmembership in any
group or organization." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-18-14(1). But such laws do
not provide for any penalties or enforcement measures in the event of a violation and
are, therefore, in practical effect merely statements of policy.
Other such laws not pertaining to matters under the commission's jurisdiction
(such as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-11-61 (1963) -discrimination in discharg-
ing an employee because of his age) declare that a violation constitutes a mis-
demeanor, but offer no affirmative relief to the aggrieved person. Even if a complaint
is filed under the statute, it is never prosecuted because of the different and heavier
burden of proof for a criminal case.
5 Colo. Enabling Act §4, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. Vol. 1 (1963).
6 COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-28 (the Bill of Rights), with specific reference to Section
4 on religious freedom and Section 25 on due process; see also Article IX, Section
8, prohibiting discrimination in public education.
7 Colo. Sess. Laws of 1885, at 132.
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a private remedy. An aggrieved person could file a private civil
action, with damages of up to $500.00 for each offense.10 The
complainant was required to elect his remedies, and could not pursue
more than one cause of action."
As with many Colorado statutes, this law was taken from an
Illinois law,' 2 which, in this case, had been copied from the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1875.13 The federal law was in substantially
the same form as that subsequently adopted in Colorado and pro-
hibited discrimination in the denial of the "full and equal enjoyment
of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of the
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places
of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude."' 4 Colo-
rado's law reads exactly the same except that it also includes
restaurants, eating houses, and barber shops and ends with "all"
other places of public accommodation.15
Various states passed such laws in response to the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Civil Rights Cases. 6 This
decision, consolidating several lower court decisions on the same
subject, held that the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 was uncon-
stitutional. The Court held that Congress was legislating in areas
reserved for state action by the 13th and 14th amendments to the
United States Constitution. The effect of these state laws was, for the
most part, annulled by the 1896 decision of the Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson," which articulated the "separate but equal"
doctrine. With the end of the Reconstruction Period, resulting from
the election of President Hayes in 1877, and the Plessy decision,
civil rights was retired as a legal concept for many years to come.
By 1964, 30 states in addition to Colorado had public accom-
modation laws, most of which are similar to Colorado's statute and
most of which were passed in the period between 1880 and 1900.18
Of these 30, 13 have been considered by their respective state supreme
courts and have been held to be constitutional. 9 In Colorado the
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 COTHRON'S ANN. STATUTES, Il. 449 (1887).
13 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
14 id. § 1.
15 
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-1 (1963).
16 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 284 (Appendix V) (1964).
19 Annot., 49 A.L.R. 505 (1927) ; see also School Committee of Boston v. Board of
Educ., 352 'Mass 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967).
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basic statute has been before the state supreme court six times. °
Four of these decisions were decided on procedural grounds, 21 but
in Crosswaith v. Bergin, the court specifically found the law to be
constitutional .
22
The case of Darius v. Apostolos 23 is particularly significant.
The issue was whether a bootblack stand was a place of public
accommodation since it was not specifically mentioned in the statute.
The court reversed the trial judge's decision and held that a boot-
black stand was included and was covered by the act. The court
ruled that the principle of ejusdem generis did not apply in the
interpretation of this statute and that the phrase "all other places of
public accommodation" was not limited to other places similar or
related to those places or establishments specifically mentioned earlier
in the statute, i.e., inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops,
public conveyances, and theaters, and that the phrase "all other
places" means exactly what it says.24 It was on the strength of this
case and Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution that the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission in 1967 issued a policy statement
that public schools are places of public accommodation in Colorado
and that the commission would therefore assume jurisdiction over
cases of de facto segregation in Colorado public schools.
25
When the legislature passed the Anti-Discrimination Act of
1957,26 Colorado's civil rights employment law, the public accom-
modations law was amended to bring the enforcement of public
accommodations discrimination under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Rights Commission,27 providing a third remedy to an aggrieved person
in addition to the civil action and misdemeanor prosecution already
available. The law also continued the requirement that a complainant
elect his remedies so that a choice of any one procedure would be
2
0Jemigan v. Lakeside Park Co., 136 Colo. 141, 314 P.2d 693 (1957); Johnson v.
Westland Theatres, Inc., 117 Colo. 346, 187 P.2d 932 (1947) ; Lueras v. Town of
Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 65 P.2d 1431 (1937) ; State ex rel. McKinney v. Lowry,
100 Colo. 144, 66 P.2d 334 (1937); Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d
848 (1934); Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1920).
21Jernigan v. Lakeside Park Co., 136 Colo. 141, 314 P.2d 693 '(1957); Johnson v.
Westland Theatres, Inc., 117 Colo. 346, 187 P.2d 932 (1947) ; Lueras v. Town of
Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 65 P.2d 1431 (1937); State ex rel. McKinney v. Lowry,
100 Colo. 144, 66 P.2d 334 (1937).
2295 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934), wherein the court cited Darius v. Apostolos, 68
Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 '(1920) for the proposition that the statute had been held
constitutional; however this issue was not discussed in the Darius case.
23 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1920).
24Id. at 327, 190 P. at 511.
2 Policy Statement, Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Minutes of Commission Meet-
ing, Dec. 22, 1967.
SCOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-1 el seq. (1963).
27id. §§ 25-3-3, 80-21-5 (1963). The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission
referred to in this statute has been redesignated the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion. COMO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-3, 80-21-5 (Supp. 1965).
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a bar to any alternate action.2" Under this amendment, the only relief
the commission can grant is to issue cease and desist orders prohibiting
further discriminatory conduct. If such an order were not obeyed, it
would be enforceable in the district court through the district court's
contempt powers.2" As with other laws administered by the com-
mission, such an administrative order can only be issued after an
administrative hearing in which the complainant has proved a
statutory violation,3" unless the case was disposed of before a hearing
through the conciliation powers of the commission to settle cases by
agreement of the parties.31
The most unique portion of the amended public accommodations
law is in the prohibition section setting forth the conduct forbidden.
No reference is made to the familiar words "race, creed, color, na-
tional origin or ancestry;" the law instead refers to: "All persons
.. shall be entitled to the. . equal use of places of public accomo-
dation." ' This would appear to be an admonition against any type
of deferential conduct by a proprietor. The statute ends this par-
ticular provision with the phrase, "Subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens." '
For example, apparently the owner of a bar could, under this law,
refuse to serve all drunks or those who appeared intoxicated or who
were causing a disturbance; but he could not be selective and only
throw out those against whom he had a particular aversion. If there
is a policy therefore, it must be applied equally to all.
Under this provision, therefore, the posting of the signs fre-
quently seen in places of public accommodation stating that "we
reserve the right to refuse service to anyone" is highly questionable
and probably unlawful. If a proprietor attempted to exercise this
privilege he might find it necessary to show that he does so under
the "conditions and limitations established by law and applicable
alike to all citizens. '3 4 If the aggrieved person could submit any
evidence showing that the proprietor's standards for such action
did not meet the statutory test and were in any way arbitrary, and
this evidence could not be rebutted by the proprietor, the complainant
would be able to prove a statutory violation.
'8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-1 (1963).
9 Id. §§ 25-3-5, 80-21-8.
30Id. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7.
31 Id. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7(3). The conciliation procedure is reviewed infra in this article.
3 2 Id. § 25-1-1 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 Id. In this regard, the commission has promulgated General Regulation No. 4 which
states that: "No person shall post, or permit to be posted in any place of public
accommodation any sign which states or implies the following: 'We reserve the
right to refuse service to anyone.'" LAws, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE COLO-
RADO CIVIL RIGHTS CoMMissioN 36 (1968).
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This law is a classic example of the uselessness of providing
a criminal penalty for a civil rights violation. The author has not
been able to find a single example of this law being enforced by
a prosecutor in the 93 years of its existence. A district attorney just
will not prosecute this kind of case for the very good reason that
the burden of proving his case beyond a reasonable doubt is practically
insurmountable.3 5 The commission appreciates how difficult such
prosecution would be from its own experience in hearing cases and
from trying to determine if the complainant has proven his case
under the easier test of proving a discriminatory act by a prepon-
derence of the evidence.
Since 1957, when the commission was given the authority to
administer this law, few private civil actions have been initiated, as
most of the cases that do arise are filed with the commission. For-
tunately, most respondents do not wish to engage in what could
be a lengthy and costly proceeding and most public accommodations
cases are conciliated amicably. This is really the best solution for
all concerned, for even if the commission is finally forced to hold
a hearing, the most it has the authority to do is issue a cease and
desist order. Therefore, it is suggested that if a respondent refused
to conciliate and the matter was taken to a hearing and the finding
was against the respondent, the commission should have the authority
to assess damages against the respondent for the complainant, espe-
cially since, as the law now reads, the complainant has given up
any form of monetary relief in initially filing his case with the
commission.36
II. FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
Colorado's civil rights law relating to employment is the Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1957. a  A 1965 amendment to this statute
created the Civil Rights Commission as it is presently constituted.
3 8
As with most civil rights employment laws of other states, Colorado's
law was copied from a 1945 New York statute,3 which was the first
to adopt a commission approach to the administration and enforce-
ment of civil rights.4°
The structure of the New York commission and statute has
since been more or less adopted by the other states who have legis-
35 See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 19-20 (1966).
Mr. Sovern touches on the nature of such laws, and comes to a similar conclusion.
36 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-1 (Supp. 1965).
37Id. §§ 80-21-1 et seq. (1963).
38 Id. §§ 80-21-2 el seq. (Supp. 1965).
39 N.Y. Sess. Laws of 1945, ch. 118, §§ 1-3.
40 SOVERN, supra note 35, at 19.
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lated in this area. 41 At the present time only 13 states do not have
fair employment laws.42 Except for two curious exceptions, North
and South Dakota, all of these states are from what might be con-
sidered the Deep South. Of the 37 states having fair employment
laws- together with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico -
33 administer and enforce the laws through commissions, boards,
or departments similar to the Colorado commission. 43 The remaining
states merely have statutory prohibitions against discrimination in
employment, with either no provision for a remedy or with only
the provision that such discrimination be treated as a misdemeanor,44
considered to be of little or no value.
Colorado's law covers all employers in the State of Colorado
and includes state agencies as well as all of Colorado's political
subdivisions.45 It also includes labor unions and employment
agencies.46 The law prohibits discrimination because of a person's







e. matters of compensation47




d. complying with a discriminatory request from an
employer48
(3) Labor unions in;
a. excluding from membership,
b. expulsion from membership,
c. denial of work opportunity.49
In addition, it is unlawful for an employer to place an advertisement
for employees which is discriminatory in its specifications. ° An
41 Id. See also Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527 (1961).
426 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:26-27 (1968).
431d.
441d.
45 COMO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-2(5)(Supp. 1969), 80-21-6(1-2) (1963).
"Id. §§ 80-21-2(3-4) (1963), 80-21-6(1-4) (Supp. 1969).
47
1d. §§ 80-21-6(1-2) (1969).
48Id. §§ 80-21-6(1-3).
-Id. §§ 80-21-6(1, 4).
501d. §§ 80-21-6(1, 5).
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additional paragraph covers persons who aid, abet, incite, compel,
or coerce others into discriminating, or who obstruct or prevent
others from complying with the law." In 1963, the Colorado law
was amended to cover discrimination in apprenticeship, on-the-job
training, or other vocational training or instruction programs. 2
Since 1963, sex discrimination has become an important issue
under federal law. The first major piece of modern civil rights
legislation by the United States Congress was the 1964 Civil Rights
Act;5" and one of the more important provisions in that law was
Title VII,54 the fair employment section, which included a pro-
scription against sex discrimination as well as the usual categories
of race, religion, color, and national origin.
In 1957, the first year of the Colorado commission's operation,
Mr. Marion Green, a Negro, filed a complaint charging Continental
Air Lines with discrimination for failing to hire him as a pilot.5"
In 1957, the issue of whether a Negro could become an airline pilot
was revolutionary in concept and the case was bitterly contested
by Continental. Today, while it probably would be incorrect to say
that discrimination does not exist in the airline industry, the question
of whether a Negro could become a pilot is not out of the ordinary
and is no longer the subject of tiresome racial jokes. Perhaps fair
employment laws are effective, not only in eliminating discrimination
in specific cases, but in changing the patterns and prejudices of our
society.
The commission found that Mr. Green had been discriminated
against and the decision was appealed to the Denver District Court,
the Colorado Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court.56
At every level of state court proceedings, the commission's finding of
discrimination against the airline was held to be outside the scope of
the jurisdiction of the state agency. The state courts held that Colo-
rado had been pre-empted from legislation in the field of interstate
commerce. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and ruled
that Colorado did indeed have jurisdiction in this area and that the
commission could regulate the hiring practices of interstate carriers
within the state. 57 Civil rights in employment was thereby included
as an area of concurrent jurisdiction between the states and the
Federal Government.
51Id. §§ 80-21-6(1, 6).
52 d. §§ 80-21-6(t, 7).
5342 U.S.C. §§ 1975(a-d), 2000(a-h) (1964).
H4d. §§ 20ooe-2000e(15) (1964).
5 See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 149 Colo.
259, 368 P.2d 970 (1962), a/f'd 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
5a Id.
57 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714
(1963).
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Lawyers anguish or delight in fine legal points, but they tend
to forget how the man in the street is affected by the evolution of
the law. It is interesting how many persons, including nonminority
group members, know of the Green decision and that Mr. Green
finally got his job, as he was thereafter hired by Continental pursuant
to the commission's original order. This case, as much as any other,
served to "establish" the commission and put employers on notice
that in Colorado fair employment is more than just a mere statement
of policy.
State legislation, in the area of fair employment, has not been
the subject of much litigation; certainly not to the extent found
in the area of fair housing. Perhaps this is because most respondents
do not wish to engage in a legal challenge of the commission
and/or the complainant's allegations. This may be for several
reasons, not the least of which are the cost, and the fact that adverse
publicity is bad for business. Generally, employers prefer to explore
the conciliation process and settle the case amicably.
As Schroeder and Smith state in their treatise, Defacto Segre-
gation and Civil Rights,58 the only case to come before the United
States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of state fair employment
laws is Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi,5" which held the New York
law valid. The Court ruled that there is "no constitutional basis
for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion
solely on the basis of race, color, or creed by an organization, func-
tioning under the protection of the state which holds itself out to
represent the general business needs of its employees.''60 On the
basis of this case, Schroeder and Smith have suggested that these
fair employment practice laws are a valid exercise of state's police
powers.6
While not dealing specifically with fair employment laws, there
are some cases of interest which relate to discrimination in employ-
ment. These cases are class actions brought by Negroes against
unions, employers, and governmental entities to invoke the injunctive
powers of the courts to prohibit any continuance of a discriminatory
pattern in employment and union membership.
One such decision is the case of Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship
Comm'n12 where a suit was brought by three Negroes against a
labor union, its joint apprenticeship committee, a steel company, a
580. SCHROEDER & D. SMITH, DEFACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 228 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as SCHROEDER).
59326 U.S. 88 (1945).
60Id. at 94.
61 SCHROEDER, supra note 57, at 229-30.
62223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963).
1969
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
construction company, the United States General Services Adminis-
tration, the United States Department of Labor and a local board
of education. The court found that the plaintiffs were not admitted
to the apprenticeship training program, were then refused member-
ship in the union, and therefore not able to obtain a job on a federal
construction project solely on the basis of their race and that there
was no other remedy open to them to obtain relief. Interestingly
enough, the defendants' counsel admitted the plaintiffs had a just
grievance but alleged there was simply no remedy to their complaint.
In response, Judge Campbell invoked the equitable doctrine "ubi Jus
ibi reinedium" - where there is a right there should be a remedy.6"
While not citing any cases dealing directly with the issues before
the court, the judge proceeded under the broad mandates of the
fifth and 14th amendments of the Constitution and related cases,64
and held that the plaintiffs were clearly being deprived of their
constitutional rights.65 Accordingly, the court ordered the various
defendants respectively to train the plaintiffs, admit them to mem-
bership, and employ them.66
Subsequently, the court of appeals stated that it could not
consider the validity of the district court's findings as the case had
by then become moot since the construction for which the plaintiffs
sought employment had been completed and there was no longer
a viable issue before the court. Judgment was therefore vacated
because of mootness and the appeal dismissed.
67
In Ethridge v. Rhodes,6" which, although very similar to Todd,
does not cite the Todd decision, the judge foresaw the problem of
a moot remedy and actually enjoined further construction on a state
building until the plaintiffs were employed. The Negro complainants
were denied a job by the contractor because they were not members
of the union. On every occasion when they attempted to join the
union the officials were conveniently "out" and "unavailable." The
court found a clear pattern of discrimination because of race and
further determined that no real remedy existed elsewhere for the
complainants, in spite of the fact that there was a state fair employ-
ment practice law in Ohio6" very similar to the law in Colorado.
63d. at 19.
64 Id. at 20, wherein the Court quoted from the Continental Air Lines case, supra, then
before the Supreme Court, and adopted the Court's statement that any law which
denied applicants a job would be invalid under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment.
65 Id. at 22.
66 Id. at 23.
67 Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm'n, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
68 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
69 Oiio REV. CODE § 4112.02 as amended (Anderson 1959).
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The court ruled that the state "displayed a shocking lack of concern
over the realities of the whole situation and the inevitable discrimi-
nation that will result from entering into and performing under
the proposed contracts with the proposed contractors. '7, The court
thereupon issued an injunction against the State of Ohio enjoining
it from entering into or performing any contracts for the construction
of the subject building and the employment of any individuals for
such construction until the state, the contractor, and the labor union
could show that the labor force was secured on a nondiscriminatory
basis.
7 1
The court was perhaps on somewhat stronger ground in
Ethridge than in Todd in that in Ethridge a state was, under color
of state law and state authority, contributing to discriminatory con-
duct and was therefore clearly in violation of the equal protection
clause of the 14th amendment.
One of the most significant points about these cases is that
the courts have assumed a responsibility which they believe the other
branches of government have abrogated, or have been unable or
unwilling to assume. These decisions go beyond a mere statement
of a policy of the law and require the state and/or Federal Govern-
ment to engage in affirmative action to correct the abuses inherent
in a discriminatory pattern and insure that the pattern is eliminated.
In addition, of course, the courts also make the point that public
funds cannot constitutionally be used in any manner which follows
or perpetuates a pattern of discrimination and Ethridge implies that
these sums must be withheld until such discrimination ceases.72
Both of these decisions, but particularly the Ethridge decision,
indicate that an alternative remedy may be available in Colorado
in a civil rights matter by alleging a violation of basic constitutional
rights. This alternative remedy appears to be available whether
or not the jurisdiction of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
has been invoked by filing a complaint.
Shortly after the Ethridge decision, Ohio amended its law to
void exclusive hiring agreements between a public works con :ractor
and a union unless the union includes procedures for referring
qualified employees without regard to race, color, religion, national
origin, or ancestry.7" Also, the Ohio Governor issued a new Execu-
tive order prohibiting the waiving of a nondiscrimination clause
in public works contracts and requiring all public works contractors
70Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
71 Id. at 89.
72 Id.
73 OHio REv. CODE §§ 153.581, 153.591 (Anderson 1967).
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to obtain their labor forces from nondiscriminatory sources.74 This
Executive order, however, does not provide for the cancellation
of a state contract where discrimination has occurred, which cancel-
lation provision is the heart of Colorado Governor John A. Love's
Executive Order of April 15, 1968."
Probably more than any other type of civil rights statute, fair
employment practice laws illustrate one of the basic problems with
the form of the civil rights statutes being administered by the states
today. The Green case is an example. It took Green seven years to
obtain the job he should have been entitled to at the outset. If a
commission finds for the complainant and orders affirmative relief,
the commission will have succeeded only in providing a remedy
for a single act of discrimination as it affects one person. Obviously
this is chipping away at the problem and does little to remedy the
basic prejudice which was manifested in the act of discrimination.
Also, in approaching the problem on a case-by-case basis, the law
is subject to abuses by both the complainant and the respondent.-6
It allows for the filing of questionable charges by a complainant
and provides a procedure for a respondent to protract the awarding
of relief to a complainant who cannot afford to wait.17
It is clear that the experiences of a decade or more have shown
that the case-by-case approach utilized by the commission structure
is not serving the purpose for which it was created. It is at the most
a deterrent from continuing with a previous pattern of behavior.
Something else is needed to not only require a halt to discriminatory
actions but, beyond that, to change or alter the direction or pattern
of the wrongful conduct. Perhaps the present type of enforcement
should be retained as a last resort to force a discontinuance of
unlawful actions, but only as a final step after some form of affirm-
ative action encouraging voluntary action to benefit many individuals
has first been attempted and has failed. It is this alternate method
or type of approach which should be explored in detail as an adjunct
74 Executive Order, Gov. James A. Rhodes, June 5, 1967, at 6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES 451:951 (1967).
75 Executive orders are of dubious value, but if you do have one it is best to have a
good one. It is submitted that without some enforcement provisions (such as cancel-
lation of a state contract upon a violation) executive orders are mere proclamations
or statements of policy and have a nice sound but beyond that are of little meaning
or importance.
78 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DOOSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES, at 1957-65 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
77 One of the major criticisms which was leveled at the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion in a recent survey was the delay involved in the handling of a case (a delay
which is in many respects unavoidable because of the requirements of the statute
and the delay inherent in the commission-type approach to civil rights laws). Com-
ment, Investigation Procedures of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 40 U. OF
COLO. L REV. 115 (1967).
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to the system now employed- or possibly even to replace the
present system.
III. FAIR HOUSING LAWS
Fair housing laws are relatively new as far as civil rights
statutes are concerned - particularly in the area of private housing.
The first contemporary fair housing statutes were limited to public
housing and it was not until the late 1950's that legislation appeared
affecting private housing and limiting a home owner in discrimi-
nating in the sale of his own property.
7 8
Colorado, in 1959, was one of the first states to adopt a fair
housing law which had jurisdiction over the sale of private prop-
erty.79 It was one of the most comprehensive laws in the country
and, with several major amendments in 1965,"0 it is now considered
to be the strongest such law administered by any state. One of the
first cases filed with the commission under the Colorado act, Colo-
rado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case,81 established the con-
stitutionality of the law and also pointed the way for subsequent
amendments in 1965. In a 6 to 1 opinion, Justice 0. Otto Moore
of the Colorado Supreme Court wrote that the Colorado Legislature
had accepted the challenge of the "forgotten Ninth Amendment" '
and that:
When, as at present, the entire world is engulfed in a struggle to
determine whether the American concept of freedom with equality
of opportunity shall survive; when tyrannical dictators arrayed
against this nation in the struggle proclaim throughout the world,
with some justification, that we do not practice what we preach,
and that "equality of opportunity" is a sham and a pretense, a
hollow shell without substance in this nation; we would be blind to
stark realities if we should hold that the public safety and the
welfare of this nation were not being protected by the Act in
question. Indeed, whether the struggle is won or lost might well
depend upon the ability of our people to attain the objectives which
the Act in question is designed to serve. 83
However, the court in the Case decision found that a portion
of the law was unconstitutional. That section which allowed the
commission to enter an order requiring a respondent to take "such
other action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate
the purposes of this article ' 8 4 was an unlawful delegation of
78 2 EMERSON, supra note 76, at 2050.
79 Colorado Fair Housing Act of 1959, Colo. Sess. Laws of 1959, at 489.
80 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-2 et seq. (Supp. 1965).
81 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962).
8Id. at 247-48, 380 P.2d at 41.
8 Id. at 248, 380 P.2d at 42.
84 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1960).
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authority and improperly gave the commission "carte blanche"
authority to do as it saw fit.85
Various attempts were then made to define the commission's
authority and in 1965 the law was substantially amended giving the
commission authority to invoke the injunctive powers of the district
court." The law as presently written prohibits discrimination against
persons because of their race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or
ancestry in the:
(1) a. refusal to show, rent, sell, lease, or transfer housing,
or to transmit a bona fide offer to buy, sell, rent or
lease housing,
b. denial of the terms, conditions, or privileges relating
to housing,
c. refusal to furnish any facilities or services in connec-
tion with such housing,
d. making of any written or oral inquiry or record
which is discriminatory of a person seeking to pur-
chase, rent, or lease housing.87
(2) a. making of any written or oral inquiry which is dis-
criminatory of an applicant for financial assistance
for the purchase, construction, or repair of housing,
b. discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges
relating to the obtaining of financial assistance for
housing.88
(3) a. utilizing or respecting of any discriminatory retric-
tive covenants.89
(4) a. discrimination in the advertising of housing for sale,
transfer, rental, or lease.9 °
(5) a. aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing
another to commit any unlawful housing or dis-
criminatory practice,
b. obstruction of any person from compliance with the
Act or attempting to commit directly or indirectly,
a discriminatory practice.9'
8 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 250, 380 P.2d 34, 43
(1962).
86 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965).
871d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,b) (Supp. 1965).
88 1d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,c) (1963).
89 1d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,d) (Supp. 1965).
90Id. § 69-7-5(1)(a,e) (Supp. 1965).
9 1 1d. § 69-7-5(1)(a,f) (1963).
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(6) a. discrimination against any employee or agent for
obedience to the Act in matters of compensation,
discharge, or demotion. 2
All property publicly advertised for sale, lease, or rent is
covered by the act with the only exception being the "Mrs. Murphy's
boarding house" situation where a single family home is occupied
by an owner or lessee as a household and rooms are offered for
lease or rental. 3 No logical reason exists for this exception and
anyone interpreting it should take as restrictive a view as possible.
The commission will adopt such restrictive position in handling
a case involving this factor and presumably a court will also, since
no public policy or benefit is served by such a limitation; and as
the police power of the state has been invoked by the passage of
such legislation, the provision should be strictly construed as being
contrary to the general purpose and policy of the statute which
was enacted to prohibit discrimination. Regardless of whatever
motives may have prompted the legislature to create such an
exception, it should be removed from the statute because such
anomolies cannot stand the test of an independent evaluation and
serve only to detract from the law as a whole while performing
no purpose whatsoever when read in the context of the entire
statute.
The law makes no distinction between private homes offered
for sale or rent by the owner himself or through a realtor; it
means any real property, including vacant land and commercial
space.94 However, other limitations are an exclusion of nonprofit,
fraternal, educational or social organizations or clubs,95 and an
allowance for religious or denominational institutions to give pref-
erence in housing to persons of the same religion or denomination.9
In addition, there is a permissive clause for leasing premises to
members of only one sex.1
7
As will be subsequently discussed, the statute sets forth a
procedure to be followed in the processing of a complaint before
the commission.9 8 This is inherently a time consuming process and
allows for a respondent to dispose of the property or otherwise
make it unavailable to the complainant by the time of a hearing.
92 1d. § 69-7-5 (1)(a,g) (Supp. 1965).
93
1d. § 69-7-3(1)(d) (1963).
94 rd. § 69-7-5(1)(a,b) (Supp. 1965).
95 Id. § 69-7-3(1)(c) (Supp. 1965).
-ld. § 69-7-5(2) (1963).
97 Id. § 69-7-5(3) (1963).
98 1d. § 69-7-6 (1963).
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One of the decided advantages of the Colorado law is that portion
of the 1965 amendment which gives the commission the authority
to seek an injunction from the district court holding the house in
status quo until the complaint can be heard by the commission."'
The injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is used by the
commission only when it finds some evidence that the respondent
is attempting to make the housing in question unavailable by trans-
ferring ownership or possession to a third party. Generally speaking,
this becomes immediately evident to the commission's investigator
and if an injunction is thought necessary by the commission coordi-
nator he requests the assistant attorney general to commence injunc-
tive proceedings within one or two days after a complaint has been
filed and investigation initiated.
Because of the procedural requirements of the act, the com-
mission must meet several prerequisites before an injunction can be
obtained. There must be a preliminary investigation, a finding of
probable cause, and a failure to settle the complaint by conference,
conciliation or persuasion. 100 Also, the commission generally serves
the respondent with a "Notice to Answer" either prior to the in-
junction proceedings or at the time of the service of the notice of
the setting for the preliminary injunction.
Since only the Civil Rights Commission can find whether a
discriminatory act has occurred, 10 it is not the function of the court
at the injunction hearing to try the issues raised in the complaint
alleging discrimination. The only question for the district court to
consider on the commission's motion for a preliminary injunction is
whether there are sufficient grounds for the granting of the in-
junction, e.g., irreparable harm, injury or loss, and no other adequate
remedy at law. Since real property is by definition sui generis under
the common law, it is only necessary to show to the court that the
respondent is attempting to dispose of the property to another person
in order to show irreparable harm, injury, or loss to the complainant
because that particular parcel of property would then be unavailable
to the complainant. This is a special, statutory remedy authorizing the
commission to take action, on behalf of another, to obtain injunctive
relief agaist a third party.
The complainant must, of course, put up a bond as security
for damages to the respondent if he is not successful in eventually
showing at a hearing before the commission that a violation of the
99Id. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965).
100Id. § 69-7-6(6)(a) (Supp. 1965).
l1Id. § 69-7-6(6)(a,b) (Supp. 1965).
102Id. § 69-7-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1965).
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act has occurred.' 0 2 The act provides for an initial preliminary in-
junction for 60 days with an extension for another 60 days if
necessary. 
10 3
Since the power of injunction was added to the act, approx-
imately 230 housing cases have been filed with the commission.
10 4
It has only been necessary to file for and obtain an injunction in eight
of these cases.' 0 5 The mere fact of the existence of the injunctive
powers of the commission is usually the only deterrent needed to
prevent a respondent from attempting to dispose of the property.
Should a respondent manage to dispose of the property to a
bona fide third party (i.e., no injunction has been obtained), and
a hearing has been held before the commission and a violation of
the act found, but the respondent has failed to comply with the
orders of the commission, a complainant may file a civil action
against the respondent. The complainant can then recover his actual
damages, interest, and costs from the respondent, and the court may
further order similar housing made available to the complainant
if the circumstances warrant.' This provision is of little value
as a deterrent as it does not provide for exemplary damages. Also,
if similar housing were not available from the respondent at the
time of the commission hearing, the only order the commission
could issue under the Case decision would be a cease and desist order
against the respondent and the complainant would then have to prove
a violation of that order before he could initiate a civil action in court.
Violation of the commission's cease and desist order would be
for all practical purposes, impossible to prove, as the plaintiff would
have to show subsequent acts of discrimination related to the initial
charges filed with the commission. 0 7
Following a hearing, if the commission finds that an act of
discrimination has occurred, it can enter an order requiring the
respondent to sell, transfer, rent, or lease the housing to the com-
plainant; to cease and desist from further acts of discrimination;
or to grant financial assistance or to rehire and compensate an
employee who has been discharged because of compliance with
the act. l ' The specific remedy to be applied will depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case.
In addition to Colorado, fair housing laws have been found to
1°3Id. § 69-7-6(6)(e) '(Supp. 1965).
104 COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, A TIME FOR CHANGE AND CHALLENGE -
CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO 1966-1968.
1051d.
106 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-8 (Supp. 1965).
107Id.
108Id. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1965).
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be constitutional in five other states: California, 09 Connecticut,"'
Massachusetts,"' New Jersey,"' and New York." 3 Of these, all
but the California decision related to fair housing laws covering
private housing. California's case is applicable only to publicly-
assisted housing. A Washington case holding the opposite is O'Meara
v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination," 4 which held
that the law unconstitutionally classified housing by banning dis-
crimination in publicly-assisted housing while not including private
housing. The O'Meara decision was specifically considered and re-
jected in California'" and a previous New Jersey case."'
To date, 23 states have adopted fair housing statutes in various
forms." 7 In addition, Congress has recently passed a federal fair
housing statute." 8 The federal law, although not as broad as the
Colorado statute, does cover all housing except private homes sold
through a realtor." 9 One of its weaknesses is lack of adequate
enforcement powers. The only real affirmative remedy provides
that an aggrieved person may file a civil suit to make the housing
available, and/or for damages ;120 but there is no specific provision
prohibiting the defendant from making the housing unavailable
while the case is being prosecuted, and the administrative procedures
required before a civil suit can be entertained will inevitably take
a considerable period of time. If he can, the plaintiff will have to
seek an early injunction in the district court if he is serious about
having the property in question or it will surely become unavailable
by the time he can obtain a court order requiring that it be made
available to him and he will then only be entitled to damages. As
far as Colorado is concerned, however, the federal law will have
09Burkes v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1962 ).
"1 Swanson v. Commission on Civil Rights, No. 94802 (Sup. Ct. New Haven Co.,
Conn. July 11, 1961).
1i Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 182
N.E.2d 595 (1962).
"1
2 David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965).
113 Cooney v. Katsen, 41 Misc. 2d 236, 245 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
14 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
1
5 Burkes v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 470, 316 P.2d 313, 320, 20 Cal. Rptr.
609, 616 (1962).
116 Jones v. Haridor Realty Co., 37 N.J. 384, 394, 181 A.2d 481, 486 (1962).
117 See EMERSON, supra note 76, at 2058. Note that this source only refers to 19 states.
Subsequently, the following states have adopted housing statutes: Hawaii, Session
Laws of Hawaii, 1967, Act 193, at 194; Iowa, IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 105 A.2, 105
A.9 (Supp. 1969); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 21 et seq. (1968);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1452 (Supp. 1968). EMERSON also includes a
rather comprehensive list of other authorities on the general subject of fair housing.
118 Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. 1969).
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little, if any, effect since the Secretary of Housing and Urban De-
velopment will defer to the state because Colorado has a law which
is "substantially equivalent" to the federal act.12'
Considering their relatively recent appearance on the scene,
fair housing laws seem to have generated more litigation than any
other type of civil rights statute. The adoption of this type of statute
is frequently bitterly opposed and such opposition is generally spear-
headed by representatives of the real estate profession. In Colorado
this was quite evident in 1959 when the state's fair housing act was
before the general assembly. However, experience with fair housing
has demonstrated to the real estate profession the desirable effects
of a statewide prohibition against discrimination. The imagined fears
of integrated housing have not materialized (e.g., reduction in prop-
erty values in areas where integrated housing occurs and a vitiation
of real property rights). There has been a general reversal of at-
titude by the building and real estate industry in Colorado to the
point where in 1965, when the fair housing act was again before
the general assembly for amendment, the Colorado real estate and
building industry generally supported the concept of fair housing.
This was evidenced by the adoption by CAREB (Colorado Associ-
ation of Real Estate Boards) on October 10, 1964, of a resolution
endorsing fair housing, and rejecting any discriminatory practices
by its members. 12 2 This is not to say that discrimination does not
exist in the profession, but it does demonstrate that responsible
members of that group have seen the validity and benefit of such
a law.
Other states, such as California, have experienced a different
response. In that state, Proposition 14 was adopted by popular initia-
tive to amend the state constitution.' 23 This amendment prohibited
the state legislature from interfering with a property owner's ab-
solute discretion to sell, rent, or lease his property as he saw fit.
The amendment to the state constitution was a direct assault against
the Rumford Act, 124 California's fair housing statute. Following
the passing of Proposition 14, the amendment was challenged. Both
the California Supreme Court2'2 and the United States Supreme
Court 1 26 held that such a provision in a state constitution was a
violation of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution
1ild. § 3610(c-d).
122 Resolution on file in office of Colorado Association of Real Estate Boards, Denver,
Colorado.
"'CAL. CONST. art 1, § 26 (1964).
124 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 35700-35744 (1962).
125 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
126 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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in that it was an attempt, by state action, to deny a segment of the
citizens of the State of California equal protection of the state's
laws. In effect, it was a constitutionally guaranteed license to dis-
criminate.
Civil rights and a charge of discrimination generally cause a
visceral reaction in people who are brought into contact with the
issue through a civil rights complaint. In such cases, the response is
almost totally emotional. In the experience of the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, this kind of reaction occurs to a far greater
extent in housing cases filed with the commission than in any other
type of case. It would seem that while some persons may not have
a strong objection to working or eating next to a Negro, for example,
the thought of actually living next to one as a neighbor is unac-
ceptable."' This attitude is, of course, contrary to our philosophy
of basic equality. Our system, as evidenced by the laws under which
we live, means equal opportunities, advantages, and privileges for
all and that the only limitations that a person should face are those
of himself as an individual.
This precept is reflected in a case recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Com-
pany," 8 suit was brought against the defendant home builder be-
cause of its refusal to sell a subdivision home to them because they
are Negroes. The defendant was a private builder operating without
the benefit of any state or federal funds. The suit claimed that this
discrimination was unconstitutional and asked for special and
exemplary damages and/or a mandatory injunction. The federal
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim for which
relief could be granted.1' 9 The court of appeals upheld the district
court's action but at the same time noted constitutional justification
for holding that the action of respondents constituted prohibited
racial discrimination but felt itself bound by past Supreme Court
decisions.'30 While a portion of the plaintiffs' case rested upon exist-
ing federal statutes, the plaintiffs also raised fundamental constitu-
tional questions regarding the action of the defendant in refusing to
sell to them because of their race. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1866,131 under which the case was filed
and which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
real property was valid and constitutional under the provisions of the
13th amendment. Every citizen may buy or rent real property under
127 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1942).
128 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
129 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
130 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
13142 U.S.C. § 1982 (1866).
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the law without limitation by the offeror because of the race of that
citizen.
The decision does not conflict with the pertinent provisions of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act,' as this new law, if anything, supple-
ments the earlier statute by more carefully defining the manner in
which Congress wishes to implement the 13th amendment.
Therefore, by federal statute, and by the Jones decision, fair
housing has become the law of the land, but, as previously stated,
it establishes a standard already set in Colorado. However, setting
a standard does not solve the problem, it only serves to identify the
problem and announce that one actually exists. The real work of
its elimination is then only just beginning.
IV. PROCEDURE.
The final portion of this article is an explanation of how the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission administers the law and the
procedures established for the handling of a case.
Under the three statutes previously discussed, any person who
feels that he has been discriminated against may file a complaint.
83
The commission does not have discretion to refuse to accept a
complaint unless jurisdiction is clearly absent (e.g,, a complaint
against the Federal Government or in an area outside of employment,
housing or public accommodations). In addition to an aggrieved
person, a complaint may also be filed by a commissioner, the com-
mission, or the attorney general.3 The various statutes require
that a complaint must be filed within a specified period of time fol-
lowing the date the alleged act of discrimination occurred or the
statutory right will lapse. These time limitations are as follows:
(1) Employment ....................... 6 months.
13 5
(2) Housing ............................ 90 days. 1'
(3) Public Accommodations ............... 60 days. 13 7
Immediately upon filing, the case is assigned to a commission
civil rights specialist who conducts an investigation of the charges
of discrimination. Under commission rules of practice and procedure,
the respondent must receive a copy of the complaint within 20 days
of filing with the commission. Service may either be accomplished
13
2 P.L. 90.284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
1




COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 2F(3), at
6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
1 35 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-7(15) (1963).
136 d. § 69-7-6(15).
137 1d. § 69-7-6.
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by the investigator personally or by certified mail.1' Amendments
may be, and frequently are, made to the complaint upon information
gathered during the investigation.'89
It must be emphasized that at this stage of the proceedings, the
commission staff is only attempting to determine the position of
the respondent with respect to the charges of discrimination made
by the complainant. In effect, the staff is only interested in getting
the other side of the story, which the staff is required to do by
law once a complaint has been filed. 4 ' If any difficulties are en-
countered by the staff in conducting their investigation, they will
utilize subpoenas duces tecum and depositions to obtain the infor-
mation thought to be necessary to properly investigate the case.
These procedures are available throughout the handling of the
case including, of course, the preparation of the case for a hearing.
Once the preliminary investigation is completed, the report of
the investigator is prepared and submitted to the coordinator (di-
rector) of the commission for an evaluation. The coordinator will
determine whether or not in his opinion "probable cause" exists
to credit the allegations of discrimination made in the complaint.'
If he finds no probable cause, the case is summarily dismissed and
the proceedings are terminated. If probable cause is found, the com-
mission will continue with the case and attempt to resolve the issues
amicably by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.' 42
The concept of probable cause has proved difficult for some
persons to understand. Since the commission must accept all cases
that are filed except those which can be summarily rejected for lack
of jurisdiction, some procedure must be established to weed out
cases which are clearly spurious or which do not contain the needed
element of discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, national
origin, or ancestry. Examples would be where the inevstigation
reveals that the actions of the respondent were entirely justified or
obviously were not motivated by discriminatory reasons, (i.e., em-
ployment cases where the complainant was denied a job for clearly
being unqualified for the position, or in housing cases where an
applicant did not meet the requirements of the landlord, e.g., having
children where children were not allowed). Various attempts have
1
3 8
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 2F(3),
at 6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
139 Id. Rule 2G.
1
4 0
CoLo. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 3(A), at
6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:186(a) (1967).
141 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7(3) (1963); Id. § 69-7-6(3) (Supp.
1965).
1
'4COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 80-21-7(3) (1963); Id. § 69-7-6(3) (Supp.
1965).
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been made to define probable cause, including an attempt by the
Colorado legislature in the Fair Housing Act. 4 '
The only case found which specifically defines probable cause
as the same as set forth in a civil rights statute is Barnes v.
Goldberg,'44 where a New York Supreme Court quoting an earlier
decision stated: "Probable cause exists when there is reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
the law is being violated .... 145 This was a housing situation, but
the application would apply in any civil rights case requiring an
administrative finding of probable cause. The authority quoted in
the Barnes case was another New York decision which dealt with
an entirely different matter- the probable cause which must be
found by a magistrate for the issuance of a search warrant.146 It is
submitted that this test is far too restrictive and will encourage the
finder of probable cause to be too critical of his evidence and cause
him to require that the quantum of evidence to make such a finding
be too high.
The problems encountered in proving a case of discrimination
are difficult enough, and it is too much to expect that every case
in which probable cause is found will proceed to a public hearing.
The official who makes this finding of probable cause cannot use
as his criteria whether the case would stand up to the level of proof
required at a hearing. If he did, very few cases would be accepted
and he cannot be that demanding for the additional reason that before
a case proceeds to a hearing generally further investigation is con-
ducted. Therefore, he is really in no position to judge the case on
its hearing merits at that point.
Generally speaking, any evidence which indicates a discrim-
inatory motive for the respondent's conduct should be enough to
1
43 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-3 (1)(k) (Supp. 1965):
Probable cause shall exist if upon all the facts and circumstances a per-
son of reasonable prudence and caution would be warranted in a belief that
the transction would have proceeded to completion except that an unfair
housing practice of refusal to sell, transfer, rent, or lease had been com-
mitted. As to all other unfair housing practices, probable cause shall exist
if upon all the facts and circumstances a person of reasonable prudence and
caution would be warranted in a belief that an unfair housing practice
has been committed.
This definition reflects the trepidation of the Legislature in its attempt to
explain probably cause. Since the first sentence defines probable cause as it relates
to a refusal to "sell, transfer, rent, or lease," it covers most of the acts set forth
elsewhere as unfair housing practices. The only unlawful practice not covered is a
refusal to show, so, presumably, this is the unlawful act covered by the second
sentence as it is the only act left, although the second definition is supposed to refer
to all other unfair housing practices.
144 54 Misc. 2d 676, 283 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
145
Id. at 352.
148 People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 191 N.E.2d 798, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1963).
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satisfy the official that probable cause exists. What is evidence is
another question. A pattern may appear in the investigation not
related to the case at all, such as an insignificant or negligible per-
centage of minority people employed at a plant and those few who
are employed occupying positions of menial work or as laborers.
In such a case, if there is a complete absence of evidence pointing to
discrimination against the particular complainant and an acceptable
reason for the action of the respondent, it is hard to see how the
official can justify a finding of probable cause on such evidence
alone. In another circumstance, such a pattern of employment may
give considerable weight to an otherwise relatively weak case. Evi-
dence as used in this context therefore, means evidence directly
related to the case in point before the official. There are some good
reasons for suggesting that even a scintilla of evidence should be
sufficient for a finding of probable cause. One of the most frequent
criticisms leveled against civil rights commissions is that they dismiss
far too many cases for a failure to find probable cause.147 Pro-
ceeding with the case wherever possible gives the commission the
opportunity to obtain some affirmative relief for the complainant
by conciliation. If the finding is unsubstantiated, the respondent can
challenge it at the point of conciliation without having to defend
himself at a hearing. A case can always be dismissed at a later date
if the commission staff finds the case is deficient for a hearing.
Furthermore, since one of the Colorado commission's statutory
functions is the elimination of discrimination by education, 148 the
commission performs an important educational function at con-
ciliation conferences.
The process of conciliation is misunderstood by some. It is not
an adversary proceeding, although it frequently takes that form.
It is an attempt to resolve the issue by the process of bargaining or
negotiating for a settlement. On the basis of long experience, the
commission staff has a policy of not having both the complainant
and respondent together at the same conference except in the most
unusual of circumstances. In its best form, a conciliation conference
is a quiet, deliberate study of the case, and an attempt to work
out a resolution of the issues which is acceptable to all of the
parties. At its worst, a conciliation may degenerate into personal
attacks on each other by the participants, and accusations, challenges,
and thinly veiled threats of political or legal action against the
commission, its staff, or the complainant.
The usual procedure is for the commission staff to present the
147 See SOVERN, supra note 35, at 46-47; EMERSON, supra note 76, at 11.
148 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-3, 69-7-4 (1)(f), 80-21-5(5) '(1963).
VOL. 46
CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO
evidence gathered in the investigation to the respondent, together
with a suggested solution of the case, and then ask for a response.
The respondent then points out what his position is and either
accepts the proposal, makes a counter proposal, or rejects any pos-
sibility of conciliation. In a successful conciliation there is usually
a withdrawal by both parties from their original position to a
mutually acceptable middle ground. In employment cases, for
example, the commission staff may not pursue the issue of back
pay but may discuss some form of reinstatement or hiring. A great
deal of the flexibility of the commission's position depends upon
the strength of the case. If the evidence of discrimination is rather
clear cut, the staff will usually take the position of obtaining for
the complainant everything he could realize if the case were taken
to a hearing and there was a ruling in favor of the complainant.
Approximately 45 percent of the cases filed with the com-
mission are dismissed because of a failure to find probable cause,
or because the case is dropped by the complainant before a finding
is made. Approximately 96 percent of the remaining cases are dis-
posed of by conciliation or conference affording some form of
affirmative relief to the complainant. Very few cases, therefore,
actually proceed all the way to a public hearing.14 0
The commission attempts to resolve as many cases as possible
by the process of conciliation or conference. If unsuccessful, how-
ever, the case can then proceed to a public hearing.'60 At the time of
the hearing, great care is taken to insure that none of the hearing
commissioners or the examiner have any prior knowledge of the
case. If there has been any prior contact or knowledge by an indi-
vidual commissioner with a particular case, that commissioner will
usually disqualify himself from sitting at a hearing. Such contact
or information may occur where a complainant wishes to appeal a
dismissal by the coordinator of his case because of a finding of no
probable cause. Such appeals are always allowed to be presented
to the commissioners; however, when one is brought before them,
they appoint a single commissioner to hear and consider the com-
plainant's argument, separate and apart from the other commis-
sioners. This appointed commissioner will then report his suggested
course of action to the other commissioners, and his suggestion is
generally followed. That commissioner then disqualifies himself
from sitting should the case eventually end in a hearing.
149 These figures were taken from a report prepared by the commission of its opera-
tions since it began functioning in its present form in 1957. This report was in-
cluded, in part, in a study conducted of the Commission and printed in Comment,
Investigation Procedures of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 40 U. OF COLO.
L. REv. 119-21 (1967).




Prior to a hearing, the commission must issue a notice to answer
requiring that the respondent file a verified answer within 10 days
of the service of the notice, or not less than five days prior to the
hearing.151 Thereafter, the commission serves the respondent with
a notice of hearing, advising him that the case has been set for
formal hearing. This notice must be served at least 15 days in
advance of the hearing. 5 ' At the public hearing, the case for the
complainant is presented by the assistant attorney general assigned
to the commission as legal counsel. The statute provides that the
commission "shall not be bound by strict rules of evidence pre-
vailing in courts of law or equity, but the right of cross-exami-
nation shall be preserved."' 53 In its rules, the commission has gone
one step further and provided that "such rules and requirements of
proof shall conform to the extent practical, with those in civil
noninjury cases in the district courts."' 54 The hearing is conducted
by either a hearing examiner appointed for that purpose or by a
commissioner or a number of commissioners. 1 There has generally
been at least one commissioner who is an attorney to act as a hearing
officer and rule on motions, the admissibility of evidence, etc. Only
commissioners or a specifically appointed hearing examiner hear
cases and the investigative staff and the coordinator do not participate
at the hearings except to give evidence through testimony as a
witness.156 Before the commencement of the hearing, either party
may move for the exclusion of witnesses.' 57
All pertinent matters relevant to the hearing are considered
in advance. No provision is made either in the rules or in the
statutes for motion practice prior to the actual hearing. The only
way a party could have a motion heard, either on substantive or
procedural grounds, would be to ask for a special hearing before
the commissioners or to take such matters up at the time the hearing
itself is convened. Except for their regular monthly meetings which
include a rather lengthy agenda, the only time commissioners meet
151 CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 69-7-6(6), 80-21-7(6) (1963). In addition,
69-7-6(8) states that the respondent shall file his answer within five days of the
hearing. Possible conflicting provisions have been resolved by commission rules
(CoLo. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 6A(3)
(1965) which state that if a respondent has answered once, his answer will be
deemed by the commission to be the respondent's answer for all purposes).
1
5 2 
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6A(3), at 6
BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
'
53 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-6(11), 80-21-7(11) (1963).
1 5 4 
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 7D(2), at
6 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80.21-7(6) (1963); Id. § 69-7-6(6)(a) (Supp. 1965).
15 6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-4, 69-7-6(7), 80-21-7(7) (1963).
1'
5 7
COLO. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rule 7L, at 6
BNA FMIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 451:185 (1965).
VOL. 46
CIVIL RIGHTS IN COLORADO
is for a hearing. Therefore, motions are generally argued at the
time of the hearing.
The hearing itself, of course, is very much an adversary pro-
ceeding. The proceedings are conducted in the same manner as a
trial before a court without a jury. The complainant's case is pre-
sented first, generally by the assistant attorney general assigned
to the commission, followed by the presentation of the case for
the respondent. Opening and closing statements, motions, objec-
tions, and the introduction of exhibits are the same as in a trial
court. The examination of witnesses is also the same; direct and
cross, followed by redirect, etc., if desired. The admissibility of
evidence both as testimony and as exhibits is somewhat more
relaxed than in a trial court, particularly since the evidence is
frequently subjective in nature. However, the degree of such relax-
ation or deviation from normal trial practice is not very great. The
commissioners or hearing examiner generally do not admit hearsay
evidence. Opinion testimony is limited and, when allowed, is only
considered and weighed on the basis of who is giving such testi-
mony and the circumstances associated with such statements and,
although admitted, may be given little or no probative value.
As with any administrative hearing, the proceedings are
recorded by a reporter and a transcript can be prepared if the case
is appealed. Either party may appeal the final decision of the
commission but must do so within 30 days of the date of the final
order.15 Orders of the commission are enforceable through the
Colorado district courts. If a respondent has not appealed, but has
refused to comply with a commission order, the decision will be
certified to the district court and an order of the court issued
requiring compliance with the commission's order.' 59
As with any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, objections
not raised at the hearing cannot be raised to the court on appeal
unless the failure to object can be attributed to extraordinary
circumstances.16 ° Under the statutes, only the Civil Rights Com-
mission can make the determination of whether an unlawful act
of discrimination has occurred and the findings of the commission
are binding on the court so long as they are supported by adequate
evidence.16" ' Based upon the evidence presented at the commission
hearing and set forth in the transcript, however, the court can
enter an order on appeal enforcing, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the commission.
162
1
58 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7, 80-21-8 (1963).
19 Id. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7(12), 80-21-8(12).
60 d. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7(4), 80-21-8(12).
161 Id. §§ 25-3-5, 69-7-7(6), 80-21-8(6).




Having had the benefit of 12 years of operation, we can now
look back on the manner in which the commission has been
carrying out its duties and assess its performance. It was charged
with the responsibility or objective of achieving a more favorable
climate for human relations and to come as close as possible to
eliminating discrimination in Colorado. No one could realistically
believe that, by itself, the commission will ever realize this goal.
It is in reality, a very limited attempt to realize some success in
a specifically defined area.
Nevertheless, the commission is effective in performing its
statutory duties - it has been doing its job. The question then
arises as to whether these duties should be changed, enlarged, or
expanded; and if so, how much and in what manner? Admittedly
there is work to be done, but can the commission, no matter how
it is structured or no matter what powers and authority it is given,
completely eliminate discrimination? Clearly, the answer is no.
For Colorado, something else is certainly needed. Additionally,
the problems and the types of discrimination for which the com-
mission was created in 1957 are not the same today.
This does not mean, however, that the commission should
be abandoned. Since the state has gone on record as having a
definite position on civil rights, there must be some manifestation
of that policy. The government as an entity must give some formal
recognition to its declaration, and there should exist some means
of enforcement of this policy when necessary. The present method
to enforce compliance with the statutes' objectives is through the
police powers of the state, and work should be undertaken to
improve its enabling laws to allow the commission to perform
that function more easily and more efficiently.
This still leaves unanswered the much larger question of
what else should be done. The work of the commission is after
the fact, and therefore only treats the symptoms of the disease;
it does nothing to effect a cure of the malady itself. A new
approach which deals with the situation on a different basis than
a piecemeal or case-by-case basis is necessary. The current concept
is one of reaction rather than action. The state waits for others
to initiate the process or start up the machinery and then it only
solves, or partially solves, that particular incident, having done
nothing about the reasons or causes which gave rise to the incident
initially. The concept of affirmative action, i.e., action which is
initiated by the state or Federal Government, without waiting to
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be asked to react, or being forced to, is now the byword of civil
rights and human rights dialogue.
Recognizing this, the commission has recently created a study
group of educators and lawyers to examine Colorado's civil rights
statutes and: (1) determine what should be done to the laws
under which the commission operates to allow it to more effectively
accomplish its basic purpose of administration and enforcement,
and (2) make some attempt to articulate what new approaches
can be undertaken by the State to implement an affirmative action
civil rights program. No one program will be a panacea and no
single idea will be a complete remedy, but the commission hopes
to draft a new focus or approach to the work it is doing, and
to be able to suggest a program to the state which will impart a
new direction to the manner in which civil rights or human rights
are handled in Colorado.
Periodic examination of state civil rights laws will inevitably
result in a patchwork of statutes with overlapping provisions and
troublesome omissions. The effect is also that of losing sight of
the basic purpose of such laws and whether such purpose is being
realized. Hopefully, by taking an objective look at what can be
done and what is not being done, some significant steps can be
made to achieve the ultimate goal of putting the Civil Rights
Commission out of business.
The commission study group did produce an omnibus civil
or human rights statute... which brings the present structure and
163 The proposed bill's declaration of purpose reads as follows:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the state and all persons
within it have the responsibility to act affirmatively to assure that every
individual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full
and productive life. Failure to provide such equal opportunity, whether
because of discrimination, prejudice, intolerance, indifference or inadequate
education, training, housing or health care threatens the rights, privileges
and personal dignity of all individuals and menaces the institutions and
foundations necessary for a productive, open and democratic society.
To implement this finding and declaration, in fulfillment of the
provisions of the constitution of this state concerning civil rights and in
exercise of the police power of the state to preserve and further public
welfare, health and peace, a commission shall be created in the executive
department. This commission shall have general jurisdiction and power to
develop, coordinate and execute programs designed to ensure that every
individual shall have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the eco-
nomic, cultural and intellectual life of the state, and it shall encourage and
promote the development and execution by all persons within the state of
such programs, including programs to reduce community-wide or state-wide
imbalances in employment, education or housing opportunities with respect
to certain racial, religious and ethnic groups. The commission shall elim-
inate and prevent discriminatory practices as herein provided, including
discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin in employ-
ment, public accommodations, educational institutions, public services and
real estate transactions; discrimination because of sex in employment, public
accommodations, public services and real estate transactions; and discrim-
ination because of age in employment.
Proposed bill on file at the office of The Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, Denver, Colo.
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approach of the commission up-to-date and does give it some of
the tools needed to cope with the problems of discrimination today.
This bill, or a portion of it, will be introduced for consideration
in forthcoming sessions of the Colorado General Assembly.
This omnibus bill does not attempt, nor was it so drafted,
to solve the larger problem of attacking discrimination on a broader
front. Hopefully, through the cooperation of other agencies (i.e.,
the law schools, the bar associations, or in conjunction with private
or governmental agencies), a plan or proposal can be worked out
to implement such an alternative plan of action. Without such an
approach it is difficult to see how any progress can be made. The
present laws only serve to prevent a worsening of the present
condition, and do nothing to improve or correct the situation
facing us today.
REPRESENTATION, SUIT, AND TRIAL IN
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS'
By H. LAURENCE Ross*
Drawing upon empirical data, interviews, and observations of
the automobile injury claims settlement process, Dr. Ross explores
the effects of representation, suit, and trial on the recovery of dam-
ages from an insurance company. These effects are explained largely
in terms of an analysis of the negotiation process which disposes
of the vast majority of claims which arise. He also delineates what
kinds of cases are most likely to be represented and most likely to
go to trial, and suggests some explanations for these findings. The
evidence supports the author's thesis, presented more thoroughly in
his forthcoming book, that the attorney's ability to negotiate settle-
mens skillfully is far more significant in terms of its effect on recov-
ery than is his knowledge of the formal law.
H OW does the claimant represented by an attorney fare, in com-
parison with the unrepresented claimant, in securing recovery
for bodily injury from an automobile liability insurance company?
Are there differences in recovery in sued and tried cases, as opposed
to cases that are merely represented?2 )What types of claims are
most likely to be represented, sued, and tried? This paper will
address these questions with empirical data drawn from a larger
study of the claims settlement process.3
The data presented below were obtained from a sample of files
provided by a large insurance company, which shall be called Acme.
The company is reputed to be rather typical of large stock com-
panies in its claims procedures. The files are a random sample,
numbering 2216, drawn from the closed files received by the main
office from its field offices in March and April of 1962. Prelimi-
nary analyses revealed that, as expected, there were strong relation-
ships between the amount paid on a file and the economic loss, or
total special damages, documented in the file, and between payment
and apparent liability, as measured by the configuration of vehicles
*Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Denver College of Law.
To be published and copyrighted by the author as part of a forthcoming book;
H. Ross, SErLED OUT OF COURT (Aldine Publishing Co. in 1970).
2 TIC term trial cases refers to those cases which involve the trial process for the
resolution of a claim. The term suit cases refers to claims which have been filed and
which may, but do not necessarily, involve the trial process since they may be settled
prior to the actual court proceedings. The term represented cases refers to those cases
which involve the attorney-client relationship. A represented case may be settled prior
to filing suit, settled after the filing of suit but before trial, or it may actually go to
trial.
3 Supra note 1.
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in the accident. These relationships are legitimated in the formal
law, and the factors are specifically identified as conditions for
payment in Acme's training materials and rule books. Represen-
tation, on the other hand, is not treated by the formal law or by
official company policy as a factor to increase the value of a claim.
Juries are not to consider attorneys' fees in computing an award,
4
and Acme's executives declare opposition to any increment in pay-
ment in represented cases. On the other hand, many adjusters
acknowledge paying more in represented cases, and this situation
has been cited both in nonempirical commentaries and in the few
empirical studies that have been made of bodily injury claims pay-
ments.' With this contradiction in mind, the Acme files were
analyzed according to whether or not an attorney was present.
Other analyses, not reported here, concerned such matters as age,
sex, and race of the claimant, and employment status of the
defendant.
I. REPRESENTATION AND RECOVERY
Apart from liability and damages, representation was found
to be the most important single factor accounting for payment.
Although it is formally irrelevant to the worth of a claim, and is
denied or minimized in discussion by most insurance company
executives and by many adjusters, the presence of a lawyer is none-
theless a major influence on the outcome of bodily injury claims.
A first glimpse at the effect is provided by Table 1, which
shows the average recovery of represented claimants to be from
5 to 20 times as high as that of unrepresented claimants. Although
some of this apparent advantage is spurious- related to the kind
of claims that attorneys agree to represent -the fact remains that
at every level of damages and liability, the outcome in a represented
case is likely to be more favorable to the claimant than the outcome
in an unrepresented case. This fact is documented in Table 2, which
shows the recovery in represented and unrepresented claims with
a simultaneous control for liability and injury. The judgment con-
cerning liability and injury was made for each case by coders, who
looked mainly at the accident configuration to determine apparent
liability, and at medical reports and statements to determine injury.
4See, Atlantic Coastline R. Co. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1956).
Compare, 25 C.J.S. Damages § 50 (in some jurisdictions attorneys' fees may be con-
sidered in estimating the amount of damages where an award of exemplary damages
is authorized, - e.g., in cases of "gross negligence").
5 
See, A. CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, JR., C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTO-
MOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS, 181 et. seq. (1964); Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, Accidents, Money, and Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16-20 (1961).
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Table 1. Recovery and representation.
Type of Representation All Cases Paid Cases Only
Mean Mean
Number Recovery Number Recovery
Unrepresented 1601 $ 254 950 $ 427
Solo attorney, non specialist 471 $1499 390 $1810
Firm attorney, non specialist 70 $2226 59 $2641
Specialist (NACCA) 74 $4815 70 $5090
Table 2. Recovery and representation with control for apparent
liability and injury.
Liability Likely Liability Unlikely
Injury Injury
Moderate, Moderate.
Severe or Injury Severe or Injury
Fatal Minor Fatal Minor
Percent represented 60% 29% 53% 20%
Percent recovering
Unrepresented cases 79% 69% 61% 42%
Represented cases 93% 92% 81% 62%
Mean (average) recovery
in paid cases
Unrepresented $ 1652 $ 329 $5769 $235
Represented $11,603 $1438 $1655 $763
Total cases with
information available 94 1350 49 723
The top line of Table 2 indicates that representation is a
function of both liability and damages, but that damages are the
more important factor. When injuries are moderate, severe, or
fatal, more than half the cases are represented, even with unlikely
liability on the part of the defendant; in fact, diminished liability
reduces representation only by 7 percent. On the other hand, minor
injury even combined with likely liability is represented in only
29 percent of the cases.
Table 2 shows that in every liability-injury category the propor-
tion of claimants recovering some award is considerably higher
when the claimants are represented. The advantage of the repre-
sented claimant in terms of chance of recovery is not eliminated
by unlikely liability. The table also shows considerable advantage
in terms of average settlement for all paid claims, in all categories
except the one embracing unlikely liability and serious injury. In
this category the median' payment still shows a difference in the
expected direction - $1125 for the represented as compared with
$500 for the unrepresented - but the mean is affected by the small
number of paid cases (14) and the presence of two extraordinary
settlements in this group: one for $61,000 and the other for $11,000.
e The "median" payment refers to that figure exceeded by 50 percent of the payments
and in turn greater than 50 percent of the payments. The "mean" payment refers to
that figure which is the arithmetic average of all payments. Where there are very few
cases in a particular category, the "mean" figure may be distorted by unusually high
or unusually low figures.
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An additional tabulation, controlling for size of known eco-
nomic loss (special damages) indicates that the average recovery
in represented cases is roughly double or triple that in unrepresented
cases, and furthermore that attorneys recover in 41 percent of cases
in which special damages are either totally absent or unknown, as
compared with 24 percent of the unrepresented claimants in this
situation.
The facts reported in this section suggest that there is some
value accorded to claims merely because of representation. This
situation is understandable, less in the light of the attorney's
knowledge of the formal law, than in the light of his negotiation
power.7 Were knowledge of formal law the cue to the attorney's
advantage, one might expect the advantage to weaken proportion-
ately as the case became weaker in formal law; but the facts are
that the represented claimant has as great an advantage over the
unrepresented claimant in cases where liability is weak and injury
is insignificant as in cases where liability is clear and injury is
significant. On the other hand, negotiation power is present through-
out the range of liability and injury combinations. The attorney, as
compared with the unrepresented claimant, understands the rules
of negotiation; he knows that payment will be made on a danger
or nuisance value basis in nearly any bona fide claim, providing the
insurance company believes that the claim will be pressed, and the
attorney can threaten to take any claim to court. He may also
credibly threaten to accumulate testimony favorable to liability and
to accentuate the extent of any injury. Moreover, an attorney in
accepting a case, has the advantage of a tacit commitment: both he
and the insurance adjuster know that his (the attorney's) business
and reputation would be threatened by a trivial settlement or a
denial. This knowledge lends additional credibility to the attorney's
threats, and makes these threats and rationalizations more effective
tools in securing a higher settlement for almost any given claim.
To this point I have been concerned with the effects of repre-
sentation on recovery. To continue, I would like to consider some
prior correlates or causes of representation. Table 2 and Table 4
below suggest a correlation of representation with size of loss or
injury. Although part of this correlation may be explained as
manipulation of the facts concerning a given claim by the attorney,
Negotiation power will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of SETTLED OUT
OF COURT, supra note 1. The principal techniques or "plays" in the negotiation1game" are: proposals, which serve as a cue to the expectations of each side;
rationalizations, which legitimate proposals in terms of agreed general principles;
threats and promises, stating consequences of particular choices; and commitments,
which bind a party more convincingly to his proposals, rationalizations, and threats.
Negotiation power refers to the ability to use these techniques in a sophisticated




I believe that the bulk of the association is due to the inclination
of claimants with higher losses to seek representation, and to the
greater willingness of attorneys to accept claims with larger losses
and thus potentially larger recoveries.
Representation is also shown, in Table 2, to be greater when
liability is likely, although this relationship is smaller than with
degree of injury. The Acme files show lawyers accepting some
proportion of claims even when liability is most doubtful, but the
proportion here is small. Where claims with unlikely liability are
accepted by lawyers, the results are generally more favorable than
in similar unrepresented claims, again indicating the existence of
bargaining power unavailable to the unrepresented claimant.
Two additional relationships with representation can be shown
with other data. Table 3 shows the relationship between represen-
tation and recovery controlling for size of city, and shows clearly
that representation is strongly related to the urbanization of the
jurisdiction. The proportion of claims represented in the large
central cities is double that in small cities or in the countryside, and
this in turn can probably be explained by the relative sophistication
and wariness of the city-dwellers. On the other hand, the proportion
of claimants that recover does not fluctuate much in this instance,
and the average settlement in represented paid cases actually declines
with increasing urbanization. This apparent paradox is most likely
explained by the inclusion of larger numbers of small cases and
cases of tenuous liability in the total mix accepted by the urban
lawyers. The small town and country lawyers probably deal with
a more selected group of cases. The higher payments on unrepre-
sented claims in the more urbanized jurisdictions are in accord with
general expectations concerning the effect of city size on claims;
however, the effect is not as drastic or as uniform as one might
have thought prior to viewing the data.
Table 3. Recovery and representation with control for size of city.
City Size
SMSA* More Than 1 Mill SMSA
Less Than Other
Central Ring 1 Million Urban Rural
Percent represented 38% 33% 21% 16% 19%
Percent recovering
Unrepresented 61% 58% 60% 58% 57%
Represented 81% 90% 87% 90% 85%
Mean recovery in
paid cases
Unrepresented $ 576 $ 344 $ 405 $ 386 9 326
Represented $1422 $2452 $2609 $4891 $2697
Total cases with
information available 698 383 576 268 136
*Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
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Finally, representation is related to the type of claimant, in
particular to whether the claimant is Jewish or Gentile, as measured
by surname. Claimants with Jewish names were found far more
likely to be represented than others (59 percent as opposed to
26 percent for other whites). The probability of their receiving
any award, however, was somewhat lower (77 percent as opposed
to 84 percent, respectively). The explanation for the lower recovery
of represented Jewish claimants is probably identical to that for the
relationship with urbanization- the larger number of Jewish
claims represented must have included some less meritorious claims.
No differences were found in representation by age or sex of the
claimant, and an attempt to investigate race was abandoned because
of the unsatisfactory state of the data concerning Negroes.
In sum, representation is unequally distributed in the population
of claims: large claims, claims with apparent liability, claims of
metropolitan residents, and claims of Jews are instances of categories
where representation is relatively high. Although groups with high
proportions of represented cases may experience a somewhat smaller
proportion of paid claims, the level of payments in represented
claims is considerably higher than in unrepresented claims, regardless
of the fact that the official policy of the company and the formal
law are both to the contrary.
II. NEGOTIATION, SUIT, TRIAL, AND RECOVERY
As far as the actual negotiation of claims is concerned, the
meaning of filing suit is ambiguous. On its face, this act may be
seen as a sign of incipient failure of the negotiation: the attorney
for the claimant prepares for an expected trial. Another interpre-
tation is that filing suit is a move in the game of negotiation: it
establishes the credibility of a threat to go to trial, but relies on a
long delay between the filing of suit and the setting of trial to
produce a negotiated settlement. This interpretation seems to me
most satisfactory for the bulk of suit cases observed. The filing
of suit may also be required to preserve the legal basis for the claim,
and thus to continue negotiation when the statute of limitations
threatens to bar the claim. Finally, it is the practice of some
attorneys, particularly in urban areas with long delays in trial
calendars, to file suit as a routine matter, regardless of their confi-
dence that a settlement will take place. The latter procedure is also
reputed to be encouraged by contingent fee agreements that provide
a higher share for the attorney in sued cases.
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The bringing of a case to trial is a less ambiguous indication of
failure of negotiation. Even though many cases brought to trial may
settle during the course of trial, major processing costs are assumed
by both parties. Since a principal benefit of the negotiated settle-
ment is the mutual avoidance of these costs, a conclusion of at least
partial failure of negotiation is unavoidable. In this section data
will be presented concerning recovery in tried cases as compared
with those settled prior to trial, and reasons will be suggested as
to why these failed to be settled out of court. There were too few
cases brought to trial to make distinctions among them, and these
cases will be treated together with those cases that settled during
trial (23 percent), and those that went to verdict (72 percent), and
those that were appealed (5 percent).
Table 4 presents a summary picture of proportions of cases
entering the successively more advanced stages of the legal process,
and indicates the recoveries in each stage.' The columns control
for known economic loss. The table shows first, that except where
special damages were nil, or unknown, there was recovery in more
than 90 percent of the total cases. Reading down the table we find
that the proportion of claimants recovering decreases with every
advance towards trial, from representation to suit to trial itself.
With the minor exception of a tie in the first column, this finding
holds in every category of damages. In apparent opposition to this
finding, the average recovery of those who receive anything increases
with representation and suit. This increase does not, however, con-
tinue to include the step of trial. Although the number of cases on
which the trial figure is based is very small, the fact that a decrease
is observed in three of the five categories marks this step as a
distinct departure from the observed trend.
Reading across the table, the proportion recovering at different
levels of damages is quite low where damages are nil, and fairly
uniformly high in all other categories, whether one speaks of total
cases, represented cases, or sued cases. In marked contrast, tried
cases show a rather steady increase in proportion of recovery, from
extremes of 15 percent where damages are nil or unknown to
71 percent where they exceed $500. A similar steady increase is
seen in the proportion of cases reaching successive stages in the
legal process, as damages increase.
8 Supra note 2.
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or Unknown $1 -$50 $51 -$200 $201 - $500 $5004+
Total cases- 867 395 450 258 246
Percent recovering 25% 92% 92% 91% 95%
Mean payment, paid
cases $ 87 $123 $374 $ 911 $4453
Represented cases - 75 67 186 135 152
Percent of total 8.7% 17.0% 41.3% 52.3% 61.8%
Percent recovering 41% 90% 90% 89% 93%
Mean payment, paid
cases $579 $247 $546 $1166 $5916
Suit cases- 39 40 104 72 122
Percent of total 4.5% 10.1% 23.1% 27.9% 49.6%
Percent recovering 41% 83% 85% 85% 90%
Mean payment, paid
cases $632 $265 $564 $1258 $6736
Trial cases - 13 6 20 20 34
Percent of total 1.5% 1.5% 4.4% 7.8% 13.5%
Percent recovering 15% 17% 35% 55% 71%
Mean payment, paid
cases $1172 $8.00* $449 $1289 $4655
*Based on fewer than 10 cases.
Support is given to the established generalization that large
cases go to trial more frequently. Tried cases are nevertheless a
distinct minority of the large cases, and there must be something
special about them.
Even disregarding processing costs, trial does not seem to yield
systematically larger net recoveries than representation alone. With
respect to the proportion of claimants recovering, it is considerably
worse.
These findings do not appear to be explainable by simple
principles other than tautological statements such as: cases which
go to trial are those that could not be settled, or are those on which
agreement as to evaluation was impossible. However, I am willing
to speculate concerning these findings, basing my thoughts on my
interviews and observations.
A first factor that may result in trial is the presence of zero
special damages per se.9 A claimant without medical bills or lost
wages has very little with which to interest an insurance company,
other than his signature. The latter alone is worth something, i.e.,
nuisance value, but the amount that an adjuster can pay in that
category is too small to buy off a represented case. Many of these
cases may verge on the fraudulent, or at best represent noncom-
9 Where damages are nil or unknown, a high proportion of represented and sued cases
go to trial. This finding may be partly an artifact of the data: claims denied early
in their history may produce a file without any indication as to damages, although
serious injury may have been involved along with very doubtful liability. The
following discussion assumes that, allowing for this artifact, there remains some
overrepresentation of zero damages cases among all tried cases.
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pensable damages to dignity. Others may involve a genuine hurt,
but injuries in the absence of bills do not impress the bureaucratic
supervisory structure within which an adjuster works. It will be
noted that few of these cases are represented, but an attorney
accepting a case makes a tacit promise to secure more than nuisance
value, and this frequently sends him to the courtroom. The wisdom
of the companies in opposing this type of claim is borne out by the
low proportion of recoveries in this category, yet the relationship
between the attorney and his client may make trials of these cases
inevitable.
A different situation may be involved in many claims with
high special damages. Very serious claims are supervised not only
at the local level, but also at the regional or even home office levels
of a company. It is not only the adjuster who has to justify his
evaluation to a supervisor, but the supervisor in turn must justify
a joint evaluation to one or more higher executives. The under-
standable tendency in this situation is to be very conservative in
evaluation. Moreover, where much is at stake, assumption of
processing costs inherent in trial is easier, because these costs become
trivial compared to the potential verdict. Trial in this case may
serve a bureaucratic function. A supervisor may recriminate with
his subordinate if he disagrees with the reasonableness of the latter's
negotiated settlement. He cannot disagree with a subordinate's
payment of a judgment ordered by a court. In this situation, trial
may be a way of preserving the bureaucratic structure of the
insurance company. Support for this interpretation comes from the
fact that a relatively high proportion of tried cases in the highest
bracket of damages do recover, and with an average payment
higher than the figure for total cases, albeit the figure is lower
than that for represented cases as a whole.
Another principle can be deduced from Table 5, which intro-
duces the simultaneous control for injury and liability. It is seen
in this table that trial is more related to injury than to liability;
in fact, more cases weak than strong on liability are tried. Resistance
to cases of weak liability might reasonably be expected from the
companies, but why should lawyers press these cases? The answer
may be related to the type of gamble offered by these cases of weak
liability. It is precisely where liability is weak and injury is moderate
or severe that the highest proportion of cases go to trial. It is in
these cases that the danger value rule' operates, and the adjuster
10 In cases with liability unfavorable to the claimant, but with bad injury, Acme's policy
is to permit local offices to offer somewhere in the neighborhood of ten percent of
"full value" as a compromise payment. This is termed danger value, the reference




is legitimately able to offer compromise payments. However, the
offers in these circumstances may appear trivial both in the light
of expenses borne by the claimant and in the light of possible
recovery if the liability barrier can be passed. Heavy expenses on
the part of the claimant mean that a considerable sum must be
offered merely to pay existing bills and the attorney's fees. In the
extreme, as in one case observed, if no payment is forthcoming the
bills will simply go unpaid. The case in question involved a woman
of 60 whose income was $30 per week and whose life savings were
$900. Her medical bills exceeded $4,000. This woman would be
no better off personally with a settlement for medical expenses than
with no settlement at all. For this reason, the adjuster declined to
make any offer. In contrast, even with one chance in 10 of getting
to a jury in such a case, it might be worthwhile to the lawyer to
press for trial, since at least one significant recovery might be
expected in the course of many trials.
Table 5. Recovery in tried and untried cases, controlling for liability
and injury.
Liability Favorable Liability Unfavorable
to Claimant to Claimant
Injury Injury Injury Injury
Mo(, or Ser. Minor Mod. or Ser. Minor
(N-94) (N-1333) (N-49) (N-716)
Percent tried 12.8 % 3.0% 16.3% 4.6%
Percent recovering
Untried cases 88% 76% 78% 47%
Tried cases 88% 63% 38%* 21%
Mean recovery in
paid cases
Untried cases $ 7288 $ 660 $3565 $380
Tried cases $12,847* $2990 $ 483* $521"
*Based on fewer than ten cases.
A final principle, relevant to the whole range of cases, may be
deduced from the example in Table 6. Where the case is compli-
cated, trial may be necessary because the negotiation task becomes
too complex. The example here is additional defendants, as would
result, for instance, from a multiple-car collision. In this instance,
agreement as to liability and damages is required from a larger
number of parties. Over four times as many cases go to trial where
there is more than one defendant. Whether tried or untried, claims
in which there is more than one defendant are paid much less often,




Table 6. Trial, recovery and multiple defendants.
Number of Defendants
One Only (N-1648) More Than One (N-544)
Percent tried 2.6% 10.6%
Percent recovering
Untried cases 74% 48%
Tried cases 86% 25%
SUMMARY
This research has confirmed the generalization that big cases
go to trial, which I believe to have been the only generalization of
this nature to have appeared in the academic literature. However,
inspection of the Acme files shows that even among cases with large
losses only a small proportion goes to trial, and among those cases
with negligible losses a surprisingly large proportion is tried. A
closer look at the data suggests some additional principles accounting
for trial; trial may occur disproportionately in cases which, lacking
bureaucratically acceptable accounts, cannot justify a significant offer
from the bureaucracy. It occurs in cases where the stakes are so
high as to make processing costs inconsiderable, and in these cases
it helps to protect the supervisory structure of the company bureauc-
racy. It occurs where it presents a long-shot chance of a very high
judgment as a choice counter to a very low settlement, in which
case the utility of the small sum would seem to be negligible. Finally,
it occurs in cases that are more complex, involving difficult fact
situations or numerous negotiators, where agreement on a definitive
allocation of costs and responsibilities is harder to obtain.
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TAXATION OF TRUSTS: WHEN DOES A
TRUST TERMINATE FOR FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PURPOSES?
By ROLF A. HANNING*
With the increased popularity of financial planning by means
of a trust, taxation problems become more complex and more
important to lawyers in this area. Dealing with a vital facet of trust
taxation, the author thoroughly explores the history of the principles
of termination of trusts for taxation purposes, citing relevant regu-
lations and tax decisions. He concludes that a trust terminates at the
earlier of these two events: 1) The time when the trust assets have
actually been distributed or 2) The expiration of a reasonable period
for distribution.
"A trust does not automatically terminate upon the happening
of the event by which the duration of the trust is measured." 1
INTRODUCTION
T HIS article attempts to shed some light on the question: When
does a trust terminate for federal income tax purposes? Before
proceeding further, however, it is appropriate to answer yet another
question: Why is it important to know exactly when a trust terminates
for tax purposes?
Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes an
income tax on trusts.2 It also provides that trusts have income,'
deductions, 4 and exemptions.' It can therefore be concluded that
trusts are taxable entities. This article will not treat in detail the
various income tax problems incident to the termination of a trust,
since these problems have been the subject of comprehensive analysis
by various competent authors.' Let it suffice here to merely point
Lt. Col. USAF; Operations Staff Officer, Headquarters USAF; B.S., Newark College
of Engineering, 1953; M.S. The George Washington University, 1964; J.D. Univer-
sity of Denver, 1968; Member of Colorado Bar.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956).
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 641.
3 Id. § 641.
4 Id. § 642.
BId. § 642(b).
8 Comm. on Modification, Revocation and Termination of Trusts, Termination of
Trusts: Trustee's Problems in Winding Up, 1 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 514
(1966); Glassmoyer, Termination Problems of Estates and Trusts: Capital Gains:
Carryover of Tax Benefits Upon Distribution, N.Y.U. 17TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX.
1227 (1959); Littenberg, Techniques for Controlling Income Tax Consequences of
Estates and Trusts, 45 TAXES 206 (1967) ; Lowell, Carryover of Unused Losses and
Excess Deductions to Beneficiaries on Termination of Trusts and Estates, 48 A.B.A.J.
1087 (1962) ; Rea, The Fiduciary's Final Return, 21 J. TAXATION 350 (1964);
Somers, Some Income Tax Problems Incident to the Termination of a Trust, 14 TAX
L. REV. 85 (1958); Tomlinson, Tax Carryovers on Termination of Trusts and Estates,
N.Y.U. 20TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX. 267 (1962).
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out some of the more important reasons for being concerned with
the termination date of a trust.
The first reason is that the trust instrument itself does not
necessarily control the exact termination date for tax purposes.
Assume, for instance, a trust with income to the grantor's wife for
her life, and upon her death the corpus to go to the grantor's
children. As will be explained, such a trust will not necessarily
terminate for tax purposes exactly on the date of the life income
beneficiary's death. Thus, the question of the termination date is
neither simple nor clear cut.
Secondly, since it is a taxable entity, a trust can be an income
splitting device resulting in tax savings. This could be true of a
trust which is accumulating income, for under the proper circum-
stances, the trust, and not the ultimate beneficiary would be taxed
on the income accumulated by the trust.7 This income splitting
benefit will come to an end when the trust terminates as a taxable
entity. It is also possible for a "simple" trust,8 which has been
distributing all its current income and has been paying little or no
taxes,9 to become a "complex" trust'0 and therefore an income split-
ting device during the termination process. Assume again a trust
with all income to be currently distributed to the grantor's wife for
her life, and upon her death the corpus to go to the grantor's
children. Such a trust would operate as a pure conduit in regard to
ordinary income during the life of the income beneficiary who would
be taxed on the income of the trust." Upon her death, however,
there might be a change in the nature of the trust. If state law or
the trust instrument required the trustee to accumulate the income
accruing after the death of the life income beneficiary, and to pay
this income out in one sum together with the principal, there would
be created a complex income accumulating trust and income splitting
device. It would come into being upon the happening of the trust
duration measuring event, the death of the life income beneficiary,
and would continue to exist until the trust terminated for income
tax purposes, 12 which might not happen for some time. Thus, the
question of when the income splitting benefit terminates is not only
important for complex trusts; it may also be important in cases of
simple trusts which turn into complex income accumulating trusts
during the termination process.
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 641-43, 661-63.
8 See TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 651(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-i (1956) for a
definition of a "simple" trust.
9 Because of the deduction allowed by TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 651.
10 Trusts which accumulate income or distribute corpus are called "complex." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.661(a)-i (1956).
'lINT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 652.
12 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(b)-3(c), 1.651(a)-2 (1956),
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The allocation of deductions is a major reason for concern over
an accurate determination of how long the trust continues to exist
for tax purposes. If, upon termination, a trust has an unused net
operating loss carryover or excess deductions for its last taxable year,
such carryovers or excess deductions are allowed as deductions to
the beneficiaries who succeed to the property of the trust."l Since the
excess deductions are only allowable to the beneficiaries in the year
of termination, 4 it is vital that the trustee be certain of the exact
time of termination for tax purposes, so that the winding up of the
trust can be planned and accomplished with maximum benefit from
deductions. Thus, the question of when a trust terminates can sub-
stantially affect the tax liabilities of the various beneficiaries. For
this reason, it is understandable that the question has been repeatedly
treated in periodical legal literature.1
5
I. LEGISLATIVE, STATUTORY, AND QUASI-STATUTORY
PRONOUNCEMENTS
Trusts were taxable well before 1954.1" However, the question
of when a trust terminates for tax purposes was not addressed in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, not even in section 161, the prede-
cessor of the present section 641 which imposes the tax on trusts
under the 1954 Code. Although the regulations under the 1939 Code
addressed the duration of estates for tax purposes, 17 they did not
define the termination of trusts.'
Congress gave the question of trust termination some thought
before enacting the 1954 Code. The reports of the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee of H.R. 8300,
which became the 1954 Code, contain the following statement:
The determination of whether a trust has terminated so that
the provisions of this subchapter no longer apply depends on
whether the property held in trust has been distributed to the
persons entitled to succeed to the property upon termination of the
trust rather than upon the technicality of whether or not the trustee
has rendered his final accounting.' 9
The 1954 Code itself, however, does not expressly address the
question of when trusts terminate for tax purposes. The question is
13 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 642(h).
14 Treas. Reg. 1.642(h)-2(a) (1956).
15 Camilli, When Estates and Trusts Terminate, 99 TRuSTS & EsTATEs 370 (1960);
Glassmoyer, supra note 6; Lowell, supra note 6; Somers, supra note 6.
16 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 161.
17 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.162-1(g) (1956).
IsId. §§ 39.161-1-39.163-1 (1956).
19 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A191-92 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1954).
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not answered in section 641 which imposes the tax on trusts, nor
is trust termination among the definitions of section 643. No
enlightening reference to trust termination is to be found in all
of subchapter J.20 However, the regulations under the 1954 Code,
unlike those under the Code of 1939, address the question of trust
termination in some detail.2 '
According to the regulation, "reasonable" time is permitted
for administration,22  and winding up cannot be "unduly post-
poned, ' 23 nor can distribution of corpus be "unreasonably delayed." 4
This all amounts to one general qualification exempting cases of
unreasonable delay in distribution from the general rule that a trust
terminates when the property has been distributed. While the regu-
lation also mentions administration and winding up in these qualify-
ing sentences, it can be shown that it is really only the delay in
distribution which counts.
The winding up of a trust has two aspects. The trustee takes
some steps to assure his discharge from further liability. This is the
aspect of accounting which, by itself, does not control termination
for tax purposes. All the other steps of winding up are somehow
related to the second aspect - distribution of the corpus - and
affect the time at which distribution is accomplished. This aspect
may include management tasks and tax or other litigation to preserve
20 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 641-692.
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956) provides:
Generally, the determination of whether a trust has terminated depends
upon whether the property held in trust has been distributed to the persons
entitled to succeed to the property upon termination of the trust rather than
upon the technicality of whether or not the trustee has rendered his final
accounting. A trust does not automatically terminate upon the happenine of
the event by which the duration of the trust is measured. A reasonable time
is permitted after such event for the trustee to perform the duties necessary
to complete the administration of the trust. Thus, if under the terms of the
governing instrument, the trust is to terminate upon the death of the life
beneficiary and the corpus is to be distributed to the remainderman, the
trust continues after the death of the life beneficiary for a period reasonably
necessary to a proper winding up of the affairs of the trust. However, the
winding up of a trust cannot be unduly postponed and if the distri-
bution of the trust corpus is unreasonably delayed, the trust is con-
sidered terminated for Federal income tax purposes after the expiration of
a reasonable period for the trustee to complete the administration of the trust.
Further, a trust will be considered as terminated when all the assets have
been distributed except for a reasonable amount which is set aside in good
faith for the payment of unascertained or contingent liabilities and expenses
(not including a claim by a beneficiary in the capacity of beneficiary).
The above provision was promulgated by the Treasury in 1956 together with
some rules concerning the duration of estates under the heading "§ 1.641(b)-3 Ter-
mination of estates and trusts." The provision quoted above concerning the time that
a trust terminates has remained unchanged since its promulgation in 1956.
22Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1956).
23Id.
-Id. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956).
1969
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the property so that it can later be distributed. It may entail sales
or other transactions to make the corpus suitable for dividing among
the various remaindermen. A trustee may have to perform certain
tasks in preparation for distribution, and all fall within the headings
of winding up and administration. But if there are any problems
in this second aspect, they all manifest themselves eventually by
a delay in distribution of the corpus to the remainderman. The
various administrative actions and omissions of the trustee constitute
the causes for the manifestation - delay in distribution. From a
pragmatic viewpoint, it is also apparent that it must be a delay in
distribution which takes a case out of the general rule, not a delay
in "administration" or "winding up." Once the property has been
distributed to the remaindermen, they are taxable on the income
from the property which they now own. This is really all the
Treasury is concerned about.
Another way to arrive at the exact meaning of the first qualifi-
cation to the general rule is to examine the regulation text by itself.
The first sentence of section 1.641(b) -3(b) states the general rule
that a trust terminates for tax purposes when the corpus has been
distributed. The second sentence merely states what is obvious from
the general rule - that a trust does not automatically terminate for
tax purposes upon the happening of the measuring event, such as
the death of the life beneficiary. The trust cannot automatically
terminate at that time, since the general rule provides that the trust
does not terminate until the property has been distributed. The third
and fourth sentences grant a reasonable time for administration and
winding up. Not until the fifth sentence is there any qualifying
language which indicates when a case is to be exempted from the
general rule. The qualifying statement is: "if the distribution of the
trust corpus is unreasonably delayed, the trust is considered termi-
nated for Federal income tax purposes .... .25 Thus, the first
qualification to the general rule, that a trust terminates when the
corpus has been distributed, is that an unreasonable delay in distri-
bution will take the case out of the general rule. This qualification
does not appear in the committee reports. However, a subsequent
analysis of case law will show that the Treasury was justified in
making this qualification, which is merely a restatement of a qualifi-
cation adopted by the courts when they interpreted the basic rule.
The second qualification adopted by the Treasury is found in the
last sentence of the regulation paragraph on trust termination. It
provides that a trust will be considered terminated for tax purposes
25 Id. (emphasis added).
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even though some assets have not been distributed, provided the
assets retained by the trustee are only a reasonable amount set aside
in good faith for payment of unascertained or contingent liabilities
and expenses, not counting claims by beneficiaries.2 6 This can be
explained as a clarification of what constitutes trust property or
corpus for purposes of trust termination -in other words, it is a
clarification of the basic rule. If so viewed, this qualification simply
takes amounts equalling unascertained liabilities and expenses out
of the category of corpus or trust property as used in the basic rule.
Another explanation of this qualification is that it is a definition
of substantially complete distribution, under the theory that substance
rather than form controls tax consequences. Regardless of which
view is preferred, the Treasury would be justified in adding such a
clarification or definition without departing from the confines of
legislative intent.
Summary of Statutory Law
The sum total of legislative, statutory, and quasi-statutory pro-
nouncements on the question of trust termination consists of the
committee reports and one Treasury Regulation paragraph. The
committee reports state the basic rule that a trust terminates for tax
purposes when its property has been distributed. The regulation
repeats the basic rule and makes two exceptions:
(1) Unreasonable delay in distributing the trust property will
cause the trust to be treated as terminated after expiration of a
reasonable period for distribution.
(2) Distribution is considered completed for trust termination
purposes even though the trust still retains a reasonable amount of
assets set aside in good faith to meet unascertained or contingent
claims and expenses, not counting claims by beneficiaries as such.
II. CASE LAW
Eighteen cases were found directly in point on the question of
when a trust terminates for tax purposes, excluding appeals and two
cases in point but representing a theory later universally rejected.
Since the periodical legal literature does not anywhere provide a
comprehensive listing of all trust termination decisions, and the
major reference works cite only selected cases,2 7 it seems appropriate
to provide a chronological listing of all decisions which were based
26 d.
27 See 3 P-H 1969 FED. TAXES § 28,025; 3 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAx REP. §
3605.71; 6 J. MERTENS, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 36.22 (1968).
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on the precise question of when a trust terminates for tax purposes. -
In the following discussion, the term "measuring event" will be
used repeatedly. It means the "event" in the second sentence of the
regulation paragraph on trust termination: "A trust does not auto-
matically terminate upon the happening of the event by which the
duration of the trust is measured.' '29 The measuring event is
the time at which the trust instrument calls for the trust to terminate.
For example, if a trust is for 10 years, the measuring event is the
expiration date of the 10 year period. If the trust is for the life of
an income beneficiary, the measuring event is his death. If the trust
is to endure until the remainderman attains a certain age, the measur-
ing event is the appropriate birthday. There are trusts with indefinite
measuring events, such as a trust until the surviving spouse dies or
remarries. Some trusts have provisions for flexibility in the measuring
event. An example would be a trust for 10 years and for so long
thereafter as the trustees agree, but no longer than the life of X.
In terms of tax impact, the measuring event triggers the termination
process, but does not actually terminate the trust for tax purposes.
The reasonable time allowed for distribution is measured from the
happening of the measuring event.
Before proceeding with the analysis of case law, it is necessary
to explain what is meant here by a "decision in point" on the question
of termination of trusts. There must have been, first, a valid trust
for tax purposes." Secondly, the decision must have hinged on the
question of when or whether the trust terminated for tax purposes.
It is not necessary that the court actually stated the termination
question, as long as it was necessary for the court to consider the
2O.D. 806, 4 CuM. BULL. 223 (1921) ; George M. Studebaker, 2 B.T.A. 1020 (1925) ;
Minneapolis Trust Co., 13 B.T.A. 1069 (1928); Francis Francis, 15 B.T.A. 1332
(1929) (the ruling of this case was expressly rejected in Della M. Coachman, 16
T.C. 1432 (1951), after having been universally disregarded since 1939); Florence
H. Fitch, 29 B.T.A. 1299 (1934) (since this decision relied upon Francis, it should
be considered rejected along with Francis insofar as it pertains to termination of
trusts); Russel v. Bowers, 27 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Willard C. Lipe, 41
B.T.A. 107 (1940), afl'd Commissioner v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 118 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1941); George S. Fiske, 45 B.T.A. 135 (1941), afI'd Commissioner v.
Davis, 132 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1943) ; Leonard Marx, 47 B.T.A. 204 (1942); Trust
of Bingham, 2 T.C. 853 (1943), revd Commissioner v. Kenan, 145 F.2d 568 (2d
Cir. 1944), rev'd Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 305 (1945); Edith
M. Bryant, 14 T.C. 127 (1950), ajjd Bryant v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 517 (4th
Cir. 1950); Della M. Coachman, 16 T.C. 1432 (1951); Anstes Agnew, 16 T.C. 1466
(1951) ; Charles F. Neave, 17 T.C. 1237 (1952); Gamble v. United States, 116 F.
Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo. 1953); Rev. Rul. 55-287, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 130; Rev. Rul.
55-159, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 391; Swoboda v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 17 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), af'd 258 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Green v. United States, 6 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 5647 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Lawrence 0. Weston, 24 P-H TAx CT. REP. &
MEM. DEC. 1439 (1965).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956) (emphasis added).
306 J. MERTENS, JR., LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 35.21-.27 (1968)
contains a detailed discussion of what constitutes a valid trust for tax purposes.
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question of whether or not the trust terminated for tax purposes
to arrive at its decision.
A. Cases Not in Point
There are three cases which tend to confuse the issue because
they have been cited or discussed in the context of trust termination,
but are really not in point. In Norton v. United States"' the remain-
derman took the corpus subject to a tax liability, and wanted to
deduct interest accrued prior to the measuring event and termination.
The argument concerned his right to the deduction. The time of
termination was not an issue. The case of f. B. Drew" involved a
question of the right to deduct trust expenses. The trustee agreed
with the remainderman not to collect the corpus commission upon
termination if the remainderman would pay the commission later.
The remainderman unsuccessfully tried to deduct the commission
on her personal tax return when she paid it in a later year. There
was never any question of when the trust terminated for tax purposes.
Samuel v. Commissioner33 involved a grantor trust where the grantor-
cotrustee-beneficiary attempted to amend the trust to make his interest
in the income resemble an annuity. The grantor had to pay tax on
the trust income, and there was no question of termination of a
trust for tax purposes.
B. Cases No Longer Followed
There is one 1929 Board of Tax Appeals (B.T.A.) case, later
rejected, which squarely treated a trust terminated as a tax entity
upon the happening of the measuring event. In Francis Francis
3 4
the measuring event was the death of the life tenant. During the
winding up process, the trustee sold some corpus stock at a capital
loss. The remainderman claimed this loss as a deduction. The B.T.A.
allowed the deduction to the remainderman, thus effectively treating
the trust as terminated for tax purposes upon the happening of the
measuring event. The rationale was that under local law the
remainderman became at once entitled to the assets of the trust
upon the happening of the measuring event, despite the trustee's
nominal power to sell the corpus and distribute the proceeds. In 1951,
the Francis decision was expressly rejected by the Tax Court, the
successor to the B.T.A., in Della M. Coachman."3 By that time, the
3' 144 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. La. 1956), aff'd 250 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1958).
3230 T.C. 335 (1958).
33 306 F.2d 682 (lst Cir. 1962), af/'d Archbishop Samuel Trust, 36 T.C. 641 (1961).
34 15 B.T.A. 1332 (1929).
I 16 T.C. 1432 (1951).
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Francis theory had already been ignored in six cases decided between
1939 and 1950.6
In 1934, however, the B.T.A. still considered the Francis theory
valid. In Florence H. Fitch,8 7 the B.T.A. relied upon Francis as an
alternate ground for its decision. Therefore, so much of Fitch as
pertains to termination of trusts can be considered rejected along
with Francis.
C. The Measuring Event as a Control for Tax Purposes
The fact that the trust does not automatically terminate for tax
purposes upon the happening of the event by which the duration of
the trust is measured does not mean that the measuring event can
be totally disregarded for tax purposes. Taxpayers cannot simply
treat the trust as terminated for tax purposes before the measuring
event. Nor can the trust continue indefinitely once the measuring
event occurs.
In Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Commissioner88 the grantor created
an irrevocable trust in 1911. In 1919, and before the measuring
event, the grantor, trustees, and beneficiaries agreed to revoke the
old trust, and to create a new one instead. The old trust was held
to have continued for tax purposes. In George M. Studebaker39 and
Weston v. Commissioner,40 the trusts were to continue as long as
the trustees - who were also beneficiaries - agreed. In both cases
the trusts owned businesses which sustained losses while being oper-
ated by the trusts. The trustees-beneficiaries tried, after the fact,
to treat the trusts as terminated and to claim the losses as their own
deductions. In the absence of any disagreement about continuing,
both trusts were held to have continued as taxable entities.
The other side of the coin is illustrated by Green v. United
States.41 In addition to major provisions for the settlor's son, the
trust instrument called for small periodic payments to certain servants.
After the measuring event, and after distribution of the corpus, the
remainderman attempted to treat the trust as continuing with respect
to the servants. This was not allowed, and it was held that the trust
did not continue for tax purposes after such distribution of the corpus.
In summary, the measuring event is a condition precedent - a
necessity - to termination of an existing trust for tax purposes; and
36See Edith M. Bryant, 14 T.C. 127 (1950); Trust of Bingham, 2 T.C. 853 (1943);
Leonard Marx, 47 B.T.A. 204 (1942); George S. Fiske, 45 B.T.A. 135 (1941); Wil-
lard C. Lipe, 41 B.T.A. 107 (1940); Russel v. Bowers, 27 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
37 29 B.T.A. 1299 (1934).
28 13 B.T.A. 1069 '(1928).
39 2 B.T.A. 1020 (1925).
40 24 T.C.M. 1439 (1965).
41 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5647 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
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ultimate termination for tax purposes is an automatic, if only eventual
consequence of the happening of the measuring event.
D. Distribution as a Control for Tax Purposes
While the measuring event controls whether or not there can be
a termination, or must be a termination, it does not control the
precise time of termination. This time is controlled by the distribution
of trust corpus.
In Anstes v. Agnew,42 the Tax Court denied the remainderman
a deduction on her income tax return for a commission paid to the
trustee out of the trust at the time of distribution, thus treating the
trust as the proper taxpayer for deducting a commission paid during
distribution. This means that a trust does not terminate for tax pur-
poses until the assets have been distributed. One of the reasons for
holding that the trust in George M. Studebaker4 3 was still a taxable
entity was that two $10,000 legacies had not been distributed by the
trust. The fact that no assets had ever been distributed and that the
title to trust property was still in the trustee was relied upon in
Weston v. Commissioner14 for finding that the trust had not ter-
minated. The holdings in Della M. Coachman 4 and Charles F.
Neave41 were that trusts continue for tax purposes while the trustee
still has duties to perform. In both cases, the only remaining sub-
stantive duty was distribution of corpus at a time when the trusts
were held to be taxable entities.
An applicable Revenue ruling simply states that a trust continues
for tax purposes during the period allowed the trustee under state
law to distribute the assets.4" The reference to local law is probably
attributable to Coachman which relied in part on New York law to
the effect that where a trustee is required to distribute the corpus,
he is allowed a reasonable period to do so, and the corpus remains
trust property during that period.48 Coachman was then cited with
approval in Agnew and Neave both of which preceeded the Revenue
statement concerning local law. The impact of state trust law will be
discussed further under "Reasonable Period for Distribution."
A further Revenue ruling concerns a trust which distributed
installment obligations upon termination.49 If the trust has been
reporting its capital gain on the installment basis, the distribution can
42 16 T.C. 1466 (1951).
432 B.T.A. 1020 (1925).
4424 T.C.M. 1439 (1965).
45 16 T.C. 1432 (1951 ).
46 17 T.C. 1237 (1952).
4 7 
Rev. Rul. 55-287, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 130.
48 16 T.C. 1432, 1434-35 (1951).
49 Rev. Rul. 55-159, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 391.
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be held to have been a disposition which accelerated capital gains to
the trust. This theory is only possible if the trust is a taxable entity
during distribution, and not only until distribution begins.
If distribution of trust property is to be the yardstick for deter-
mining when a trust terminates for tax purposes, it is not only
necessary that trusts be held to endure at least until the assets have
been distributed, it is also necessary that trusts be considered ter-
minated as soon as distribution is or should have been completed.
The necessary decision for this second element was provided in
Leonard Marx.50 There, a trust was held terminated for tax purposes
when a reasonable time for distribution had elapsed, even though
distribution had not been made. This would seem to imply that trusts
are considered terminated at the time actual distribution is completed,
if done within a reasonable time. This case also helps establish the
point that trusts may terminate for tax purposes as to only part of
their corpus under the same rules applicable to the termination of the
entire trust.
There are, then, two types of decisions. One holds that a trust
continues until assets have been distributed. The other provides that
trusts will not continue beyond the date when distribution should
have been accomplished. Between the two, they limit the possibilities
of the termination time for tax purposes. In precise terms, the
cases hold that a trust terminates at the earlier of the following two
events:
(1) The time when the trust assets have actually been distributed.
(2) The expiration of a reasonable period for distribution.
If the possibility of unreasonable delay is ignored for the moment, a
general rule can be stated: The determination of whether a trust has
terminated depends upon whether the property held in trust has been
distributed to the persons entitled to succeed to the property upon
termination of the trust."1
Under the discussion of statutory and quasi-statutory law, it
was asserted that distribution of corpus is the only true yardstick as
to termination of trusts for tax purposes, and that all other aspects
of winding up or administration are only relevant to the question of
whether a delay in distribution is reasonable -but these aspects do
not determine the time of termination by themselves. So far, the
analysis of case law has only considered decisions which support this
5047 B.T.A. 204 (1942).
51 This rule was developed by the courts between 1925 and 1952, as can be seen from
the dates in notes 38 through 48. The rule was then enunciated in the Committee
Reports in 1954, followed in two revenue rulings in 1955, and incorporated in the
Treasury Regulation in 1956. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A-191-92




proposition.52 It is now necessary to reconcile with these distribution
cases all other decisions in point.
E. The Sales Aspect
There are three cases5" in which the trustees sold the trust
property at a loss during the winding up process, but prior to dis-
tribution of assets to the remaindermen. In each case, the remainder-
men tried to deduct the capital losses incurred by the trust on their
personal income tax returns. In each case the remaindermen were
denied this deduction, and the trusts were held to be the tax entities
to the deduction. These decisions stand for the proposition that a
trust endures for tax purposes at least until the sale of the trust
property. They do not hold that trusts terminate after the trust prop-
erty has been sold. Because of the precise tax question involved, it
was not necessary to decide whether the trusts continued for tax
purposes beyond the date of sale. In one of the three cases, Swoboda
v. United States,54 the district court expressly limited its holding by
stating that the trust did not terminate until at least the day of sale.
Since in all three cases the sale occurred before distribution, and since
in all three cases the court held that the trust was in existence at the
time of the sale but did not decide how long after the sale the trust
would continue, these sales cases are not in conflict with the propo-
sition that trusts terminate after the trust property has been dis-
tributed. The district court in Russell v. Bowers,55 and both the
district court and the Third Circuit in Swoboda, also relied upon
applicable state trust law in reaching their decisions.
F. The Accounting Aspect
In Edith M. Bryant,56 the Tax Court held that a final accounting
rendered while the trust still holds property does not terminate the
trust for tax purposes. This 1950 holding decisively eliminated
accounting as the ultimate yardstick for defining the tax termination
date of a trust, and is reflected in both the 1954 Committee Reports17
and the 1956 Treasury Regulation."' The rule in no way conflicts
with the proposition that distribution controls the termination time.
While it does not, by itself, control the time of termination, the
aspect of accounting can have a profound effect upon distribution
52 Florence H. Fitch, 29 B.T.A. 1299 (1934); Francis Francis, 15 B.T.A. 1332 (1929).
53 Swoboda v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1957), a/I'd 258 F.2d 848
(3rd Cir. 1958); Gamble v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo. 1953);
Russel v. Bowers, 27 F. Supp. 13 '(S.D.N.Y. 1939).
54 156 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1957), a/id 258 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1958).
55 27 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
56 14 T.C. 127 (1950), a/f d 185 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1950).
57 H.R. REP. and S. REP., supra note 18.
5 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956).
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which, in turn, controls the time of termination. The Second Circuit
recognized this in Commissioner v. First Trust & Deposit Co.5"
where it was held that it may not be unreasonable for a trustee to
await the protection of a decree upon his accounting before making
distribution, and that the trust continues for tax purposes during this
wait. Thus, the aspect of accounting has a definite function in the
law of termination of trusts for tax purposes: The need for an
accounting may be relevant to the question of whether a delay in
distribution was reasonable.
G. The Duty or Purpose Aspect
The courts have made statements to the effect that a trust con-
tinues for tax purposes while the trustee still has duties to perform,
and in three of the "duty" cases the duty involved was the distribu-
tion of trust property. These three cases, Coachman, Studebaker, and
Neave can, therefore, be classified as holding that a trust continues
for tax purposes until distribution has been made.
In Willard C. Lipe,6° the B.T.A. was confronted with an inter
vivos trust which was to last until the death of both the grantor and
his spouse. The trust instrument, however, placed a duty upon the
trustee to pay the state and federal death taxes of the grantor. It
took several years after the measuring event, and before distribution
was effected, to finally determine and pay the grantor's federal and
state death taxes. The B.T.A. treated the trust as continuing for tax
purposes during this long period, and the Second Circuit affirmed,
accepting the proposition that since one of the purposes of the trust
was to pay the death taxes, the duration of the trust as a tax entity
could properly be extended. The courts did not hold the trust to
continue beyond the distribution date. The decisions, therefore, are
not in conflict with the proposition that termination for tax purposes
is controlled by distribution.
There are no cases which hold that a trust continues while the
trustee still has any duty to perform - at least not as a broad propo-
sition. The cases discussed above concern major duties of trustees in
administration of a trust. In Lipe, the duty was to pay taxes for
which the trustees would have been liable in part as the recipient of
life insurance proceeds. Thus, Lipe can be explained as a case where
tax problems delayed distribution and the delay was found to be
reasonable.
H. General Winding Up Aspect
The discussion of case law has covered all but three of the
pertinent decisions on the question of trust termination for tax pur-
59 118 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1941), ajf'g Willard C. Lipe, 41 B.T.A. 107 (1940).
6041 B.T.A. 107 (1940), affd 118 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1941).
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poses. The first of the remaining three cases is a 1921 Treasury Office
decision."' The trust provided for distribution of trust property one
year after the life beneficiary's death. The decision treated the trust
as a taxable entity for a period following the anniversary of the death.
In George S. Fiske,62 it was held that the trust did not terminate
for tax purposes the moment that the income beneficiary died, but
that the trust was allowed a reasonable time to wind up.
The United States Supreme Court, in Trust of Bingham v.
Commissioner,68 held winding up expenses to be deductible by the
trust. This theory necessarily requires the trust to endure as a taxable
entity at least until the winding up expenses are incurred. It should
be noted that the winding up, in this case as in most, consisted of
distribution of corpus.
Thus, the winding up decisions hold that a trust does not auto-
matically terminate upon the happening of the measuring event.
I. Distribution of Trust Assets: The Determinant of Trust
Termination Time
In summary, the case law points to the conclusion that it is the
time of distribution of the trust corpus which controls the exact time
when a trust terminates for tax purposes. There are several cases
which precisely so hold. None of the remaining cases in point, and
not expressly rejected, conflict with the aforementioned rule: a trust
terminates for tax purposes at the earlier of the following two events:
(1) The time when the trust assets have actually been distributed.
(2) The expiration of a reasonable period for distribution.
It now remains to be shown how administration and winding up
aspects other than distribution affect, under the case law, the defini-
tion of a reasonable period for distribution.
J. Reasonable Period for Distribution
The case law on trust termination sheds very little light on what
is a reasonable period for distribution. However, the qualifying rule
that the actual distribution will not control the date of termination
if there has been unreasonable delay in distribution was clearly stated
as early as 1942 in Leonard Marx.64 Marx also held that the reason-
ableness of the delay is a question of fact.65 There are three other
cases in which the courts expressly found no unreasonable delay;
6
1
6 1 0.D. 806, 4 CUM. BULL. 223 (1921).
6245 B.T.A. 135 (1941), affd 132 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1943).
63 325 U.S. 365 (1945), rev'g 145 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1944, rev'g 2 T.C. 853 (1943).
6447 B.T.A. 204 (1942).
6Id. at 211.
66
Charles F. Neave, 17 T.C. 1237 (1952) ; Della M. Coachman, 16 T.C. 1432 (1951)
Edith M. Bryant, 14 T.C. 127 (1950), a/'d 185 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1950).
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although this holding could be implied in any case which holds a
trust not terminated. The cases with express reference to no unrea-
sonable delay are of little help in establishing precisely what time is
reasonable, because they were not close cases. The delays involved in
the three cases were of only five (Edith M. Bryant)," six (Charles F.
Neave) ,68 and nine (Della M. Coachman)69 months duration count-
ing from the measuring event. All three involved an accounting, and
in the case of the nine months delay, the trustee had to distribute to 50
remaindermen.
On the other hand, the delay in Marx was so obviously unrea-
sonable as to be of little help in deciding other close cases. The
trustee delayed for four years the distribution of part of the corpus
to a beneficiary as to whom the measuring event- age 30- had
occurred.7 ° The court found that the corpus could have easily been
divided and distribution made. Thus, there is no express definition
of a reasonable period for distribution in the case law on trusts. It is
possible, however, to draw some conclusions concerning which factors
are relevant to the question of reasonable delay.
1. Time
Time, by itself, does not appear to control the question of rea-
sonableness of a delay in distribution. One trust was permitted to




It has been expressly held that a trustee may, under some cir-
cumstances, reasonably delay distribution until he is protected by a
court decree upon his accounting." The circumstances involved risky
trust property in the form of mortgages and high tax liabilities. The
delay was at least six years. There are three other cases involving an
accounting and an express holding of no unreasonable delay; but
the delays were comparatively short, all less than nine months from
the measuring event. 8
3. Taxes
It has also been held that trust termination may be delayed until
87 14 T.C. 127 (1950), affd 185 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1950).
6817 T.C. 1237 (1952).
69 
16 T.C. 1432 (1951).
70 Leonard Marx, 47 B.T.A. 204, 207 (1942).
71 Willard C. Lipe, 41 B.T.A. 107 (1940), affd 118 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1941).
72 Commissioner v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 118 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1941).
73 Charles F. Neave, 17 T.C. 1237 (1952); Della M. Coachman, 16 T.C. 1432 (1951);
Edith M. Bryant, 14 T.C. 127 (1950), ajfd 185 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1950).
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taxes are determined and paid, if the payment of taxes is one of the
trust's purposes.
74
4. Ascertaining Amount of Distribution
A trustee may have to wait until the end of a calendar or fiscal
year before he can determine each beneficiary's ratable share of
income. This was held to be a good reason for delaying distribution. 5
Under the same theory, a delay caused by any other bona fide prob-
lems in ascertaining distributive shares would seem to be sufficient
excuse for delay.
5. Sales
The three decisions that trusts continue at least until the trust
property has been sold 76 indicate that the need to make a sale of
trust property, in order to be able to distribute the corpus in the
manner prescribed, is sufficient to delay distribution. These cases,
however, shed no light on how long the required sale may be post-
poned. In one case, the sale itself was the measuring event. 7 The
other two decisions involved short periods of less than one year
between the measuring event and the sale.
6. Dividing Corpus
The need to divide the corpus so that it could be distributed to
some 50 remaindermen was a definite factor in holding a nine months
delay in distribution to be reasonable; 78 but the fact that the corpus
could have easily been divided was a definite factor in holding delay
in another case unreasonable.79 Since division of corpus is so directly
related to the ultimate distribution, any bona fide problems in division
should be sufficient excuse for a delay. However, one requirement
would seem to be that a division was necessary.
7. Local Law
There are a few references in the trust termination decisions to
the applicability of local law to the question of when a trust ter-
minates for tax purposes.8" None of these cases involved a determina-
74 Commissioner v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 118 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1941).
75 Edith M. Bryant, 14 T.C. 127 (1950).
76 Swoboda v. United Sttaes, 156 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1957), afld 258 F.2d 848
(3rd Cir. 1958); Gamble v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo. 1953);
Russel v. Bowers, 27 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
7 Gamble v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
78 Della M. Coachman, 16 T.C. 1432 (1951).
79 Leonard Marx, 47 B.T.A. 204 (1942).
8 0 Swoboda v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1957), ajj'd 258 F.2d 848
(3d Cir. 1958); Della M. Coachman, 16 T.C. 1432 (1951) ; George S. Fiske, 45
B.T.A. 135 '(1941); Russel v. Bowers, 27 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Rev. Rul.
55-287, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 130.
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tion that there was an unreasonable delay for tax purposes when
local law permitted the delay. Thus, state trust law and federal tax
law have not yet come into direct conflict in the area of trust ter-
mination.
8. Individual Circumstances
The fact that there is no defined period after which a delay in
distribution is presumed to be unreasonable, and the decision that
reasonableness is a question of fact 8' result in each case being con-
sidered on its own merits, depending upon the particular circum-
stances surrounding the case. All the factors outlined above influence
the decision as to reasonableness of delay, but none of the factors
control absolutely by themselves. Furthermore, this list of factors is
by no means complete. There simply have not been enough decisions
to date. It is clear, however, that the question of reasonable delay is
influenced by factors from both aspects of trust administration. Some
pertinent factors stem from the aspects concerned with distributing
the corpus to the remaindermen. Examples are sales, dividing corpus,
and ascertaining the amount of distribution. Other factors stem from
the aspect of administration concerned with obtaining a discharge
for the trustee. Examples are accounting and taxes which may involve
a personal liability on the part of the fiduciary.
9. Estate Termination Law
There is a certain temptation to apply estate termination law,
across the board, to trust termination questions. Estates and trusts are
treated together in the same subchapter of the Code. 82 They both
involve the termination of a taxable entity whose affairs must be
wound up. These similarities would tend to make estate termination
law applicable to trusts. There are also, however, some very striking
differences between estates and trusts which should result in some es-
tate termination decisions not being applicable to trusts. One major
difference is that all people die, but few do so voluntarily. While only
very few people create trusts, those created are nearly all premedi-
tated, intentional, and voluntary. Also, hardly anyone ever dies purely
for tax reasons, while many trusts are motivated, at least in part, by
tax considerations. Too, the task of administering an estate is fre-
quently imposed upon the fiduciary with little or no prior warning.
The trustee, on the other hand, usually has much more opportunity
for preplanning the winding up. These differences should be kept
in mind when drawing parallels between estate and trust termination.
81 Leonard Marx, 47 B.T.A. 204 (1942).
82 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, Subchapter J, § 641.
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It is not intended here to analyze estate termination case law in detail.
The subject has been quite adequately treated by various authors.8
CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does not define the time
at which a trust terminates for tax purposes.
The Committee Reports on H.R. 8300, the Treasury Regulations,
and the case law lead to the conclusion that a trust terminates at the
earlier of the following two events:
(1) The time when the trust assets have actually been distributed.
(2) The expiration of a reasonable period for distribution.
Whether a delay in distribution is reasonable is a question of
fact, and depends upon the circumstances of each individual case.
No single factor controls the question of reasonableness and all
aspects of trust administration are relevant - aspects related to
distributing corpus, as well as aspects related to protecting the trustee
from further liability.
The Treasury Regulations further provide that a trust will be
considered terminated for tax purposes even though some assets have
not been distributed, provided that the assets retained by the trustee
are only a reasonable amount set aside in good faith for payment of
unascertained or contingent liabilities and expenses, not counting
claims by beneficiaries in the capacity of beneficiary.
83 Supra notes 6 and 15. See also Bailey, To Continue or Not to Continue as an
Estate, N.Y.U. 23d ANN. INST. ON FED TAx. 1143 (1965) for a categorization of
the factors which influence the question of whether a delay in estate termination is
reasonable.
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TECHNOLOGY, OCEAN MANAGEMENT, AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA: SOME CURRENT HISTORY
By EDwARD MILES*
In this article Mr. Miles discusses aspects of the recent history
of ocean law which reveal the impact of technological development
on the processes of developing international standards to govern
use and management of the oceans. More specifically he demon-
strates how technology considerations have influenced the types of
jurisdictional claims over coastal waters which have been made by
various countries. The present state of ocean technology is briefly
outlined and discussed in terms of its implications for the future
development of ocean law, and the author notes that the law of
outer space will be shaped in a similar way by considerations of
technological development.
INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper is intended primarily for the nonspecialist on the law
of the sea, and it will discuss some of the salient problems in
this branch of international law which have been considered since
the time of the League of Nations Codification Conference of 1930.
The major problems discussed concern the resolution of con-
flicting claims of national jurisdiction over the ocean spaces which
are contiguous to particular nation-states. The considerations which
motivate a particular nation to claim a 3 or a 6 or a 12-mile terri-
torial sea, and the considerations which are relevant to the regulation
of ocean uses beyond the boundaries set by the traditional concepts
of "territorial sea" have changed drastically in recent years. The
most significant of these changes have been recent innovations in
marine technology. The problems which have been generated by
these changes have come to the forefront of international attention.
It is the purpose of this paper to provide both a summary of these
current problems in the law of the sea and a guide to the more
specialized literature in which these problems are discussed in more
detail.
In their monumental work on the law of the sea,' Professors
McDougal and Burke have pointed out that this phenomenon of
international ocean management really reflects three basic processes
vis-a-vis the human use of the oceans. At the highest level of general-
*Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver;
B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
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ity these are: (a) The process of interaction on and in the oceans
among all participants; (b) The process of claim arising out of
these activities; and (c) The process of authoritative decision to
resolve contending claims.2
These processes will be examined, paying particular attention
to the relationship between them. More specifically it will be seen
that the actual and possible uses of the oceans, as viewed from the
perspective of each country's economic and political situation, have
determinative effects on the processes of claim and authoritative
decision.
I. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The extent to which a country is able to use the ocean as a
resource is dependent upon the state of that country's technological
and economic development. Interaction on or in the oceans among
nation-states would indeed be impossible without some minimum
degree of development in marine technology. It is therefore not
unexpected that rapid advances in marine technology would have
a substantial effect upon the entire process of developing inter-
national standards to govern the use of the oceans.
During the last six years, and particularly within the last five,
there has been considerable ferment on national, regional, and
global levels of questions concerning the exploration and exploita-
tion of the oceans. This ferment is a function of several factors, the
major one of which appears to have been the continuing advance
in marine technology, which has had a major impact on the national
security of nation-states, as well as on the economic potential of
ocean exploitation. 8
Marine technology as it has existed up to the present time has
facilitated five kinds of human uses of the ocean. These are for
(a) transportation and communication, (b) food resources, (c) min-
eral resources, (d) national security, and (e) recreation. They have
involved essentially two-dimensional uses of the ocean, but advances
in technology have now placed us on the threshold of the third
dimension- depth. The inefficiency and dangers of operating at
or near the air-sea interface are being significantly reduced, if not
eliminated, and for the first time the exploitation of the deep ocean
2 ld. ch. 1.
3 See the comprehensive estimates published in COMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, [hereinafter




floor is a distinct possibility. In addition to this, we have begun
to pay increasing attention to the interaction between the atmos-
phere and the oceans with a view toward expanding our knowledge
of weather and climate and the possibilities of exercising some
control upon them.
4
This increasing technological sophistication has changed the
order of importance of possible conflict confronting participants
within the international maritime system. Through 1960, the major
problem was the limit of the territorial sea as it related to the problem
of jurisdiction over coastal fisheries. In 1969, the major problem
concerns the limits of the continental shelf and jurisdiction over the
ocean floor beyond the shelf.
During the early international conferences concerning national
dominion over adjacent seas, nations with limited technological
resources demanded large limits subject to their sovereign control
in order to prevent their coastal fisheries from being exploited by
distant nations with technologically superior fishing fleets. The
technologically advanced nations, on the other hand, wanted to
protect distant international waters, which they were capable of
exploiting, from encroachments by the coastal state.
Throughout the many conferences on the subject of national
dominion over adjacent seas during the early years, progress was
made toward establishing uniform international norms, but no satis-
factory agreement was ever adopted. However, the recent develop-
ments in technology have opened up new areas for national
exploitation including the sea bottom adjacent to the coast and the
ocean depths beyond. This new capacity to reach the ocean bottom
has shifted the debate from the monopoly of coastal fishing to
entirely new problems unknown before this decade. As the capacity
to reach these new depths increases, the jurisdictional interests of
adjacent nations increase as well, and once again the conflict between
these expanding interests has brought the issue of ocean management
in its broadest implications to the forefront of international concern.
These issues became the focus of the United Nations General
Assembly debates on the Resources of the Sea in the fall of 1966,'
and the Maltese note verbale of August 18, 1967, proposing inter-
4 See NAS/NRC, INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE OCEANS (Pub.
No. 983, 1962); HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SPACE AND THE
WEATHER, H.R. REP. No. 2561, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1962); W. Sewell, Human
Dimensions of the Atmosphere, Feb. 1968 (Draft Report to the National Science
Foundation, Program on Applications Analysis, National Center for Atmospheric
Research, Boulder, Colorado).
5 U.N. Doc. A/OR/21/C.2/SR (1966), at 1062-65.
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national control of the ocean floor "beyond present limits of national
jurisdiction."'
The problems generated by the expansion of these national
jurisdictional interests may be pointed out by comparing one of the
earlier conferences on the law of the sea with some of the more
recent conferences.
II. SALIENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA SINCE 1930
At this time a review of three attempted codifications of the
law of the sea -The Hague Codification Conference of 1930,
sponsored by the League of Nations, and the United Nations Geneva
Conferences of 1958 and 1960 - will reveal quite clearly the
processes of claim and authoritative decision, and will show how
these processes have been affected by expanding jurisdictional
interests. We should remember, however, that the three attempts at
codification took place in two different international organizations
and inevitably reflect the larger structures of these systems. For
instance, while it is true that norms which systematize and regulate
activities of competing participants on the oceans have historically
reflected the prevailing interests and capabilities of the major nation-
states, particularly under the League of Nations, since 1955 minor
members of the international system, concomitant with their increased
role in the United Nations General Assembly, have been effective
in challenging existing norms and influencing the emerging law of
the sea in such a way as to be responsive to their own interests.7
6 U.N. Doc. A/6695 (Aug. 18, 1967). For summaries of recent developments in marine
technology and the challenges they pose, see e.g., W. BURKE, OCEAN SCIENCES,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1966);
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT,
MARINE SCIENCE AFFAIRS-A YEAR OF TRANSITION (1967); PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PANEL ON OCEANOGRAPHY, EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SEA
(1966); W. Chapman, The State of Ocean Use Management, Apr. 24, 1967 (un-
published paper presented to the 2d Session of the FAO Committe on Fisheries,
Rome).
7 For reports and analyses of the Geneva Conferences, See Burke, Some Comments on
the 1958 Conventions, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw [hereinafter
cited as ASIL] PROCEEDINGS, 1959, 197-206; Dean, The Law of the Sea Conference,
1958-1960, and Its Aftermath, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, 244-64 (L. Alexander ed.)
[hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER (1967)1; Dean, Achievements at the Law of the
Sea Conference, ASIL PROCEEDINGS, 1959, at 186-97; Friedheim, Factor Analysis as a
Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 47-70; Herrington,
The Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of Living Resources, Accomplishments
of the 1958 Geneva Conference, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 26-35; MCDOUGAL &
BURKE, supra note 1; Neblett, The 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea: What
Was Accomplished, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 36-46; Dean, The Second Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 54 AM. J. INT'L LAW 751-89 (1960); Dean, The
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L
LAw 607-28 (1958); Friedheim, The "Satisfied" and "Dissatisfied" States Negotiate
International Law, 18 WORLD POL. 20-41 (1965); Whiteman, Conference on the Law
of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52 AM. J. INT'L LAw 629-59 (1958).
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In the three international conferences under consideration, the
issues of determining the limit of the territorial sea and the extent
of fishing rights in the contiguous zone became the focal points
around which highly disruptive conflict revolved, and in none of
them was it possible to arrive at agreement. In at least two of these
three conferences, these two issues were regarded as the crux of the
whole undertaking of the codification of the law of the sea.8 This
is a vivid example of a situation in which no solution appeared to
be a better alternative than a solution which ignored the claims of
any of the competing groups, most of whom rigidly adhered to their
initial positions.
Claims made with regard to desired limits of the territorial sea
were almost identical under both the League and United Nations
conferences. Although some participants shifted their positions over
time, the limits suggested under the League were the same as those
proposed under the United Nations, with the exception of claims
to prescribe and apply authority over an area extending 200 miles
from the coastline made by certain Latin American states after 1945.
Also, under the League, the debates tended to be conducted in much
more doctrinal terms than under the United Nations, with the result
that the interests which lay behind these claims were often obscured.
A. The Hague Conference of 1930
At The Hague Conference of 1930, both the United Kingdom
and the United States, inter alia, firmly adhered to a 3-mile limit as
being most efficacious in preserving the historic freedom of the seas.9
This was, in fact, the majority position to which other nations sub-
mitted alternatives.
The most extreme claim which confronted adherents of the
3-mile limit was Spain's initial proposal that each country be allowed
unilaterally to fix the breadth of its own territorial sea.'0
8 Statement of the representative of Saudi Arabia at the 2nd Conference sponsored
by the U.N.: U.N., SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, Official Records, Summary Records of Meetings of the Committee of the Whole,
March 17-April 26, 1960, A/CONF.19/8, at 37 (Hereinafter cited as U.N. 2ND
SEA CONFERENCE). See also, the statement of the Chairman of the 2nd Committee
on Territorial Waters at The Hague Codification Conference of 1930, LEAGUE,
PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, 1930, 2nd Committee, Doc. C.351(b).M.145(b). V, at
119 (1930).
9 U.N. 2ND SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 17-18, 20.
10 Id. at 28.
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TABLE 1
State Policies Towards the Breadth of the Territorial Sea Before
The Hague Codification Conference of 193011
Unilateral
3-mile limit 4-mile limit 6-mile limit 12-mile limit 18-mile limit delimitation

















(Total - 16) (Total - 2) (Total - 2) (Total - 0) (Total - 1) (Total - 1)
In descending order of exclusiveness, Portugal claimed a 12-mile
limit, and in the explanation of her position we have a condensed
version of the entire conflict over the delimitation of the territorial
sea in both the League of Nations and the United Nations. Since
Portuguese fishing sites extended in the relatively shallow water
around her coasts for approximately 12 miles, said the Portuguese
delegate, and since the Portuguese population was considerably
dependent upon the fishing yield for a substantial part of its diet,
Portugal could not agree to any limit which would deprive her of
satisfying this essential interest.'2  If, however, most states were
opposed to a 12-mile limit, Portugal was prepared to agree to a
6-mile limit and a contiguous zone of a further 6 miles in which
her comprehensive and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and control
over fishing rights would be acknowledged.3
The primary interest with which all states were concerned
involved the competence to extend or prescribe authority over fishing
in certain waters adjacent to their coasts and beyond. Thus, by as
early as 1930, the terms of a debate which was to occur many times
were firmly established. The confrontation was one between those
states like Great Britain, the United States, and Japan which had
the capability and need for engaging in distant-water fishing and
those states possessing the need but not the capability for doing so.
In the latters' eyes, therefore, it was essential to gain exclusive control
over as wide an area of the sea adjacent to their coasts as was
'1 Complied from, LEAGUE, PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, BASES OF DISCUSSIONS: TERRI-
TORIAL WATERS, Doc. C.74, M.39, at 22-32 (1929).




possible; their attempts to do so were encroachments upon the
distant-water fishing interests of the larger nation-states.
After days of arguing, the original positions of states were
virtually unchanged and no agreement was in sight.' 4 The Hague
Conference was unable to agree upon an International Convention
regulating the limits of the territorial sea. As one Committee Chair-
man put it: "There is an atmosphere of resignation in the Committee.
We have to acknowledge to our regret that agreement is not possible
on the question of the breadth of territorial waters."' 5
TABLE 2
State Policies Towards the Breadth of the Territorial
Sea at the End of the Conference' 6
Unilateral
3-mile limit 4-mile limit 6-mile limit 12-mile limit 18-mile limit delimitation




















(Total - 19) (Total - 4) (Total - 10) (Total - 1) (Total - 0) (Total - 0)
B. First United Nations Conference of 1958
As indicated, there was very little difference in substance
between confrontations over delimitation of the territorial sea under
the League and confrontations under the United Nations. The inter-
national conferences sponsored by the United Nations did, however,
manage to reveal exactly those interests that lay behind various
positions. That these were much the same as those existing in 1930
was testified to by the delegate from Jordan in the First Committee
of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.'
14 1d. at 123-26.
15 Id. at 160.
16Compiled from, LEAGUE, PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, 2nd Committee, Territorial
Waters, Doc. C. 351(c).M.145(c) (1930).
2'7 U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Geneva, Feb. 24-Apr. 27, 1958.
Summary Records of the Meetings of the First Committee (The Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone), A/CONF. 13/39, at 18 (1958) [hereinafter cited as U.N.
SEA CONFERENCE).
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Summing up the conflict taking place in the First Committee
over the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, it appeared to the
Jordanian delegate that the problem occurred as a result of divergent
views adopted by the great maritime powers, on the one hand, who
called for a decision on the basis of 3 miles, and the smaller nations,
on the other hand, who urged that a limit of 12 miles or more be
established. The bases of these divergent views, he thought, were
to be attributed to the fact that a strict interpretation of the freedom
of the seas would work to the advantage of the larger maritime
states while an extension of the area in which smaller states could
exercise comprehensive and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and
control would serve their interests - which were partially dictated
by their concern with defense. I" The concern with defense may have
been of paramount importance for the State of Jordan, given the
prolonged condition of hostility existing between the Arab States
of the Middle East and Israel. For the rest of those states opposing
the establishment of a 3-mile limit, however, the uppermost concern
remained with fishing rights.
The United Kingdom, supported by the Netherlands, Canada,
and France, continued to adhere to a 3-mile limit as the one which
had gained the widest historical acceptance and practical applica-
tion.' 9 Being a little more specific, the United States claimed that
a 3-mile limit was the safest for shipping and was the most equitable
limit possible for all states.2 ° Furthermore, a 3-mile limit, if generally
recognized, would serve to secure fisheries, a source of food for all
the world, from further encroachment of the coastal state.2 I This
claim was strongly supported by Japan, which depended on the sea
for 90 percent of her animal protein.2
Of those states who lobbied for a 3-mile limit, Canada was
among the first to offer a compromise - the establishment of a
3-mile territorial limit, with a 12-mile contiguous zone for fishing.2"
Now forced into specificity, the United Kingdom replied that its
own economic interests could not admit to such an extension. 21
The most extreme claims were those proposed by Peru, Chile,
Costa Rica, and El Salvador, all of whom demanded general recog-
18Id.
1
9 1d. at 8, 11, 19.
20Id. at 25-26.
21 Id.
2 2 Id. at 24-25.
2 Id. at 90. The phrase "territorial limits'" meant those waters subject to a compre-
hensive and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and control - i.e., subject to the abso-
lute sovereignty of the adjacent nation. The phrase "contiguous zone" meant those
waters beyond the territorial limits over which the adjacent nation would be awarded
specified competences by international agreement to occasionally exercise jurisdiction
and control with regard to certain particular interests within the zone.
2
4 Id. at 104.
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nition of the extension of their territorial sea to 200 miles in order
"to protect the living resources of the sea from excessive exploitation
by foreign fishing fleets.""1 Both Burma and Indonesia called for
the establishment of varying breadths based on the "economic,
geographical, biological, technological, political, and defense needs
of the state concerned."2 The foregoing positions, and others, are
summarized in Table 3.
In the light of these diverse positions, each supported so rigidly
by its own faction, it is not surprising that effective compromise
proved elusive. In addition, voting tended to be in blocs composed
on the basis of interests and/or geographical location, and all pro-
posals which were offered failed to command a consensus, no matter
how many conciliations were made.
C. Second United Nations Conference of 1960
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
in 1960 was essentially a continuation of the first, and the attending
nations continued to build upon proposals submitted during the
previous conference in an attempt to reach the two-thirds majority
required for agreement. In another attempt at the reconciliation of
competing interests, the United States reintroduced a proposal in
which the maximum limit of the territorial sea was to be 6 miles
with a contiguous zone for fishing extending for another 6 miles.2 8
In addition, foreign fishermen who had been accustomed to fish in
this contiguous 6-mile zone before January 1, 1958 (the base period),
would be allowed to fish for the same yield of the same groups of
species.29 The United States delegate also explicity recognized that
this proposal did not provide for those special situations in which
the coastal state was particularly dependent upon fishing but where
it did not possess the technical capability to fish beyond coastal
waters. On this point, however, the United States was prepared to
extend sympathetic and careful consideration."0
The United Kingdom, with great reluctance, supported this
proposal which would involve a "heavy sacrifice" for her fishing
interests.8 1 But the Yugoslav delegate severely attacked the pro-
vision securing the rights of foreign fishermen as a poorly conceived
effort to uphold acquired rights which were nothing but "vestiges
2Id. at 33 ; see also 6, 48.
2 U.N. SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 4, 14.
27 U.N. 2ND SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 158-63.
2 U.N. 2ND SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 45-46.
2 8 id.
30 Id.
31 id. at 55.
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of colonialism.""2 Canada was again opposed to this provision but
this time was prepared to compromise if the United States placed
a 5-year limit on the preceding base period and a 10-year limit on
the exercise of these benefits by foreign fishermen from October 31,
1960. This having been done, the proposal was jointly sponsored
by the United States and Canada.3 Because of this amendment,
though, the proposal was unpalatable to the United Kingdom, to
whom the time periods were too short and the costs too great.
3 4
But she still voted for it in Plenary Session, at which time the vote
was 54 in favor, 28 opposed, with five abstentions. 5 It was not
adopted, however, as it was one vote short of the required two-
thirds majority. Consequently, no norm regulating the breadth of
the territorial sea was included in the results of either convention.
Only a few of the significant positions, proposals, and votes
on this issue are described above. However, Robert Friedheim has
factor analyzed all 78 votes - 67 substantive and 11 procedural -
taken during the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences in order to
determine the underlying issues of conflict in voting behavior.36
His results are compatible with the statements made heretofore.37
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR CURRENT SITUATION
Given this background, what trends are now evident on issues
concerning the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and jurisdiction over
fisheries?
At the end of the long discussions on the problem of the terri-
torial sea in the International Law Commission, there was neither
32 1 d. at 70.
33 d. at 121.
341d. at 126-27.
35Id. at 30.
36 Friedheim, Factor Analysis as a Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea, in ALEXANDER
(1967), at 47-70.
37 Id. at 57. Friedheim claims that combining proposals on the breadth of the territorial
sea with proposals on a contiguous zone probably explained the failure to reach any
acceptable compromise. As mentioned earlier, supra note 23, the contiguous zone was
an area beyond the territorial limits over which the adjacent nation would be awarded
specified competences to exercise a limited jurisdiction with regard to particular
interests. Conflict regarding the contiguous zone revolved around what specified
competences were to be awarded the coastal state, the legal significance of such com-
petence, and the manner in which its enforcement was to be accomplished. See e.g.,
LEAGUE, PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, 2d Committee, at 31, (1930).
For example, although it was generally agreed that a state could exercise occa-
sional jurisdiction in the contiguous zone in regard to fiscal, sanitary, and customs
interests (A/CN.4/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1, 2 ILC YEARBOOK, 1956, at 264 (1956))
a dispute arose at the first United Nations Conference as to whether or not a coastal
state should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction and control within the contiguous
zone on the basis of security interests. U.N. SEA CONFERENCE, 1st Committee, at
107, 181. See also, criticisms of the International Law Commission's recommendations
and the decisions of the 2nd U.N. Conference in McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1,
at 76, 604-07.
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a single point of view nor a concrete proposal which had gained
general acceptance. In the face of hopeless deadlock, therefore, by
the significant vote of 7 to 6, the ILC passed the problem on to the
future international conference in the following way:
1. The Commission recognizes that international practice is not
uniform as regards the traditional limitation of the territorial
sea to three miles.
2. The Commission considers that international law does not justify
an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.
3. The Commission, without taking any decisions as to the breadth
of the territorial sea within that limit, considers that inter-
national law does not require States to recognize a breadth
beyond three miles.3 8
Somewhat ironically, in spite of (or perhaps as a result of),
the conflict generated in 1958 and 1960, this is about where we
stand. Even at the end of the 1930 Conference the traditional 3-mile
limit still represented the majority position, although the 6-mile
limit had increased its supporters from two to 10. By 1960, how-
ever, the 3-mile position had declined from a majority to a plurality,
the 10-mile position had remained steady but was superseded by
the 12-mile position which now had 13 adherents. In fact, a majority
of states (33) supported positions which called for limits greater
than 3 miles. If they did nothing else, therefore, the 1958 and 1960
Conferences definitely undermined the supremacy of the traditional
restrictive 3-mile limit and the lesser developed states did much to
achieve this.
As of 1967, the situation, based on data provided by Professor
Lewis Alexander, looks like this:
TABLE 4
Frequency Distribution of Current
Limits to the Territorial Sea"
Number of Number of
Limit Countries Limit Countries
3 miles 32 12 miles 26
4 " 3 50 Km. 1
5 " 1 130 miles 1
6 " 16 200 " 1
12 Km. 1 None specified 7
9 miles 1 No information 15
10 " 2 Landlocked countries 28
Although the distribution is considerably affected by the com-
prehensiveness of the data, the major clusters are still around the 3,
6, and 12-mile limits. However, at least 50 percent of all countries
with a seacoast now have limits beyond 3 miles. The figure is higher
than that if we realize that states like Costa Rica, Iceland, Peru,
38 A/CN.4/Ser. A/1955 Add 1, 2 ILC YEARBOOK, 1955, at 35.
39 Alexander, Offrhore Claims of the World, ALEXAN, ER (1967), Table 3, at 72-75.
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and South Korea who report no specified limit certainly are not
stout defenders of the traditional norm. On the other hand, there
are only three countries who claim limits beyond 12 miles, and so
we are back to the ILC's conclusion.
While the evidence suggests that exclusive claims on the terri-
torial sea may have stabilized around the 12-mile limit as maximum,
it is not entirely clear that claims concerning fishery jurisdiction
have also stabilized, even though zones up to 12 miles now represent
the majority (55 out of 86) position. 0
There is another irony about all this - fish do not breed and
live according to rigidly defined constructs like contiguous zones,
nor is a territorial sea of 12 miles any more effective for security
reasons than one of 3 miles.41 As McDougal and Burke so aptly
point out, the spatial variable per se is not crucial and, indeed, is
often misleading. Rather, "what is important for policy is not mere
distance but the concentration of activities and interests being
located."
42
If we were to contrast the distinctive features of the 1958 and
1960 Geneva Conferences with those of The Hague Conference of
1930, the major differences would have to be phrased in terms of
the primacy of the East-West confrontation in the post World War II
era, the rate of technological advance and the expectations that are
generated as a result, and the role played by the smaller, lesser
developed participants in shaping the outcomes of the last two
conferences. One of the other striking differences to be observed
would be in the whole issue of the continental shelf which did not
even exist as far as The Hague Conference was concerned.
It was not until 1942 that the first treaty demarcating relative
jurisdictions over the shelf in the Gulf of Paria was signed between
Britain and Venezuela, and it was not until 1945 that the United
States issued its proclamation claiming jurisdiction over the shelf
surrounding the United States.48 This was followed by an Argen-
tinean claim which included the superjacent waters, with the United
States denying the validity of the latter ingredient.
The problem of defining the limits of the shelf is difficult
because the concept refers to the subsoil extending from the coast
of a state out under the sea and the geologic diversity which exists
makes any limit defined in terms of depth an artificial one. This is
40Neblett, The 1968 Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,
ALEXANDER (1967), Table 1, at 42.
41 McDougal, International Law and the Law of the Sea, ALEXANDER (1967), at 20.
4 McDouGL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 9, n. 25.
43 For the relevant documents, see H. BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS 377-85 (2d ed.
1952). For a more conprehensive history see Moutan, The Continental Shelf, 85
RECUEIL DES COURS 347-463 (1954).
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so even though UNESCO claimed in 1957 that the continental shelf
had a remarkably uniform marginal depth of 100 to 150 meters.
44
Prior to 1945, the shelf was important primarily for coastal
fisheries, both pelagic and sedentary, because the water is sufficiently
shallow to allow considerable photosynthetic activity which leads to
the creation of rather large fisheries.4" In addition, there was some
coal mining, but it was the coming of off-shore oil drilling operations
that led to the new significance attached to this area. As a result,
the continental shelf became a major issue about which most
controversy turned in the ILC's preparatory work on the law of the
sea.
As the Commission stated in its commentary, the debate over
definitions of the continental shelf was a long (and at times con-
fusing) one. 46  Several times the Commission wavered between
adopting the criterion of exploitability to define the limits of the
shelf and adopting a precise limit based on the depth of the
superjacent ocean, i.e., up to 200 meters. In the end, the Commission
included both criteria.47
During the discussion on the legal status of the shelf, Mr. Ivan
Kerno, representative of the Secretary-General to the ILC, stated
that whatever the Commission decided about the continental shelf,
explicit mention should be made of the status of its superjacent
waters.48
He suggested that although it was necessary for the ILC to
make specific the depth and distance up to which rights of juris-
diction and control could be exercised by the coastal state, these
limits should be supplemented by a provision designed to maintain
the flexibility of the norm vis-a-vis continued advances in techniques
of exploitation. In other words, both a fixed limit and the exploita-
bility criterion should be employed. There appeared, at no time,
44 UNESCO, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, in
U.N. SEA CONFERENCE: PREPARATORY DOCUMENTS, Doc. A/CONF. 13/2/Add. 1, at
39-46 (1957). For a more recent analysis which differs considerably from UNESCO's,
see Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor Sovereignty, in ALEXANDER (1967), at
139-59.
4 Chapman, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 87-105.
See also FAO, Examination of Living Resources Associated with the Sea Bed of the
Continental Shelf with Regard to the Nature and Degree of their Physical and Bio-
logical Association with Such Sea Bed in U.N. SEA CONFERENCE: PREPARATORY
DOCUMENTS, Doc. A/CONF. 13/13, at 187-97 (1957).
46 2 ILC YEARBOOKS, 1956, at 296-97.
47 Article 67 reads:
For the purposes of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used
as referring to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres
(approximately 100 fathoms) or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the said areas.
A/CNA/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1, at 296.
4U.N. Doec's A/CN.4/Ser. A/1950, 1 ILC YEARBOOK, 1950, at 228.
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to have been any consideration of the probable incompatibility of
these two criteria in practice, especially in terms of the conflict
which might be generated between those states which could sponsor
and employ advances in techniques of exploitation as opposed to
those which could not. Prior to the 1958 Conference, UNESCO had
prepared a working paper on this question which specifically pointed
out the incompatibility of a combined bathymetric/exploitability
limit, but there is no indication that this warning was heeded in the
debates.
The solution which was finally adopted during the actual
conference was that a clause be inserted in the article defining the
shelf, and stipulating that no state could exploit the seabed and
subsoil off the coast of another without its express consent.49 With
this sole addition, the conference accepted the recommendation of
the Commission, which was a compromise on the lowest common
denominator - words rather than substantive issues.
The problem which now confronts us is that it has become
technologically possible to drill for oil and other minerals far beyond
the 200-meter isobath, leaving the limit on the shelf rather open-
ended. In addition, mineral exploitation has significant impacts on
other uses of the ocean - fishing, navigation, and security - and
these conflicting uses must be reconciled. I will return to current
attempts to deal with expanding national jurisdiction over the oceans
after I survey some of the more important technological innovations
in ocean exploitation.
IV. RECENT INNOVATIONS IN MARINE TECHNOLOGY AND
THEIR IMPACTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF THE OCEANS
In this section a number of innovations will be cataloged, current
and predicted, which were pinpointed at the first Mershon Confer-
ence on Law, Organization, and Security in the Use of the Oceans."
These innovations will be put into the following categories: fishing,
drilling and mining, military uses, and weather prediction and
control. 1 Although these have to be separated for purposes of
analysis, I do not wish to leave the reader with the misleading
4U.N. SEA CONFERENCE, 4th Committee, A/CONF. 13/42, at 43 (1957).
o Held at Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University, March 17-18, 1967.
51 For other summaries, see, Abel & Sullivan, Trends in Marine Sciences, in ALEXANDER
(1967), at 42; W. BURKE, OCEAN SCIENCEs, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1966); Burke, Law and the New Technologies,
in ALEXANDER (1967), at 204; MacDonald, What's in the Ocean, 64 INT'L SCI. &
TECH. 38 (1967); J. Craven, Technology and the Law of the Sea, Mar. 17, 1967
(unpublished paper presented to the first Mershon Conference on Law, Organization,
and Security in the Use of the Oceans, Mar. 17-18, 1967, at Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter cited as 1st Mershon Conference]; J. Knauss, Prob-
lems in Oceanography- 1977, Mar. 17, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the
first Mershon Conference).
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impression that each category can actually be dealt with in isolation.
The ocean is a single system in which all technologies have multiple
impacts, compatible and incompatible, on other uses and users. Two
generalizations can be made which should be kept in mind at all
times but which are rarely underscored in the popular literature.
These are:
(a) That technological advance per se is inherently unlimited;
but
(b) That the widespread utilization of new technologies will
be determined, in broad terms, by the rate of return for
industry and by cost/benefit ratios for governments.
A. Innovations in Fishing52
One built-in uncertainty about this problem is that we do not
know what major technological breakthroughs are likely, but
Kasahara suggests that research ought to be channeled primarily
into two major fields. These are: "the utilization of marine animals
(including zooplankton) at lower trophic levels; and the possibility
of changing oceanographic conditions to increase primary produc-
tivity." 3 Similarly, it is fair to say that, apart from normal improve-
ments in gear, boats, the composition and capability of fleets, etc.,
most recent innovations reflect to varying degrees the concern with
moving from fishing as hunting to more efficient and controlled
systems of husbandry. 4
More specifically, these innovations have been directed toward
such activities as farming both crustacea and pelagic species in bays,
estuaries, and other enclosed places, herding fish in the open sea
by using electric fields or trained porpoises, harvesting krill in the
antarctic, manipulating the ecosystem of certain portions of the
ocean to increase productivity by inducing artificial upwelling, and
developing marine protein concentrate for human consumption. 5
Until these become effective methods of "aquaculture," Gemini
photographs have shown that it is possible to use orbiting satellites
52 This section is based primarily on the following unpublished works from the 1st
Mershon Conference: W. Chapman, Food Production from the Sea and the Nutritional
Requirements of the World; H. Kasahara, Food Production from the Ocean; D.
Moore, Developing Fishing Technology and the Future Law of the Sea; M. Schaefer,
Some Comments on Interaction between the Exploitation of the Food Resources and
Other Uses of the Ocean.
53 H. Kasahara, supra note 52, at 17.
54 Proceedings of the 1st Mershon Conference, at A6-A7 (privately distributed publica-
tion) ; see also, Isaacs, Food From the Sea, 64 INT'L Sci. & TECH. 61 (1967).
55 See, E. Miles, Some Socio-Cultural Problems Involved in Expanding Use of Marine
Protein Concentrate for Human Consumption, Oct. 5, 1967 (unpublished paper pre-
sented to the Second Mershon Conference on Law, Organization, and Security in the
Use of the Oceans, Oct. 5-7, 1967, at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio)
[hereinafter cited as 2nd Mershon Conference].
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to detect large schools of fish and thereby to aid fishermen in their
search. 6
It has been suggested that sedentary fish farming and the
harvesting of pelagic species on the continental shelf have been
greatly facilitated by another major technological innovation -
saturation diving."7 But so far fish farming on a large scale is an
enormously expensive activity and is therefore not likely to be widely
employed. The difficulties of farming in the open ocean are still
considerable, and it is not at all clear that the harvesting of zoo-
plankton will in the long run generate sufficient pay-off. The most
promising of the innovations cataloged here is thought to be inducing
artificial upwelling by nuclear energy, and it is estimated that the
cost/benefit ratios will become more favorable as the cost of pro-
ducing nuclear energy decreases.58
B. Innovations in Drilling and Mining
I will not detail here specific innovations in ocean drilling and
mining activities. "9 I need only point out that the thrust of all these
innovations is to provide the petroleum and mining industries with
a greater mobility and an enlarged capability for operating at greater
depths of the ocean in their search for new raw materials and new
energy reserves. As one expert put it: "I believe that in the future,
semisubmersibles and the self-powered floaters will be committed
to ever-increasing water depths. The ultimate design objective for
a drilling unit is depicted as a totally automatic, submarine unit,
whose principal function will be unaffected by environmental
forces." 60
We should realize, also, that these developments will have
several side-effects among which will be an increase in the difficulty
of controlling oil and other pollution of the ocean. The emergence
of the supertanker has presented us with this problem in a magnitude
56 See, W. Chapman, Implications of Space Research to Fishery Development, Apr. 7,
1967 (Unpublished paper presented to the Symposium on the Ocean from Space
conducted by the American Society for Oceanography in Houston, Texas, Apr. 7,
1967).
57 See, J. Craven, supra note 51, at 24-25; Clarke, Flechsig & Grigg, Ecological Studies
During Sealab 11, 157 SCIENCE 1381 (1967).
58 Comment by Dr. M. B. Schaefer at the 1st Mershon Conference.
59 See Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenomenon to World
Resources in THE FUTURE OF THE SEAS RESOURCES 32 (L. Alexander ed. 1968).
Hibbard, Offshore Petroleum and Natural Gas: A Marine Resource of Increasing
Importance in THE FUTURE OF THE SEAS RESOURCES 52 (L. Alexander ed. 1968) ;
Mero, Alternatives for Minteral Exploitation in id. at 94; Walthier, Remarks on the
Mining of Deep Ocean Mineral Deposits in id. at 98; Andel, Deep-Sea Drilling for
Scientific Purposes: A Decade of Dreams, 160 SCIENCE 1419 (1968); Coene, Profile
of Marine Resources, Mar. 17, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the 1st Mershon
Conference).
00 Hibbard, supra note 59, at 53.
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hitherto unexperienced. 61 Oil, as well as radioactive waste, will
continue to pollute the oceans, while we are still largely ignorant
of the effect of these on the ecosystem of the ocean.
C. Innovations in Military Technology
In the area of military technology we will continue to see
improvements on Polaris-type systems, accelerating research to
enhance a nation's anti-submarine warfare capability, improvements
in propulsion, particularly with regard to making the fuel cell an
economic alternative to nuclear power, and we are now at the point
where the emplacement of missile silos on the ocean floor is tech-
nically feasible. But perhaps the most dramatic recent innovation
is the deep submersible with its attendant improvements in the
structure of hulls and command and control systems. As Dr. John
Craven, Director of the United States Navy's Deep Submergence
Systems Project, states: "[T~he projection of deep-ocean technology
is such that in the period beyond 1980 we may expect a socially-
significant proliferation of non-military submersibles and equipment
of low-cost, capable of operating throughout the water column at/or
on the bottom and capable of exploiting the sea bed or the resources
of the sea bed.1"
6 2
It is clear that these deep submersibles will be used for a wide
range of military and nonmilitary purposes, from finding lost
H-bombs and submarines, to conducting ocean science research, to
carrying out exploration and exploitation of mineral and petroleum
resources. They will be owned not only by governments but by
private companies and individuals, and this will add a host of new
complications to the use of the deep ocean and the sea bed. As far
as the utility of these vessels for research is concerned, one expert
has made the following observation:
Without question the most valued feature of the submersible
is that the observer can visit the site and make direct records of his
observations. Examples of the work thus made possible are direct,
prolonged observation of the behavior of marine organisms and of
the fine variability in sediments; observation of sediment transport
and features of deeply submerged canyons; observation of near
bottom currents with dye; discovery of extensive terraces on the
continental shelf; correlation of the biota with the nature of the
bottom sediment; proof of the existence of life at the deepest
known spot in the ocean; exploration of the bathymetry and biota
61 See Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENvER L. J.
400 (1967); Walsh, Pollution: The Wake of the "Torrey Canyon," 160 SCIENCE
167 (1968).
62J. Craven, supra note 51; see also Craven, Ocean Technology and Submarine Warfare,




of Lake Michigan, revealing the existence of a mid-lake sill, glacial
boulders, and snowlike precipitation. 63
D. Innovations in Weather Forecasting and Modification
Technological innovations which affect weather research include
the utilization of orbiting weather satellites (TIROS, ESSA,
HIMBUS) and improvements in buoy and other sensor technology
for data gathering purposes. The net result, therefore, is to permit
a potentially global observation which was heretofore impossible.64
Apart from this development, perhaps the greatest concern is being
focused on patterns of ocean circulation and their relationship with
the exchange of heat between the atmosphere and the oceans.6"
It appears that it is this relationship which is crucial for understand-
ing and predicting weather patterns - and particularly for under-
standing the generation of large-scale weather disturbances like
hurricanes and typhoons. 6
The need for more knowledge in this area is necessary not only
for improving forecasts, but it is also crucial to attempts to modify
the weather in different ways; the most dramatic example of which
may be the plans to seed hurricanes. The great problem here, how-
ever, relates to the uncertainty of the behavior of the hurricane after
it is seeded and the probable damage to countries in its path with
the possible subsequent liability of the country sponsoring the
research. There is agreement among scientists that the experiments
which are conducted should not lead to irreversible results.
6 7
V. THE IMPACTS OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
It is clear that the thrust of all trends and technological inno-
vations discussed above has been to extend the jurisdiction of the
coastal state beyond traditional limits and to stimulate increasing
national claims for even greater exclusive controls. Some agreement
has been made that this will facilitate the efficient exploitation of
oil and gas and minerals given the need of these industries for long
term security and predictability in their activities - a result of the
magnitude of the investment required. But if one looks at the
problem from a global perspective that includes other uses and users,
63Arnold, Manned Submersibles for Research, 158 SCIENCE 84-95 (1967).
64 See THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOP-
MENT, UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN SPACECRAFT OCEANOGRAPHY, Oct. 1, 1967
(pamphlet).
6 5
NAS/NRC, INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE OCEANS 1-4 (pub.
No. 983, 1962).
66Miller, Characteristics of Hurricanes, 157 SCIENCE 1389-99 (1967).
67 See the comments by Dr. Athelstan Spilhaus, at the 1st Mershon Conference, Vol. II,
at D15-D19 (Mar. 17-18, 1967).
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the attractiveness of this alternative declines." s States with major
naval capabilities are not likely to find such carving up of the oceans
very desirable.
Furthermore, the scientific research requirements of ocean
exploration are such that only a coordinated, massive international
effort will yield comprehensive results. It is for this reason that
President Johnson's proposal for an international decade of ocean
exploration was favorably received by the Soviet Union and other
countries. "9
Thus, recent technological innovations have succeeded in bring-
ing questions of ocean policy to the forefront of current international
political issues. These questions revolve mainly around the limits of
the continental shelf and jurisdiction over the floor beyond the shelf.
In other words, the major issues are who gets what, when, where,
and how, and the conflicts generated thereby impinge upon the
efficiency and feasibility of an international regulation system for
fisheries, oil and gas, minerals, transportation and navigation, and
security and recreation.70
Most recommendations which have been made fall into the four
categories, succinctly characterized by Richard Young:
(1) An extension of the shelf doctrine to all ocean areas,
thereby effecting a division of the ocean floor among coastal states
fronting on the ocean.
(2) A revision of the occupation theory which would permit
acquisitions by individual states, but which would establish by
multilateral convention an international registration system for
national claims, possibly along with some international controls and
some provision for preventing or resolving conflicts.
(3) A vesting of the deep-sea floor in some international
agency, which would in effect act like a landlord in granting
68 For excellent summaries of the major questions involved, see Christy and Brooks,
Shared Resources of the World Community, in NEW DIMENSIONS FOR THE UNITED
NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT DECADE (C. Eichelberger ed. 1966) ; Young,
The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 641-53 (1968) ; see
also Hearings on Governing the Use of Ocean Space Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
69N.Y. Times, June 18, 1968, at 23, col. 1.
70 Full discussions of these questions may be found in: Christy, The Distribution of
the Seas' Wealth in Fisheries, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, ALEXANDER (1967), at
106-21; F. CHISTY & A. SCoTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES
(1965); SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON OCEANIC RESEARCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS, INTERNATIONAL OCEAN AFFAIRS: A SPECIAL
REPORT (1967) ; THE FUTURE OF THE SEA'S RESOURCES (L. Alexander ed., 1968) ;
Christy, Economic Criteria for Rules Governing Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals,
2 INT'L LAWYER 224-42 (1968); W. Chapman, Problems of North Pacific and
Atlantic Fisheries, May 10, 1967 (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meet-
ing, Fisheries Council of Canada, Montreal, Canada); D. Cheever, The Role of
International Organizations in Ocean Development, Oct. 5, 1967 (unpublished paper
presented to the 2d Mershon Conference) ; F. Christy, Realities of Ocean Resources,
July 27, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the Marine Frontiers Conference,
University of Rhode Island, July 27-28, 1967); F. Christy, Alternative Regimes for
the Minerals of the Sea Floor, June 8, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the
American Bar Association, National Institute on Marine Resources).
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licenses, leases, or concessions to explore and exploit the mineral
resources in specified areas.
(4) A vesting of the deep-sea floor in an international agency
which would itself carry on exploration and exploitation activities. 71
We should realize, however, that whatever resolutions are
finally decided upon will have to accommodate the national security
interests of all participants, particularly those with wide-ranging
naval capabilities. It is clear that the United States Navy would
prefer to place rather restrictive limits on the extent of exclusive
national jurisdiction in the ocean,7 and it is reasonable to assume
that in the near future the Soviet Union may also adopt this position
given the recent substantive inputs into the Soviet naval program
and their increasing activity in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian
Ocean. Proposals, therefore, which look to the Antarctica and Outer
Space arrangements as models for the ocean do not take sufficient
account of the much different role of the oceans as a strategic
military arena when compared with the other two.
As in the field of space exploration, 8 the smaller nations,
especially the newly independent ones, have had and will continue
to have a considerable role in reshaping the law of the sea. The fact
that many of these are also coastal states gives further impetus to the
current trend of the extension of national jurisdiction over the ocean.
Therefore, future conflict over the exploitation of coastal fisheries,
the continental shelf, and the deep ocean floor may be greater
between those states on opposite sides of the capability dimension.
It may be, too, that as the fruits of exploitation grow, the less capable
will perceive the stakes as being so high that the incentive to go to
war over alleged intrusions may be greater unless some apparatus
exists which attempts to maximize the distribution of values for all
participants. However, the recent United Nations efforts to regulate
activities in the use of ocean space show promise toward establishing
an international mechanism to encourage peaceful uses in this fertile
area.
74
71 Young, supra note 68, at 647-48.
7 See Michael, Avoiding the Militarization of the Sea in NEW DIMENSIONS FOR THE
UNITED NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT DECADE, at 167 (C. Eichelberger
ed., 1966); K. Frosch, Military Uses of the Ocean, 9 Oct. 5, 1967 (unpublished
paper presented to the 2d Mershon Conference); L. Zeni, Defense Needs in
Accomodations Among Ocean Users (unpublished paper presented to the Third
Annual Law of the Sea Institute, 1968).
73 See E. Miles, Development of Legal Regimes to Guide Space Exploration, Aug. 28,
1968 (unpublished paper presented to the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics Conference on the Impact of Aerospace, Science and Technology on Law
and Government, Washington, D.C., Aug. 28-30, 1968).
74 For recent discussions, see Nanda, Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L.
000 (1969) ; Panel, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea, 62 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 214
(1968).
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THE "XYY SYNDROME": GENETICS,
BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW
By KENNETH J. BURKE*t
Certain persons have been discovered who possess more or less
than the normal complement of two sex chromosomes. The probable
incidence of males possessing an XYY complement (XY being
normal) of sex chomosomes has been estimated at 1:1000 by most
authorities. However, a much larger incidence of this complement
has been found in institutionalized individuals and studies have
suggested a strong correlation between anti-social behavior and the
XYY individual. Furthermore, the relationship of genetics and
biochemistry to behavior may suggest that the presence of an extra
Y chromosome could be a cause of the anti-social behavior ob-
served in XYY males.$ The question thus arises: is the male, pos.
sessing the extra Y chromosome, criminally responsible for his
anti-social acts? The present tests for legal insanity stress cognitive
and/or volitional elements. Perhaps under a test such as M'Nagh-
ten, which recognizes only cognitive behavior, the XYY individual
may be able to successfully argue for the inclusion of a volitional
element on the constitutional ground of due process.
PROLOGUE
0 N April 21, 1968, The New York Times carried a front page
article beginning with the words: "The murder of a prosti-
tute by a stable hand in a cheap Paris hotel has opened a twilight
zone of criminology for unsuspecting jurists and scientists."'
The article described the murderer as possessing an extra
Y chromosome which, it was thought, might predispose him to
commit violent acts. The story thus exhumed the age-old question
of whether criminals are born rather than made, and if born, to
what extent one's genetic nature might diminish his criminal re-
sponsibility in a traditionally nurture-oriented legal system. The
report quoted Berkeley geneticist Dr. Curt Stern's interesting specu-
lation that woman's gentility is attributable to the absence of a
* Member, Feldhamer & Hochstadt, P.C., Denver and Buena Vista, Colorado; Member,
Colorado Bar; B.S., Holy Cross College, Worcester, Mass., 1961; J.D., University
of Denver, 1969.
t The author is indebted to W. R. Matoush, Ph.D., staff member, Denver Law
Journal, for his contribution to the discussion on genetic and biochemical topics
contained in Section III, PHYSIOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP OF XYY TO BEHAVIORAL
ABNORMALITY as well as the probability figure contained in table 2.
$ For a recent survey article concerning the XYY male, incorporating published and
unpublished data, see Brown, Males with an XYY Sex Chromosome Comtlement,
5 J. MED. GENETIcs 341 (1968).
1 N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
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Y chromosome, while a double complement of the male-deter-
mining Y may perhaps explain overly-aggressive behavior. 2
The next day, it was reported that Richard F. Speck, convicted
of the 1966 Chicago murder of eight nurses, also possesses an extra
Y chromosome, and that his lawyers were considering raising the
issue on appeal.3 This article painted a picture of the XYY offender
as being a tall, mentally dull, aggressive, sometimes violent indi-
vidual likely to be afflicted with facial acne. These reports set
off a wave of speculation in the practicing as well as in academic
circles of the legal profession, heightened by the announcement that
an Australian XYY defendant was acquitted in a case involving
genetic structure as an indication of insanity.4
In view of the spate of concern generated by such news articles,
the purpose of this inquiry is to analyze available scientific data
to determine first whether there is a positive correlation between
the extra Y chromosome and antisocial behavior, and second whether
the correlation is significant enough to present an adequate defense
to a criminal charge.
I. THE SEX CHROMOSOMES 5
Of the 46 chromosomes found in each human cell, two are
termed the sex chromosomes, of which the normal female possesses
two X-type, or an XX complement, and the normal male possesses
one X and one Y-type, or an XY structure. Occasionally, however,
individuals are discovered with more or less than the normal com-
pliment of two sex chromosomes, and within the past seven years,
individuals as varied as XO (only one X), XXX, XXXX,
XXY, XYY, XXYY, and XXXXY have been described and con-
firmed. Furthermore, it is also possible that not all of an individual's
cells will carry the same sex chromosome complement, and such
an individual is referred to as a "mosaic" because of his uniquely
varied genetic structure.6
The chromosomal structure is analysed by a process known
21d. at 72, col. 6.
3 N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1968, at 43, col. 3. This report has never been confirmed in
any of the scientific journals. Ironically, Speck is reported to carry a chest tattoo
bearing the legend "Born to Raise Hell."
4 TIME, Oct. 25, 1968, at 76. This report also informed us that the above-described
Parisian murderer was convicted and sentenced to seven years, notwithstanding his
abnormal genetic structure.
5 Unless otherwise indicated, the source of the material presented in this section is
M. B~ARTALos & T. BAIumli, MEDICAL CYTOGENETICS (1967).
O For examples of genetic mosaics, see Court Brown et al., Fertility in an XY/XXY
Male Married to a Translocation Heterozygote, 1 J. MED. GENETICS 35 (1964);
Cox & Berry, A Patient with 45XO/48XYYY Mosaicism, 4 J. MED. GENETICS 132
(1967) ; Kajii et al., XY/XYY Mosaicism in a Pre-Pubertal Boy with Tall Stature,
Prognathism, and Malformation of the Hands, 41-2 PEDIATRICS 985 (1968).
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as karyotyping, which is accomplished through the following steps:
(1) culturing7 the skin or blood cells of the subject to be
studied,
(2) photographing the stained chromosomes, and
(3) rearranging the photographed chromosomes to fit a
standard, international pattern.
Although the link between chromosomal defects and physical
abnormalities is well known for many conditions such as albinism"
or acondroplastic dwarfism,' direct evidence linking genetics with
mental and behavioral problems is relatively new. Exemplifying
a genetic condition which combines severe physical and mental
defects in mongolism (Down's Syndrome), which has been found
to be associated with an extra chromosome (number 21 in the
karyotype) .10
Regarding the sex chromosomes in particular, since only those
individuals whose X structure was altered were found to be acutely
abnormal or troublesome, it was generally felt that the Y chromo-
some carried relatively little genetic information." In studies of
multiple sex chromosome conditions, geneticists had devoted the
greater proportion of their time to the X chromosome, much effort
having been expended in the study of "chromatin-positive" males
(those with two or more X chromosomes) in an effort to discover
a link between the extra X chromosome and mental deficiency,' 2
especially since there appeared to be no notable differences be-
tween patients with either XXY or XXYY structure.'
II. THE XYY COMPLEMENT
The first XYY individual noted in the medical literature14
appears to have come to light in 1961 after his chromosomal con-
7 It is during the division process known as mitosis in which two identical cells are
produced from a parent cell, the primary genetic material being distributed equally
to each daughter cell. During the metaphase of the mitotic process, the chromosomes
align themselves in an equatorial plane of the cell, and are most easily distinguished.
The chromosomes are then stained to facilitate examination, and to highlight the
differences between each type.
8 A. MONTAGU, HUMAN HEREDITY 235-36 (1963).
9Id. at 269.
10 "All patients with this characteristic phenotype ... have all or most of chromsome
21 triply represented rather than doubly . V. McKusicic, HUMAN GENETICS 18
(1964).
11 Telephone interview with Dr. Arthur Robinson, geneticist, at the University of
Colorado Medical Center, Denver, Colo., Oct. 16, 1968. Cf. G. VALENTINE, THE
CHROMOSOME DISORDERS 91 (1966).
'2 Maclean et al., A Survey of Sex-Chromosome Abnormalities Among 4514 Mental
Defectives, LANCET, Feb. 10, 1962, at 293.
13 Either of these double-X male structures produces what is known as "Klinefelter's
Syndrome," characterized by some mental retardation, development of breasts, high-
pitched voice, and increased social problems with advancing age.
14 Sanberg et al., An XYY Human Male, LANCET, Aug. 26, 1961, at 488; See also
Haushka et al., An XYY Man with Progeny Indicating Familial Tendency to Non-
Disjunction, 14 AMER. J. HUMAN GENETICS 22 (1962).
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stitution was examined because he fathered at least one defective
or abnormal child during each of his two marriages. The subject, a
45-year-old white male, was described as being of average intel-
ligence, and aside from his difficulty in satisfying employers, he
appears to have been normal in all respects. Aside from confirming
the existence of the XYY karyotype, this case appears to have
passed relatively unnoticed by the medical community, and was
probably considered to be further evidence of the absence of
congenital defects and small gene content associated with the Y
chromosome.
In 1965, investigators discovered a high incidence of XXYY
individuals in an institution for violent or aggressive subjects who
were also mentally subnormal. 15 This study prompted an inquiry
by Dr. Patricia Jacobs and her colleagues who discovered seven
of the 197 inmates of a maximum security hospital to have XYY
karyotypes. 16 Since then, numerous studies have been completed
in various countries.
A. Statistical Evidence of XYY Relationship to Behavioral Ab-
normality
Out of a total of 967 institutional and other subjects surveyed
by karyotyping, 50 postpubescent individuals were found whose
chromosomal structure was either totally XYY or, in the case of
mosaics, was dominated by 80 percent or more XYY cells. The
survey data are collected in Tables 3, 4, and 5 of the appendix.
Since many of the studies reported different information concerning
the same subjects, great care was taken not to duplicate individuals
in the tables, and where doubt has arisen concerning an overlapping
area, those individuals were eliminated from consideration.
Before considering the data further, it would be well to dis-
cuss briefly the incidence of this defect. Estimates of the incidence
of the XYY complement in the general population run from as
low as 1:200017 or 1:150018 to an unofficial high of 1:300.19
Geneticists are reluctant to accept this latter figure since it does
not correspond to the known incidence of similar chromosomal
disorders, and it appears that chromosomal defects come in un-
15 Casey et al., Sex Chromosome Abnormalities in Two State Hospitals for Patients
Requiring Special Security, 209 NATURE 641 (1966). The authors noted that the
extra Y chomosome might also be responsible for the height difference noted between
XXY and XXYY individuals.
16 Jacobs et al., Aggressive Behavior, Mental Sub-normality, and the XYY Male, 208
NATURE 1351, 1352 '(1965).
17 Slater, 2 WORLD MEDICINE 44 (1967).
18 Jacobs et al., supra note 16, at 1352.
19 N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1968, at 34, col. 1.
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predictable clusters."0 Most authorities agree upon an incidence of
1:1000 as most probable, a figure which equals 0.10 percent of the
male population.
A statistical analysis was conducted of the data in Tables
3 and 4, and from the results of that analysis, set out in full in the
appendix, a summary of the more important conclusions are pre-
sented below and are illustrated in Tables 1 and 2:
Table 1
XYY's In Selected Populations
Institutional No. XYY's % XYY's
Ordinary Criminals (C) 108 6 5.56
Ordinary Mentally III (M) 24 2 8.33
Both Mentally III and Antisocial (MI) 679 22 3.18
Mentally Subnormal and Antisocial (MS) 115 13 11.3
Total Institutional 926 43 4.32
Total Non-Institutional 36 0 0
Total Population 962 43 4.16
Other XYY's (Table 5) 7 7
Total Subjects 969 50
1. Heights of XYY Individuals
The statistics indicate a marked positive correlation of height
with incidence of XYY. The average height of XYY's ranged
from 71.1 inches to 75.6 inches, depending on whether height was
a factor in the sampling process. This is in contrast to the normal
average male height (British subjects) of approximately 67 inches.2
2. Incidence of the XYY Syndrome
Summarized in Table 1 are the incidence rates for XYY among
various samples of the surveyed population. Based on an estimated
incidence of 1:1000 for this condition in the normal population,
the probabilities of the indicated rates of incidence are also shown.
3. Behavioral Characteristics of XYY Individuals
Of the 50 XYY's discovered in the surveyed population, only
one can be classed as behaviorally normal. A large majority (45)
are given the general designation, "antisocial," but in reality, the
remaining five, with such varied problems as obsessive-compulsive
overaggressiveness, impulsiveness coupled with mental retardation
or merely difficulties in holding employment, might also be classed
20 Robinson interview, supra note 11.
21 P. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 37-39 (1947).
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in that general category. As thus viewed, 49 of 50, or 98%0, were
found to be in some way behaviorally abnormal to a significant
degree.
The data on the incidence of XYY among institutionalized
individuals suggests a strong positive correlation between anti-
social behavior and the XYY individual, a correlation which in-
creases significantly with increased stature. Furthermore, although
it appears that there is a controlling source bias in attempting to
formulate any relationship with intelligence, the evidence is strong
that the extra Y chromosome does have some effect on one's be-
havior. Indeed, the opinions of the active investigators ranged from
firm, yet cautious confidence in the relationship 23 to scientific
reticence concerning the term "YY Syndrome.' '24 Most authorities
would agree that the XYY is more likely than not to be significantly
taller than his parents, 25 at best disinvolved, but probably aggressive
and reacting more often against property than against the person.
They would further agree that the XYY's antisocial behavior is
likely to exhibit itself at a relatively early age26 which, coupled
with the conspicuous absence of crime among the siblings of the
XYY's, 27 lends credence to the proposition that their deviant be-
havior is more influenced by genetic rather than environmental
factors.
Other findings which may prove of future value in describing
or treating the XYY individual, but which have not yet been studied
widely enough to be reliable, are a significantly different reading
in some parts of the electrocardiogram," and abnormal electro-
encephalograms. 9 One of the most intriguing preliminary findings
is an apparently direct relationship between sex chromosomes and
23 "Therefore we believe the XYY karyotype can be correlated with height and unusual
behavioural problems ...." Borgaonkar et al., The YY Syndrome, LANCET, Aug. 24,
1968, at 461,462; "The freqency .. . indicates that an extra Y chromosome has
a part to play in antisocial behaviour .... ." Casey et al., YY Chromosomes and
Antisocial Behaviour, LANCET, Oct. 15, 1966, at 859, 860; "We have no doubt,
nevertheless, that there is some form of link between an extra Y chromosome and
antisocial conduct ...." Forssman et al., The YY Syndome, LANCET, Oct. 5, 1968,
at 779; "[clonfirms Court Brown's proposal that . . . the XYY complement perhaps
influences behaviour rather than intelligence." Leff & Scott, XYY and Intelligence,
LANCET, Mar. 23, 1968, at 645; "[It seems reasonable to suggest that their
antisocial behaviour is due to the extra Y chromosome." Price & Whatmore, Criminal
Behavior and the XYY Male, 213 NATURE 815 (1967).
24 Kelly et al., Another XYY Phenotype, 215 NATURE 405 (1967).
2 See Borgaonkar et al., supra note 23, at 462.
26 See Price & Whatmore, supra note 23.
27 Id.
28 See Borgaonkar et al., supra note 23; Price,The Electrocardiogram in Males with
Extra Y Chromosomes, LANCET, May 25, 1968, at 1106.
29 See Cowie & Kahn, XYY Constitution in Prepubertal Child, I BRITISH MED. J. 748
(1968); Mintzer & Sato, The XYY Syndrome, J. PEDIATRiCS, Apr., 1968, at 572;
Welch et al., Psychopathy, Mental Deficiency, Aggressiveness and the XYY Syn-
drome, 214 NATURE 500 (1967).
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fingerprints, 0 which led at least one observer to comment wryly:
"A fascinating thought is that, since it is known now that an extra
Y chromosome may predispose its possessor to commit crimes,
finger-print clues could be used simultaneously for detection and
diagnosis of the thief - at least in science fiction."'"
While it is well known that certain chromosomal defects are
closely and intimately associated with the regular production of
detectable effects upon the organism as a whole, 2 the biochemical
cause (as opposed to the descriptive cause associated with any one-
to-one correspondence) appears to be shrouded in mystery, although
more knowledge is continually being accumulated." It is known,
however, that chromosomes carry the genetic information which
determines the structure and duplication of body chemicals,34 and
it is also known that the presence or absence of certain chemicals
in the human brain is intimately associated with behavioral changes,
although this field of inquiry requires far more investigation in
order to be conclusive.835 It is interesting to speculate that, if and
when discovered, the biochemical cause of overly aggressive be-
havior might possibly be controlled through the administration of
proper drug therapy.
Using the aforementioned figure of 1:1000 as an expected
incidence to interpret the survey results, the overall rate for XYY's
of 4.32 percent (Table 2) of all anti-social (institutional) types
surveyed is 43.2 times higher than would be expected in the general
population. Similarly, this figure rises to 78.3 times the expected
incidence when we include some minimum height restriction, and
to 107 times the expected incidence when the minimum height is
restricted to 6 feet. Estimates of the probability of drawing the
identified XYY's from a normal population solely by chance
indicate an extremely small probability that the results are merely
fortuitous. Moreover, if there were no difference between the
30 See Alter, Is Hyperploidy of Sex Chromosomes Associated with Reduced Total Finger
Ridge Count?, 17 AMER. J. HUMAN GENETnCS 473 (1965); Hunter, Finger and
Palm Prints in Chromatin Positive Males, 5 J. MED. GENETICS 112 (1968); Penrose,
Medical Significance of Finger-prints and Related Phenomena, 2 BUTISH MED. J. 321
(1968).
31 Penrose, supra note 30, at 324.
32 See McKuSICK, supra note 10. See generally, BARTALOS & BARAMKI, supra note 5.
33 The biochemical cause of the genetically-linked disease phenylketonuria, for example,
is attributed to untoward changes in brain chemistry; see McKusicK, supra note 10,
at 69. Testing of the newborn for this disease, required by CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 66-27-1 et seq. (Supp. 1965), can result in the elimination of the severe mental
retardation produced by the malady, through the use of proper diet therapy, involving
reduced intake levels of the amino acid phenylalanine.
34 See McKusicK, supra note 10, at 61.
3 See Mandell et al., Psychochemical Research in Man, 162 SCIENCE 1442 '(1968).
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observed incidence and the incidence in the general male population,
the figure 4.32 percent indicates a tremendous societal problem,
particularly since psychiatric treatment does not appear to help
many of these individuals. 86
III. PHYSIOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP OF XYY TO BEHAVIORAL
ABNORMALITY
While the statistical evidence that has been collected shows
a strong correlation between the XYY condition and antisocial
behavior, a more satisfying demonstration of a cause and effect
relationship would rest upon the demonstration of an actual bio-
chemical mechanism for behavioral aberrations traceable to the
presence of the XYY chromosomal complement. Clear evidence of
such a mechanism is not yet available, however; hence any discussion
of the available data in this area is necessarily quite speculative.
A. The Relationship of Genetics and Biochemistry to Behavior
Although many workers in the field would ascribe considerable
importance to environmental factors,37 a genetic origin has been
suggested for many aspects of general behavior. Such specific psy-
chological illnesses as amaurotic family idiocy and Huntington's
chorea3" have been shown to follow classic hereditary patterns,
while other illnesses with mental or behavioral implications, such
as phenylketonuria (PKU) 3" and galactosemia 40 have been traced
to metabolic disturbances which very likely have a genetic origin.
Perhaps of greater significance, however, are the studies which
indicate possible genetic or biochemical bases for schizophrenia and
manic-depressive psychosis. Extensive statistical analysis of studies
involving identical and fraternal twins has indicated that a strong
"genetic factor" is indicated in schizophrenia, 41 although this factor
does not follow classical Mendelian patterns but is explicable on
the hypothesis that genetically predisposed individuals will develop
schizophrenia if subjected to sufficient environmental stress. Less
36 Nielsen, The XYY Syndrome in a Mental Hospital, BRITISH J. CRiM., Apr., 1968,
at 186; see Price & Whatmore, Behaviour Disorders and Pattern of Crime Among
XYY Males Identified at a Maximum Security Hospital, 1 BRITISH MED. J. 533
(1967).
37 See e.g., J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE (1956).
8 See A. MASLOW & B. MITTELMANN, PRINCIPLES OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 117
(1951).
3See MONTAGU, supra note 8, at 174-76, 365.
4°d. at 363.
41 See Kallman, The Genetic Theory of Schizophrenia, in READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin, eds. 1968) 56-60; MASLOW & MIT-
TELMANN, supra note 38, at 119.
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extensive twin studies have suggested a similar genetic factor in
manic-depressive psychosis.42
From a physiological point of view, schizophrenia has been
related to a disturbance in adrenal gland function in which there
is a lack of sufficient corticoid hormone secretion to meet stressful
conditions.43 The ability to induce schizophrenic symptomology
with such drugs as mescaline and lysergic acid has suggested to
some that schizophrenia may result from the presence of certain
brain chemicals with properties similar to these drugs.44 Heath
obtained the most impressive physiological results by injecting
volunteers with a substance (taraxein) obtained from the blood
of schizophrenic patients which induced such schizophrenic symptoms
as catatonic reactions, paranoia, disorganization and depersonal-
ization.45 The onset of symptoms was gradual, reaching a peak
between 15 and 40 minutes following the injection and then sub-
siding. Heath considers the symptoms resulting from tarazein to
be more specifically schizophrenic in nature than those resulting
from mescaline or lysergic acid, the effects of which he considers
more characteristic of toxic psychoses.
The significance to a genogenic argument of these biochemically
based explanations of schizophrenia may not become clear until it
is pointed out that physiology and body chemistry are fundamentally
reflections of one's genetic endowment. That is, genes and chromo-
somes are the ultimate sources of those biochemical substances
(enzymes) which regulate all biochemical processes,46 which in
turn are known to have an effect upon behavior.
Turning again to the XYY syndrome, a strong statistical cor-
relation between the genetic condition and antisocial behavior has
been shown. Confirmation of the causal link through the demon-
stration of a physiological mechanism is not yet possible, although
the presumption of a genetic-biochemical relationship is perhaps
stronger than with other psychopathologies, since in XYY indi-
viduals there is an observable chromosomal abnormality with the
result that microbial and traumatic pathologies are essentially
eliminated.
4 2 See MASLOW & MITTELMANN, supra note 38, at 121.
43 See COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 275; C. MORGAN & E. STELLAR, PHYSIOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 541-42 (1950); but see C. MORGAN, PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
564 (3d ed. 1965).
44 See COLEMAN, supra note 37, at 275.
45Id. at 276.
46 See E. GARDNER, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 259-80 (3d ed. 1968).
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B. Interrelationship of the Sex Chromosomes
It would be tempting to ascribe the antisocial behavior of
XYY's to a masculinizing or more aggressive behavioral influence
traceable to an excess of male hormones (androgens), an increase
in which would be suggested by the extra Y chromosome. However,
since both male and female hormones (estrogens) are present in
both sexes,4 7 a genetic link for androgens would not be indicated
for the Y chromosome. It is nevertheless possible for the Y chrom-
osome to have the function of activating or regulating other gene
sites, particularly on the X chromosome. Present scientific theory
suggests that unlike the "euchromatin" of gene-bearing chrom-
osomes, which govern specific, Mendelian traits, the so-called
"heterochromatin" of the Y chromosome appears to act as a
genetic regulator and therefore exerts a quantitative effect which
may be the real basis for observable sex differences.4" Consequently,
the presence of the extra Y chromosome may alter a delicately bal-
anced regulatory function, with possibily far-reaching consequences.
Certain genes govern the production of specific physiological
intermediates which in turn direct ultimate physiological results.
When such genes are "nonfunctional" in whole or in part, as ap-
pears to be the case with such diseases as phenylketonuria (PKU)
and diabetes mellitus, it is presumably the absence or scarcity of
gene sites that brings on the symptoms and determines their severity.4
Conversely, where an excess capacity is available for the production
of physiological intermediates, it appears plausible that an over-
production of gene products will ensue, with or without detectable
physiological effects. Returning to the XYY syndrome and assuming
that the Y chromosome produces an intermediate activator sub-
stance, the presence of two chromosomes in the XYY male pre-
sumably makes available twice the genetic capacity for the Y-related
product, with consequent disruption in the quantitative function
which has been postulated.
It should be noted that where multiple X chromosomes are
concerned (including the case of the normal XX female), only one
of the X chromosomes is "euchromatic" and is therefore functioning
via Mendelian genes (i.e., conferring specific, qualitative traits).
47 See U. MITTwOCH, SEX CHROMOSOMES 243-44 (1967).
48 See id. at 238-45, for a discussion of the possible mode of action of sex chromo-
somes.




One well-known theory (Lyon hypothesis) 50 holds that only this
one X chromosome (whether in the normal XX female or such
multiple X complements as XXY and XXX) is genetically active,
while the others are not, although the possibility remains that the
"inactive" chromosomes may yet retain a quantitative function.
While multi-X individuals are able to survive, the lack of totally
normal physiology supports the notion of a secondary quantitative
function.
In summary, it may be said that the presence of an extra Y
chromosome provides a potential excess capacity for synthesis of
genetic products, which could be a cause of the type of behavior
observed in XYY males. Perhaps it is unnecessary to attempt to
define the specific role of the extra Y chromosome, and it may
be sufficient to note that chromosomal abnormalities can be expected
to cause some degree of disturbance in biochemical-physiological
balance, as evidenced by widespread physical and mental abnorm-
alities observable in the individuals affected by other multiple-
chromosomal defects, such as mongolism.
The foregoing speculations, while not in the least establishing
a physiological cause-and-effect relationship between XYY indi-
viduals and antisocial behavior, do suggest a strong probability of
such a relationship, especially when the physiological-genetic
hypothesis is reinforced by the rather convincing statistics observed
earlier. Based upon a consideration of the foregoing presentation,
we shall next inquire into the possibility of modifying the present
outlook on criminal responsibility, through an analysis of the various
tests of insanity and the various constitutional issues involved therein.
IV. THE XYY MALE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Mens Rea
One writer has summarized mens rea by stating that it is inef-
ficacious and unjust to punish conduct without reference to the
actor's mental state. The author noted that the primary problem
lies not with the actor's mens rea, but with his ability to cope
with it.5 In an exhaustive study of the mens rea concept, another
writer, recalling the slogan expressed by R.M. Hare that "ought"
50 MITTwocH, supra note 47, at 242.
51 Packer, Idens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 107,
148-52. For three conflicting Supreme Court decisions concerning mens rea, see
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) ; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1942) ; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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implies "can,""2 traced the development of the notion of a "capacity
to conform" in terms of the constitutional principles of due process
as applied to the concept of insanity.5" Furthermore, when con-
sidered in conjunction with the widening communication gulf be-
tween psychiatrists and lawyers, 54 the chaotic results which have
obtained with an intent-oriented concept of diminished capacity,55
and the presumption that courts will continue to embrace some
notion of a free will in human affairs, 6 it appears that future de-
velopments in the field of criminal responsibility will emerge as
modifications of the insanity defense. The remainder of this article
will therefore be devoted to an analysis of this defense as applied
to the XYY male.
B. Insanity
It is evident that an insane person cannot constitutionally be
tried for a crime,57 although the constitutional limitation really
prescribes that any test is sufficient if it has some basis in fact which
is consonant with state policy." The chief tests of insanity in the
52 R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASONS 51 (1963).
53 Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966).
54 See J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL (1958).
55 People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 916-17, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820-21
(1966) affirmed the principle stated in People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386
P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 82 (1963) which recognized the significance of
a defense not amounting to legal insanity, yet resulting in an amelioration of the
M'Naghten approach to criminal responsibility. The Conley court approved the
rule that the doctrine of "diminished capacity" dealt with the defendant's ability to
form the requisite specific intent, specifically when some mental defect '(e.g.,
drunkenness) reduces his ability to comprehend the law's proscription and to under-
stand the obligation to conform his conduct thereto. The doctrine would thus present
a defense to a crime if the evidence established such diminished capacity that the
defendant could not form the required specific intent. However, in People v. Talbot,
64 Cal.2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 646, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417, 430 (1966) cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1015 (1967) and 388 U.S. 923 (1967), the California Supreme Court held
that no prejudice resulted from a failure to read to the jury instruction on man-
slaughter as set forth in the Conley case which would have allowed the jury to
consider the doctrine of diminished capacity in a felony-murder convicition; Talbot
v. Nelson, 390 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1968) upheld this position in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding. In an intervening California appellate court decision,
People v. Aubrey, 61 Cal. Rptr. 772, 777 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1967), it was held
that the trial court has committed error "in failing to advise the jury that a deliberate
and unprovoked homicide may be manslaughter" due to the diminished capacity
of the defendant. Finally, People v. Muszalski, 260 Cal. App. 2d 764, 67 Cal. Rptr.
378, 384-86 (Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1968) added more support to the Conley decision
by indicating that the doctrine of diminished capacity does apply to felony-murder
situations, thus leaving California with two somewhat different, yet overlapping,
standards of criminal responsibility.
6 See e.g., United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 1968); see also
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
57 See Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) ; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952) ; People v. McClain, 37 II. 2d 173, 226 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1967).
58 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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United States are the M'Naghten, Durham, and "substantial ca-
pacity" tests, each of which is explored below.5
1. M'Naghten.
In those jurisdictions which rely on the old M'Naghten test "°
or its numerous variants, the essence of the defense requires the
accused to prove that, due to a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, he was totally unable either to understand what he was
doing or to comprehend the wrongfulness of his act.61 At least one
state has embellished the test with instructions that "care should be
taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity, mental
depravity or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or
other motives, and kindred evil conditions, for when the act is
induced by any of these causes the person is accountable to the
law, ' '62 thus confusing the already vague situation with even more
nebulous normative judgments. Major critics of this test mention as
primary liabilities its overemphasis of the cognitive element63 and
its "all or nothing" approach.64
Since the XYY individual apparently has difficulty controlling
his behavior, it is hard to see the relevance of genetically affected
conduct to a cognition test in the first instance, or the weight it
would be accorded in the second.65 Under such circumstances, it
is highly unlikely that a successful defense can be predicted upon
one's genetic makeup where the test of criminal responsibility is
determined under the M'Naghten rules.
2. Durham
66
In 1954, the District of Columbia Circuit broke with tradition
and introduced a test which relieved the defendant of criminal
responsibility if the act in question was the product of mental
disease or defect. Soon plagued by problems of construction,67 the
" Although many states include "Irresistible Impulse" with their law regarding the
insanity plea, this defense was not considered relevant to the discussion at hand due
to the disfavor attending the concept; see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 756-63
(1957). A further reason for its dismissal is the lack of evidence propounded by
the cited medical authorities regarding compulsive behavior as being attributable
to the extra Y chromosome and the resultant unwillingness of geneticists to mechan-
istically attribute compulsive or aggressive behavior to any single genetic defect.
60 Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
61 PERKINS, supra note 59, at 746-51.
62 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1(2) (Supp. 1965).
63 See MACDONALD, supra note 54, at 26-38.
6
4 See T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 127-37 (1963).
65 The issue concerning a defendant's genetic constitution as an XYY was reportedly
raised in a recent American proceeding concerned with a rape-homicide charge.
TIME, Oct. 25, 1968, at 76.
66Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (adopted similar 1870
New Hampshire test, id. at 874) ; see PERKINS, supra note 59, at 763-65.
67See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857-73 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (concurring
opinion).
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court was forced to redefine the terms "mental disease or defect"
to include any abnormal condition of the mind which "substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs
behavior controls.' '68
The admissibility and evidentiary weight of an XYY genetic
structure are evident in the Durham-McDonald test and the like-
lihood that one's genetic composition might present a valid defense
to a criminal charge is thus correspondingly increased over that af-
forded by the M'Naghten rules, although the limitation of this
test to "conditions of the mind" may operate to lessen the impact
of the modification in the case of an XYY individual.
3. American Law Institute or "Substantial Capacity"
One year before Durham was announced, the American Law
Institute (A.L.I.) proposed a model standard of criminal respon-
sibility worded as follows:
(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantiall capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or
defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
69
Of those states rejecting the opportunity to adopt the new
test, some courts maintain that they are bound by statute and that
change is for the legislature, 70 while others contend that there was
no error in refusing instructions based upon this test. 71
68 McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; accord, Washing-
ton v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967). An interesting dictum appears
at 446 wherein the court states that a defendant's "genetic structure," inter alia may
impair his ability to control behavior.
69MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Alternative (b) to
paragraph (1) of MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft 41 No. 4, 1955)
provided the interesting variation either: "to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or is in such state that the prospect of conviction and punishment cannot
constitute a significant restraining influence upon him."
70 State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332, 150 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967) (husband convicted
of murder of wife and mother-in-law after receiving additional papers concerning
divorce proceeding commenced by wife) ; accord, State v. Eubanks, 277 Minn. 257,
152 N.W.2d 453, 457 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968). This case inter-
preted the failure of the legislature to modify Minn. Stat. § 611.026 (1965) after
Dhaemers as indicating adherence to the old rule (sociopath convicted of first degree
murder arising out of attempted rape).
71 See e.g., State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50, 68-69 (1959) (mentally deficient
defendant convicted of felony-murder arising out of rectory arson). The court stated:
"Until such time as we are convinced by a firm foundation in scientific fact that a
test for criminal responsibility other than M'Naghten will serve the basic end of
our criminal jurisprudence . . . we shall adhere to it." Id. at 68. Note: The M'Nagh-
ten test had been adopted in State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 200-13 (O.&T. 1846) ;
accord, State v. Poulson, 14 Utah 2d 213, 381 P.2d 93, 94-95, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
898 (1963) (former inmate of mental institution convicted of first degree murder
arising out of rape-homicide of eleven-year-old girl) ; State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d
551, 374 P.2d 942, 959-66 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963) (sociopath
convicted of unprovoked murder of woman arising out of rape-homicide).
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Adoption of this test, either by statute72 or by court decision, 3
has been exceedingly slow in the several states but is is hoped that
recent advances in the science of psychiatry will drastically accelerate
the required changes.
In contradistinction to the states, however, the federal circuits
have not been unwilling to include a volitional element in tests
other than that proposed by the A.L.I., 4 and in fact have adopted
the A.L.I. test almost verbatim in at least five other circuits. 5
It is clear that any test substantially incorporating the A.L.I.
approach will grant a distinct advantage to the XYY individual,
an advantage not shared by defendants in the state courts. It is
with the constitutional implications of this relationship that this
article will conclude.
V. THE XYY MALE AND THE CONSTITUTION
In 1952, the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon7' noted the
prevalence of M'Naghten in the majority of American jurisdictions
and indicated reluctance to eliminate it, reasoning that the science
of psychiatry had not yet reached the point where its knowledge
would require such abandonment as being "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."
7 7
If, however, it is a federally cognizable denial of due process
to try an insane person, 8 the question of what constitutes a proper
72 ILLINOIS ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59,
§ 9(a) (as amended ch. 709 § 1, 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 552.010, 552.030
(1949 Rev.) (includes volitional element but eliminates "substantial capacity" quali-
fication); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ch. 157, § 4801 (1959) (substitutes word"adequate" for "substantial") ; but cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW, ch. 39, § 30.05 (McKinney
1967) (adopting "substantial capacity" test of cognition but rejecting inclusion of
words "to conform conduct"; see Practice Commentary, id. at 48).
7 Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Ky. 1963). (Actually this case
adopts a rule comprised of "substantial capacity" as applied to M'Naghten and
Irresistable Impulse, although the court stated that § 4.01 of the Model Penal Code
correctly reflected the law.) ; Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 266
N.E.2d 556, 563 (1967); State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458, 465
(1966). This case gives the defendant a choice between M'Naghten and A.L.I.
wherein the state must establish his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt if the former
is chosen; upon giving a written waiver, however, the defendant may request the
A.L.I. test be given whereupon he then assumes the burden of establishing lack of
criminal responsibility "to a reasonable certainty, by the greater weight of the
credible evidence." Id.
74See McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Feguer v.
United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962) ; Dusky
v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1961).
75 United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926-28 (4th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
606, 625 (2nd Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1963); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774
(3d Cir. 1961) (cognitive element omitted).
76343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952).
77 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 '(1937).
78 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); see also Bishop v. United States, 350
U.S. 961 (1956).
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test of insanity should be federally answerable, at least to the extent
of prescribing minimum standards in the light of modern knowledge.
The most recent constitutional pronouncement in this area is
found in Powell v. Texas,79 an unfortunate 4-1-4 decision affirming
the public drunkenness conviction of a defendant who had been
similarly convicted approximately 100 times since 1949. For affirm-
ance, four justices8" distinguished Robinson v. California8 from
the case at hand on the primary ground that Robinson dealt with
a status or condition, while the present case involved potentially
dangerous public conduct. The justices also refused to expand the
Robinson doctrine for the additional reason that it would involve
the issuance of a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility
which, it was felt, would reduce the "fruitful experimentation" of
the various jurisdictions regarding insanity, and "freeze the de-
veloping productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a
rigid constitutional mold. ' 8 2 The justices implied that a constitu-
tional defense would probably be presented only if one could
establish both an inability to abstain from drinking in the first place
and a loss of control over such conduct once begun.83
The dissenting justices84 recognized the need for more knowl-
edge regarding the disease of chronic alcoholism, but argued that
it is folly to ignore what is already known. Noting agreement
concerning the alcoholic's decreased moral fault, they recognized
the futility of solving psychiatric problems with criminal sanctions,
and parenthetically point out that a number of things may affect
the likelihood of one's becoming an alcoholic, including "hereditary
proclivity. ' 85 Finally, they felt that the protection of Robinson
ought to preclude punishment of an individual if the condition
essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern of
his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic thereof.
Apart from the dicta noted above, Powell appears to limit
the XYY's eighth amendment argument until such time as more
causally linked statistical data become available, unless another
79392 U.S. 514 (1968).
80 Warren, C.J., and Marshall, Black, and Harlan, JJ.
81370 U.S. 660 (1962). This case invalidated a statute making it a crime to be
addicted to the use of narcotics. The Court based its decision on the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the eighth amendment as applied to the states through the
14th amendment.
8 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968). Other factors considered by the
Justices, but not made an express basis for their holding were: the lack of agreement
concerning the definition of "disease," the lack of treatment facilities, and the need
for proper treatment in the event that such a defense is recognized. It should also be
noted that the Justices somewhat caustically denounced the unpreparedness of both
adversaries. Id. at 522.
8 Id. at 522-26.
4 Fortas, Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.
85 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 561 (1968).
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abnormal genetic structure may first be shown to fit the dissent's
extension of Robinson.86 If we assume that a true "compulsion" is
required in order to present a defense under the Powell rationale,
however, it is evident that our XYY individual will not fit that
test, although forensic psychiatrists may force the facts to meet the
test in order to satisfy their sense of justice. On the other hand,
Powell leaves the due process argument intact, and if we assume
that the "fruitful experimentation" of the various jurisdictions has
yielded the conclusion that volition is equally as important as cog-
nition in determining behavior, then perhaps we can state that
the A.L.I. test prescribes minimum standards of criminal respon-
sibility which are now "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
CONCLUSION
The XYY male is more likely than not to be taller than his
parents, displaying both nonsocial and anti-social behavior patterns,
and tending to react more often against property than against the
person. His genetic structure will most likely not present a valid
defense in those jurisdictions utilizing the M'Naghten or cognition
test, although his chances appear better in the minority of juris-
dictions requiring a volitional element, particularly the model test
proposed by the A.L.I. In those jurisdictions whose test is based
solely upon cognition, it appears that current developments in
psychiatry and genetics may enable the XYY individual to suc-
cessfully argue for the inclusion of a volitional element on the
constitutional ground of due process.
It is the author's opinion that substantial changes will even-
tually be brought about in the area of criminal responsibility based
upon current inquiries into behavior control. The author also feels
that this enlightened and more humane approach to criminal law
will result in a system so different from the one we presently
employ, that in retrospect, our present system shall appear as in-
equitable and antiquated as trial by ordeal.
APPENDIX
I. SURVEY OF POPULATIONS FOR XYY
Tables 3 and 4 contain the data collected from surveys of
various populations for the XYY anomaly. The surveys were pri-
marily of institutionalized persons, the only noninstitutional popu-
lation consisting of 36 basketball players all of whom were found
to be normal.
8 Such a possibility might be presented by linkage of sex-chromosome anomalies with
homosexuality.
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Also shown in Tables 3 and 4 are data on the types of criminal
conduct exhibited and the intelligence quotient (I.Q.) possessed by
the XYY's identified in the surveys. Similar data appear in Table 5
for additional isolated cases of XYY's who have come to light for
various reasons.
II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF XYY INCIDENCE
Shown below are statistical results calculated from the data
of Tables 3 and 4. These results appeared earlier in more summary
form in Tables 1 and 2 and in the accompanying textual materials.
A. Relationship of XYY to Height
(1) Of those XYY's discovered without regard to height, the
average height was 71.1 inches (5 feet 11 inches) ; 53 percent were
at least 72 inches (6 feet); 6.66 percent were at least 74 inches
(6 feet 2 inches).
(2) Of those XYY's whose height was positively measured,
the average height was 73.9 inches (6 feet 2 inches) ; 76.5 percent
were at least 72 inches (6 feet); 41.2 percent were at least 74
inches (6 feet 2 inches).
87 Bartlett et al., Chromosomes of Male Patients in a Security Prison, 219 NATURE 351
(1968).
88 Price & Whatmore, supra note 23.
89 Price & Whatmore, supra note 36.
90 Price et a!., Criminal Patients with XYY Sex-Chromosome Complement, LANCET,
Mar. 12, 1966, at 565.
91 Nielsen et al., XYY Chromosomal Constitution in Criminal Psychopaths, LANCET,
Sept. 7, 1968, at 576.
92 Hunter, Chromatin-Positive and XYY Boys in Approved Schools, LANCET, Apr. 13,
1968, at 816.
93 Nielsen, supra note 36.
94 Casey et al., supra note 23, at 860.
95 Telfer et al., Incidence of Gross Chromosomal Errors among Tall Criminal American
Males, 159 SCIENCE 1249 (1968).
96 Telfer et al., YY Syndrome in an American Negro, LANCET, Jan. 13, 1968, at 95.
97 Telfer et al., supra note 95.
98 Welch et al., supra note 29.
99 Goodman et al., Chromosomes of Tall Men, LANCET, June 15, 1968, at 1318.
100 Court Brown et al., Further Information on the Identity of 47 XYY Males, 2
BRITISH MED. J. 325 (1968).
101 Kelly et al., supra note 24.
102 Borgaonkar et al., supra note 23.
103 Leff & Scott, supra note 23.
104 Forssman et al., supra note 23.
105 Lisker et al., YY Syndrome in a Mexican, LANCET, Sept. 14, 1968, at 635.
106 Hauschka et al., supra note 14.
VOL. 46
THE "XYY SYNDROME" AND THE LAW
(3) Of those XYY's discovered because of a positive height
factor,' 0 7 the average height was 75.6 inches (6 feet 31/2 inches).
B. Incidence of XYY's Among Surveyed Populations
(1) Of all individuals surveyed, 43/962 or 4.47 percent were
XYY.
(2) Of all institutionalized individuals surveyed (with and
without a minimum height limit), 43/926 or 4.64 percent were
XYY; with some height restriction, 30/383 or 7.83 percent were
XYY; with a height limit of at least 6 feet, 19/177 or 10.7 percent
were XYY.
(3) Of normal individuals surveyed (Type Class N), 0/36
or 0.0 percent were XYY.
(4) Of all ordinary criminals surveyed (Type Class C), 6/108
or 5.56 percent were XYY.
(5) Of all ordinary mentally ill patients surveyed (Type
Class M), 2/24 or 8.33 percent were XYY.
(6) Of those surveyed who were both mentally ill and anti-
social (Type Class MI), 22/679 or 3.24 percent were XYY; with
some height limit imposed, 11/160 or 6.88 percent were XYY; with
minimum height limit 72 inches, 6/62 or 9.68 percent were XYY.
(7) Of those tall (at least 71 inches), mentally subnormal, and
anti-social individuals (Type Class MS), 13/115 or 11.3 percent
were XYY.
C. Behavioral Abnormality Among XYY's
1. The fraction 45/50 or 90 percent of the XYY's shown in
Tables 3 and 4 were reported as exhibiting highly anti-social be-
havior. Of the remaining five, one is described as having difficulty
satisfying employers,' 0 8 one as very aggressive and often changing
jobs,' 0 9 one as obsessive-compulsive and over aggressive," one
as mentally retarded, impulsive, and hyperactive,"' and the remaining
one as behaviorally and mentally normal.' 2 Of the 50 XYY's re-
ported, the 49 who were in some way abnormal represent 98 percent
of the total.
107 Not all of these subjects were discovered in surveys. Note the extreme height of
some individual XYY's.
10 Hauschka et al., supra note 14.
109 Lisker et al., supra note 105.
110 Forssman et al., supra note 23.
" Borgaonkar et al., supra note 23.
12 Court Brown et al., supra note 100. It should be noted, however, that this subject
was an X-/XYY mosaic, with 80 percent XYY.
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2. Where such information was reported, 29/40 or 72.5 percent
of the XYY's were considered to have below average intelligence.
3. Where such information was reported, 16/23 or 69.5 per-
cent committed crimes against property, with a large fraction of
these crimes involving arson. The studies of pre-pubertal XYY's
included a significant tendency to destroy property by arson.11
11Cowie & Kahn, supra note 29 (8 /-year old, mentally dull, violently aggressive
and destructive, 4' 9" tall child) ; see also Mintzer & Sato, supra note 29 (severely
malformed 7-year-old child described as very aggressive).
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FEDERAL INcoME TAx LAW IN
FUTURE INTEREST TRANSACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
F UTURE interests are generally associated with estate and gift
taxes and do not as frequently become a factor in the determina-
tion of taxable income as defined in the Internal Revenue Code.' In
fact, narrowing the subject to income tax problems does not avoid
consideration of the estate and gift tax provisions of the Code,
because federal income tax law in this area relies heavily upon the
theories and practices developed for estate and gift taxation. The
income tax basis of a future interest in property will frequently be
derived from an estate tax valuation.
Future interest income tax problems can be divided into two
categories. The first involves measurement of the taxable gain
or loss to be reported upon the sale, exchange, or release of a
deferred property interest. The second involves computation of
the deduction from income to reflect a contribution to charity of
a property interest with intervening rights reserved to the donor.
Many mechanical procedures are common to both areas.
I. MEASUREMENT OF GAIN OR Loss
A. General Principles
Taxable gain measurement axioms dictate elimination from
the "amount realized"2 of that portion which represents a return
of capital to the vendor. Computation of the amount of this portion,
that is the tax "basis"' of the property being given up, relies upon
rules exclusive to future interest transactions.
1INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 63.
2 id. at § 1001. This section provides for the determination of the amount of and
recognition of gain or loss.
3 Id. at §§ 1012, 1014, 1015. Section 1012 provides that "It]he basis of property shall
be the cost of such property, except as otherwise provided .... " Sections 1014 and
1015, respectively except from the cost rule property acquired from a decedent and
property acquired by gifts and transfers in trust.
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In considering future interests, it is imperative to distinguish
between problems in determining the basis of a party holding a
fractional interest (hereinafter referred to as original basis prob-
lems) and problems in determining how much basis must be
allocated to a disposition of a fractional interest when the basis
previously determined includes a greater interest than that being
conveyed. Valuation devices for establishing the fair market value
of fractional interests in property are to be explored in subsequent
sections of this paper.
Many future interests find their origin in trust instruments,
and in applying rules for establishment of the original basis of
"property acquired by gifts or transfers in trust,"4 an important
area of exceptions must always be considered. Under certain con-
ditions inter vivos transfers will be construed under the federal
tax statutes as incomplete until the date of the grantor's death, and
in these situations the gift property will take basis under the rules
established relative to property acquired from a decedent.' Important
examples involve cases where the grantor retained a reversionary
interest and cases where certain facts can create statutory pre-
sumptions that the gift was made "in contemplation of death.""
B. Estate Tax Original Basis Considerations
1. Statutory Foundation
The general rule with regard to determining the basis of
property acquired from a decedent is that the property takes its
basis from "the fair market value of the property at the date of
the decedent's death"' (or optional valuation date one year after
the date of death).8
4 Id. at § 1015. For a treatment of the taxation of trusts see, Note, Federal Income
Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 43 DENVER L.J. 183 (1966); and Gelband, Taxation
of Trust Income, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 233 (1966).
5 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(b). On providing for establishing the basis of
property acquired from a decedent, § 1014(b) enumerates acquisitions which "shall
be considered to have been acquired from or to have passed from the decedent" even
though actually acquired by intervivos transfer.
6 id. at § 2035.
7 1d. at § 1014(a).
8 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (1957). The regulation states: "The purpose of section
1014 is, in general, to provide a basis for property acquired from a decedent which
is equal to the value placed upon such property for purposes of the Federal estale ,s:
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The general rule is effectively expanded when considering
future interest valuation problems. The Code provides that "[pirop-
erty passing without full and adequate consideration under a general
power of appointment exercised by the decedent by will" will be
treated for basis purposes as property acquired from the decedent.'
Similar treatment may be accorded property acquired by non-
exercise of a general power if the donee died after December 31,
1953.1" In these cases the property is deemed to have been acquired
on the estate tax valuation date. In other cases of property acquired
under a power of appointment, the tax basis will be established as
if the property had been acquired by gift from the creator of the
power.
Obviously, the regulation governing estate tax valuations will
be instrumental in determination of the original tax basis of a
substantial portion of the future property interests which become
involved in income tax transactions." Section 1 of the regulation
sets forth the basic rule for valuation: "The fair market value is
the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any com-
pulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
the relevant facts."' 2 The regulation continues to enumerate special-
ized methods for valuation of specific classes of property.' 3
The final section of the regulation provides for "valuation
of property not specifically described in §§ 20.2031-2 to 20.2031-8
... ..- These residual properties are to be valued "in accordance
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(b) (4).
10 Id. at § 1014(b) (9).
1 Although it is recognized that other methods exist for determining basis to compute
taxable gain or loss, this paper will concentrate on a discussion of estate tax valua-
tions.
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958). The regulation goes on to say: "Thus, in the
case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, which is gener-
ally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value of such an item
of property is the price at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at
retail."
13 Id. Section 2 provides for valuation of stocks and bonds, § 3 for interests in business,
§ 4 for notes, § 5 for cash on hand or on deposit, §6 for household and personal
effects, § 7 for annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders and reversions, and
§ 8 for certain life insurance and annuity contracts and shares in an open-end invest-
ment company. All of these sections are but specialized methods for determining fair
market value at the retail price.
14Id. at § 20.2031-9 (1958).
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with the general principles set forth in § 20.2031-1"'" quoted
above. Section 9 of that regulation continues: "For example, a
future interest in property not subject to valuation in accordance
with the actuarial principles set forth in 20.2031-7 is to be valued
in accordance with the general principles set forth in Section
20.2031-1."' 6
2. Actuarial Method
From the preceding quote, the question arises: what future
interests are subject to valuation in accordance with actuarial
principles? Actuarial methods are not a substitute for establishing
time periods which are more accurately predictable. 7 Thus, a
standard discount rate to establish the present value of a future
interest is not satisfactory, nor necessary, when such value can be
arrived at with certainty.' s However, actuarial methods are adequate
tools for the determination of the present value of a future interest
not otherwise ascertainable. 9
However, the appropriateness of the actuarial method where
factors are uncertain has long been established. Judge Learned
Hand summarized the philosophy in 1943:
When compelled to take present action based upon forecasts
of a man's life, courts have long been accustomed to use mortality
tables; for, although logicians may say that probability never tells
us anything about a given instance, in fact we never make a de-
cision, or take a step, except in reliance upon it; and it so happens
that in this particular matter the probability has been refined by
averaging an enormous number of instances.
20
The Commissioner's tables, to which various income tax as
well as estate and gift tax regulations refer, are released by the
Internal Revenue Service. 21 Tables I and II are published in the
15 Id. The corresponding regulation section dealing with actuarial valuation of gifts
is Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958).
16Id. at § 20.2031-9 (1958).
17 See discussion in text § II(B) (3) inra.
18 That is, if the time when the interest is to be enjoyed is definite and not dependent
upon the death of some person, actuarial methods are not to be used.
19 It must be remembered that Treas. Reg. §§2031.2-6, 8 set forth specific methods for
arriving at fair market value. Hence, any resort to actuarial methods in § 7 must be
in situations extraneous to those enumerated in the foregoing sections.
20 Bankers Trust Co. v. Higgins, 136 F.2d 477, 479 (2d Cir. 1943).
251RS Publication No. 11, Rev. 5-59.
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estate tax regulations 22 and supplemented by Publication No. 11.
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958). The two tables are:
TABLE I
Table, single life, 32 percent, showing the present worth of an annuity, of a life












































40 ....... ...... 17.9738
41 ............. 17.6853
42 ........ ... 17.3911
43 .-...........17.0913
44 ............... 16.7860
45 ........ ... 16.4754
46 .................-16.1596
47 ....... ..... 15.8388
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65 . ....... 9 5486
66 .. ......... 9.1960












79 .................. 5 0572
80 .................. 4.7884
81 ............ 4.5283
82 . .......... 4.2771

































































































































Kept to date by U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News Pamphlets.
TABLE II
Table showing the present worth at 31/2 percent of an annuity for a term certain, of
an income interest for a term certain, and of a remainder interest postponed for
a term certain.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Annuity Term Remainder Number of Annuity Term Remainder
years certain years certain
1 ................ 0.9662 0.033816 0.966184
2 ................ 1.8997 .066489 .933511
3 ................ 2.8016 .098057 .901943
4 ................ 3.6731 .128558 .871442
5 ................ 4.5151 .158027 .841973
6 ................ 5.3286 .186499 .813501
7 ............... 6 1145 .214009 .785991
8 ................ 6.8740 .240588 .759412
9 ............... 7.6077 .266269 .733731
10 .............. 8 3166 .291081 .708919
11 ................ 9 0016 .315054 .684946
12 ............... 9 6633 .338217 .661783
13 . ....... 10,3027 .360596 .639404
14 ......... 10.9205 .382218 .617782
15 ................ 11.5174 .403109 .596891
16 ................ 12.0941 .423294 .576706
17 ............... 12.6513 .442796 .557204
18 . ........ 13.1897 .461639 .538361
19 ....... 13.7098 .479844 .520156
20 ................ 14 2124 .497434 .502566
21 ................ 14.6980 .514429 .485571
22 . 15.1671 .530849 .469151
23 ................ 15.6204 .546714 .453286
24 . 16.0584 .562043 .437957
25 ................ 16 4815 .576853 .423147
26 ................ 16.8904 .591162 .408838
27 . 17.2854 .604988 .395012
28 ................ 17 6670 .618340 .381654
29 ................ 18.0358 .631252 .368748
30 ................ 18.3920 .643722 .356278
A survey of the table of contents of the booklet discloses that the
tables are intended to cover a wide variety of remainders, life
estates, and reversions. The problems are raised by way of ex-
amples, many of which involve contingencies, and a solution for
each example is included.
In addition, the introductory paragraphs of the booklet provide
for obtaining valuation factors from the Commissioner in those
cases where a factor cannot be computed from the tables. The Com-
missioner will not, however, compute factors to satisfy hypothetical
questions; it is mandatory that the facts submitted relate to an
actual decedent or a completed gift.
3. Interests Not Subject to Actuarial Valuation
As previously suggested, a common device for avoiding use
of the tables and related regulations is an argument that the par-
ticular property interest in question is beyond the scope of actuarial
valuation techniques. Mertens ably defines the issue: "The variety
and complexities of a transferor's desire to cover all conceivable or
desirable future contingencies have outstripped the statutory pro-
visions, the regulations, and indeed the actuarial art itself and
makes a precise and controlling statement of such limits [for em-
ployment of actuarial techniques] impossible."23
A 1961 revenue ruling holds that a remainder interest which
will vest only upon the death without issue of a married woman
aged 44 who has never had children is not susceptible to valuation
under the actuarial rules.24 This ruling cites the Supreme Court's
Commissioner v. Sternberger25 decision which had denied an estate
tax charitable contribution deduction for the actuarial value of a
remainder interest which could vest only if the decedent's 27-year
old daughter failed to remarry and have children. The court with
a degree of skepticism had noted that the actuarial computations
omitted adjustments to reflect the fact that the daughter had a two
million dollar inducement to remarry and have children.
The revenue ruling continues in its comments on the Sternberger
case to draw some conclusions which are important to this section
of this paper as well as in the subsequent section on charitable
contributions. The ruling concludes that "merely because an in-
terest in property cannot be evaluated with sufficient accuracy to
support a deduction, it does not necessarily follow that the interest
is without value. ' 2
6
23 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 7.10 '(1959).
24 Rev. Rul. 88, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 417.
2348 U.S. 187 (1955).
26 Rev. Rul. 88, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 417-18.
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The ruling makes it clear that the interest could be valued
for purposes of gross estate inclusion under the general fair market
value rules of § 20.2031-1 even though the actuarial rules of
§ 20.2031-7 cannot be applied. This means that a property interest
could be attributed with basis in an income tax transaction to the
extent which it had been included in a gross estate, even though it
was not subject to actuarial valuation.
A more recent federal district court decision 27 illustrates some
of the complexities of fact which produce problems in actuarial
valuation, although in this instance the court was not required to
determine whether or not actuarial rules would be applied. The case
involved valuation of a vested reversionary interest subject to being
divested by exercise of a power of appointment. The donor of the
testamentary power (conceded to be a special power) had made no
provision for disposition of the remainder of the trust property in
event his donee-daughter failed to exercise the power in her will.
This omission by the donor had, of course, created the reversion in
his estate.
The daughter did exercise the power in her will, but the In-
ternal Revenue Service attempted to include the value of the entire
trust assets in the daughter's taxable estate, contending that the
reversion inherited by the daughter had merged with her life estate
and with her power to appoint by will, giving her an absolute
interest in the trust property. However, the government contention
was denied. The restrictions imposed on the power made it clear
that the donor had never intended that an absolute interest vest in
the daughter. The court recognized that the fair market value of
the reversion was subject to inclusion in the daughter's taxable
estate but found that the interest had no market value due to the
daughter's inability to convey the interest without entering a con-
tract promising not to exercise the power, a promise which would
have frustrated her father's testamentary intent.28
The Internal Revenue Service has acknowledged that actual
life expectancy can be substituted for actuarial table expectancies
in cases where "it is known on the valuation date that a life tenant
is afflicted with a fatal and incurable disease in its advanced stages,
and that he cannot survive for more than a brief period of time
'29 This follows the rule expressed by the Tax Court in the
2
7 Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 532 (D. Md. 1964).
28 Id. at 536.
2Rev. Rul. 307, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 429.
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Estate of Nellie H. Jennings3" which involved valuation of a re-
mainder estate being bequeathed to charity after a life estate in the
decedent's invalid husband had terminated. The court stated the
proposition "that the use of established mortality tables, which are
evidentiary only, must give way to the proven facts which show
a less life expectancy.'
'
3
The Jennings decision also quotes the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Provident Trust Co." to the effect that values
'must be determined from data available at the time of death of
decedent." 3 The Provident Trust decision and the Supreme Court's
preceding holding in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States" also
establish the principle that hindsight is not relevant. The actual
death of the life tenant prior to the filing of the estate tax return
will not preclude application of actuarial tables to establish the life
tenant's life expectancy as of the estate tax valuation date.
A more recent Tax Court memorandum opinion considers a
contingent remainder which the remainderman had conveyed by
gift in order to be sure that it would not be included in his taxable
estate.35 The life tenant died prematurely within two months after
the gift, and this was a case where the Commissioner desired to
substitute the actual life as determined for the expectancy to be
produced by his own mortality table. The gift tax deficiency im-
posed by the Commissioner as a result of substituting actual life
in the valuation factor was almost a million dollars.
The Tax Court recognized the rules of the above cited cases
and held, in addition, that to avoid use of the tables, the life span
as of the date of transfer must be ascertainable with exactitude."6
The Commissioner was held to the use of the tables in this case
where it had not been shown that the life tenant's date of death
was predictable at the time of the gift.3 7
30 10 T.C. 323 (1948). The court held:
The evidence is that at the date of decedent's death the life expectancy of her
husband was not more than one year. [Such evidence being derived from
husband's physical condition, not established mortality tables.] Actually,
he lived only two months. We therefore sustain petitioner's contention that
the valuation of the life estate, which must be deducted from charitable
bequests, should be based upon a life expectancy of not more than one
year.
Id. at 328.
31 Id. at 327.
32291 U.S. 272 (1934).
33 Id. at 281.
34279 U.S. 151 (1929).
35Chauncey Stilman v. Comm'r., 24 CCH TAx CT. MEM. (1965).




4. Validity of the Tables
In some instances, those desiring to challenge applicability of
the tables have looked to the structure of the tables themselves
rather than to the nature of the property interest to be valuated.
The present actuarial tables utilize a 32 percent discount rate com-
pounded annually and the "Makehamized" mortality table which
appears as Table 38 of United States Life Tables and Actuarial
Tables 1939-1941, published by the Bureau of Census. 8
Tables in use before January 1, 1952 used mortality factors
based on the experience of 17 British insurance companies between
the years 1762 and 1837.39 Needless to say, the use of these life
expectancies gave cause for concern, but their obsolescence prob-
ably worked to the tax advantage of the concerned parties as often
as to their disadvantage. One may speculate that this was one
reason why the use of the tables had not been successfully challenged
on this infirmity.
There have been many serious and more recent questions raised
as to the appropriateness of the interest rate. As noted above, the cur-
rent Internal Revenue Service tables were compiled using a 31/2 per-
cent factor,40 although tables in use before 1952 use 4 percent.41 The
Tax Court has taken its stand with reference to deviations from the
rates: "To avoid introducing unnecessary complexity and confusion
into this broad and active field, we take the view that the method
prescribed in the regulations is to be followed unless the facts present
a substantial reason for departure therefrom. ' 42 This court went on
to find an actual yield of 4.34 percent on the single common stock
held in trust and held there was not "sufficient basis" for deviating
from the 4 percent discount rate which was at that time incorporated
in the Commissioner's tables.43
Other cases have permitted alternative rates of return to be
substituted for those in the tables. 44 The Court of Claims in
Hanley v. United States45 found that a 3.09 percent return was sub-
38 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES LIFE AND ACTUARIAL TABLES, 1939-41
(1946). Since these tables are not currently in use they are not included for reference.
39 Koshland v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1949).
40 See table, supra note 22.
41 Supra note 32.
GEstate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728, 732 (1954). See also, McMurtry v. Comm'r,
203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953) where the court held that although "valuing individual
life interests by resort to mortality tables may be educated guesswork," the discrep-
ancies will average out in the long run. Id. at 666-67.
43 Estate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728, 733 '(1954).
4Hanley v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1945); Huntington Nat'l Bank,
13 T.C. 760 (1949).
563 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1745).
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stantially at variance with the 4 percent tables,4" and a later Tax
Court decision permitted use of a 312 percent actual yield in lieu
of the 4 percent tables.
47
A very recent Fourth Circuit decision, Rosen v. Commissioner,"8
permitted a taxpayer to use the tables in valuation, for gift tax
exclusion purposes, of an income interest in closely held corporate
stocks despite the Commissioner's protests that the stock had neither
paid nor could be expected to pay a dividend. The court said that
"[r]esort to the tables is justified in cases where valuation neces-
sarily presents an element of speculation and where use of the
tables is actuarially sound."4 The court did note that the trustees
had power to sell the donated shares and invest the proceeds in
income producing property.
As in cases involving actual life expectancies, it appears that
the Commissioner may have been less successful in deviating from
his actuarial tables than the taxpayers. In Rosen, the court recog-
nized that "[n]eutral principles forbid that the Commissioner be
allowed to apply the tables where to do so produces greater revenue
and to refuse application where it does not.""0
An earlier district court decision 5' had denied the Commissioner
his presumption of correctness when it had been shown that the
method substituted by the Commissioner for the actuarial tables
was erroneous. The court summarized the justification for broad
application of the tables:
The valuation of future interest is at best a highly speculative
undertaking not unlike the determination of life expectancy which
courts and juries are called upon to make in almost all personal
injury actions. Recognizing that the value of future interest cannot
be determined with any degree of certainty, those called upon to
make valuations have resorted to established computations which
seldom accurately predict the value in a particular situation but
prove to be accurate when used in a great number of instances. 52
With reference to the substitution of actual known rates of
return, it must be noted that the regulations provide separately and
specifically for valuation of all interests in commercial annuity
contracts and insurance contracts.5" Surely a vast majority of the
46 ld. The court stated further: "The Commissioner recognizes that when the facts
indicate the use of a rate other than 4% he will use such rate." Id. at 77.
47 Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949).
48 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968).
49Id. at 247.
5Id. at 248.
51 Hipp v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 222 (W.D.S.C. 1962).
52Id. at 226.
53Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1958).
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contracts in which the rate of return is fixed in advance will fall
into these classifications.
C. Allocation of Basis
The regulations provide that:
When a part of a larger property is sold, the cost or other
basis of the entire property shall be equitably apportioned among
the several parts, and the gain realized or loss sustained on the
part of the entire property sold is the difference between the
selling price and the cost or other basis allocated to such part.54
Other income tax regulations describe in detail the mechanics
involved in measuring the gain on a "[s]ale or other disposition
of a life interest, remainder interest, or other interest in property
acquired from a decendent."55 There are, however, no corresponding
instructions to cover dispositions of property not acquired by be-
quest or inheritance. The actuarial method prescribed by regulation
for property acquired from a decendent has been accepted by the
courts when applied to property acquired by deed,56 but in 1965
the Tax Court acknowledged that "[njeither the Code nor the
regulations prescribe a method for allocating a lump-sum basis
when the owner of a fee simple interest conveys, inter vivos, a less-
than-fee estate.
' 57
This case involved the sale of ranch lands located within
Grand Teton National Park to the National Park Service with
a life estate retained by the sellers. The court permitted the Com-
missioner to apportion basis using a ratio formed with the actual
amount paid by the government for the remainder interest over
the appraised value of the fee simple. The court recognized the
above cited regulation and the Camden v. Commissioner" de-
cision but concluded that these imposed no requirement that the
actuarial tables be used. The Commissioner's method was found
to be both logical and reasonable.
It must be noted, however, that the court was not informed
as to what method of attributing value between respective interests
had been used by the National Park Service in arriving at the
price to be offered for the remainders. If the actual price paid had
been determined with reference to the life expectancies of the seller,
the Commissioner's pro-rations had in effect duplicated the actuarial
method prescribed in the regulation which the court purported to
5id. at § 1.61-6(a) (1957).
55 d. at § 1.1014-5(a) (1957).
56 Estate of Johnson N. Camden, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1952) afId, Camden v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
57 Eileen M. Hunter, 44 T.C. 109, 115 (1965).
58 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
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ignore. Of course the discount rate selected to determine the actual
price, if different than that used in the Commissioner's tables, could
cause a difference in amounts.
It is clear in the decision that the court would have considered
the actuarial method appropriate. Part of its readiness to accept the
alternative method arose from impatience with the petitioner-tax-
payers who had concentrated on allegations of "arrogant usurpation
of authority by incompetent and ruthless employees of the Govern-
ment."5 The judge regretted the petitioners' failure to rely to a
greater extent on substantive tax law.
Certainly the regulation governing apportionment of the basis
of property acquired from a decedent must be recognized as an
appropriate guide in apportioning basis whenever there is a con-
veyance of a life estate or remainder interest, whatever its source;
but, because so many such interests originate in wills, the regulation
is of pervasive importance in taxation of future interest transactions.
D. Uniform Basis
Section 4 of Regulation 1.1014 introduces a concept known as
the principle of uniform basis. In the words of this regulation, the
basis of the property "will be the same, or uniform, whether the
property is possessed or enjoyed by the executor or administrator,
the heir, the legatee or devisee, or the trustee or beneficiary of a
trust created by will or an inter vivos trust.''60
Section 5 provides for allocation of basis upon disposition of
one of multiple interests in property.6" The regulation, for this
purpose, incorporates by reference the same actuarial tables pre-
viously considered in connection with estate tax valuations. Also
repeated is the offer of factors to be furnished by the Internal
Revenue Service in actual situations which do not conform to the
tables.
The text of the regulation provides that: "[I1n ascertaining the
basis of a life interest, remainder interest, or other interest which
is sold or otherwise disposed of, the uniform basis rule contemplates
that proper adjustments will be made to reflect the change in
relative value of the interests on account of the passage of time."62
In other words, the total basis as established by estate tax
valuation does not change, but apportionment of this total basis
among fractional interests is dependent upon actuarial factors which
are applied at the time the fractional interest is sold. This means
59 1d. at 112.
6
Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (1957).
61




that the tax basis of a fractional interest fluctuates as the life ex-
pectancies of the interested parties diminish. The result is a situ-
ation seemingly without parallel in income tax procedures. The
basis of an individual property owner's interest is permitted to
change with the passage of time even though no basis adjustments
are being reflected in the computations of periodic taxable income.
There is, of course, an offsetting change to the tax basis of some
other owner of a related property interest.
The principle of uniform basis has been developed to deal
with problems involving the amount of basis in a fractional interest
in property, but related rules are designed to establish a certain
uniformity in methods for establishing the time of acquisition for
tax purposes of property acquired from a decedent. The time factor
is critical to many income tax determinations.
Prior to the Supreme Court's Helvering v. Reynolds63 decision
in 1941 there had been conflict as to whether contingent remainders
would take their basis from the fair market value at the date of
the testator's death or from their fair market value when they
became finally vested. Justice Douglas, in Reynolds, noted that
"to carry into that [basis] computation the value of property at
the time the taxpayer had only a contingent remainder interest in
it is not to tax him on values which he never received. ' 64 Presently,
the income tax basis rules do not distinguish between vested and
contingent remainders.
The Reynolds decision reaffirms an exception to the uniform
basis rules which had been established in an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Maguire v. Commissioner.65 When a remainderman of a
testamentary trust receives property which was purchased by the
trustee and not included in the property distributed from the settlor's
estate, the remainderman's basis is the same as the trustee's basis.
The propriety of this exception is clear when one considers that
the trustee must file income tax returns and recognize the taxable
transactions which would arise when the property acquired by the
trust from the decedent was converted to other property. By the
same reasoning, the uniform basis rule does not preclude the Code
§ 1016 adjustments to basis for depreciation, depletion, and capital
improvements."
Early Board of Tax Appeal decisions compelled a remainderman
to reduce his basis by the actuarial value of a life estate or estate
"3 313 U.S. 428 (1941).
64 Id. at 434.
6 313 U.S. 1 (1941). The Court held: "As respects the property which was purchased
by the trustees, we are of the view that its cost to them, rather than its value at the
date of delivery to the taxpayer, governs." Id. at 8-9.
66Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4 (1957).
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for a term of years which had already expired. 6 This rule, of
course, cannot be reconciled with the uniform basis doctrine or
with the principles applied in the Maguire and Reynolds decisions.
The concept of shifting basis, long incorporated in the regulations,
dictates that as the intervening estate approaches its termination,
the basis shifts to the remainder; and when the remainderman takes
title to the property, he acquires also the total original tax basis
as determined by the estate tax valuation.
The conflict was resolved in 1937 when the board acknowl-
edged that its position had been erroneous. "8 The remainderman,
who had already come into possession of the property, was per-
mitted in this case to deduct as basis the entire original estate tax
value upon sale of the property.
II. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Principles
As noted in the paragraphs introducing this work, mechanical
methods for measuring the amount of a tax deduction for a con-
tribution to charity of a future interest are similar to those applied
in the determination of tax basis. The charitable contributions
regulations6" rely upon the same tables, those provided in Internal
Revenue Service Publication No. 11 entitled Actuarial Values for
Estate and Gift Tax.
70
Undoubtedly, the procedures for valuation of future interests
find their most frequent exercise in the areas of charitable contri-
butions. Contributions to charity of remainder interests with a
beneficial life estate reserved to the donor are a popular tax saving
device, and an effective method by which the property owner can
with certainty designate his charitable beneficiaries while retaining
unrestricted use of the property during his lifetime.
"If a contribution is made in property other than money, the
amount of the deduction is determined by the fair market value of
the property at the time of the contribution."'" This excerpt from
the regulation established an exception to the general rule in tax
67 William Huggett, 24 B.T.A. 669 (1931); rev'd, Huggett v. Burnet, 64 F.2d 705
(D.C. Cir. 1933) ; but see, Elizabeth S. Vale, 30 B.T.A. 1351 (1934).
68 William H. Slack, Jr., 36 B.T.A. 105 (1937). The court said:
In the case of Elizabeth S. Vale, 30 B.T.A. 1351, the Board adhered to
the opinion it had adopted in the case of William Huggett, supra, rejecting
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals in Huggett v. Burnet, supra.
The Board is now convinced that its position in the Vale case was erroneous
and that case will not be followed in the future.
Id. at 109.
69
Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(d)(2) (1958).
70 IRS Publication No. 11, Rev. 5-59.
71Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958).
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law that a deduction must always be limited to the taxpayer's basis
in the property given up. Such an exception is difficult to ration-
alize within the framework of traditional income measurement prin-
ciples and would seem to originate simply from a governmental
policy of encouraging charitable donations.
Clearly future interests qualify as property other than money.
The regulation provides that "[a] deduction may be allowed for a
contribution of an interest in the income from property or an in-
terest in the remainder .... .72
B. To Irrevocably and Unconditionally Vest in Charity
The regulation paragraph following that cited above, however,
imposes a general limitation with broad effects:
If as of the date of a gift a transfer for charitable purposes
is dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening
of a precedent event in order that it might become effective, no
deduction is allowable unless the possibility that the charitable
transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible. 78
The courts have narrowly confined income tax deductions to
those meeting a test of strict unconditional vesting,74 although
estate tax deductions have been permitted where "there is virtually
no possibility that anyone other than the charity will take the
property."'
7 5
The Code provides specific guidelines for gifts to trusts in-
volving reversions:
No deduction shall be allowed under this section for the value of
any interest in property transferred after March 9, 1954, to a
trust if -
(i) the grantor has a reversionary interest in the corpus
or income of that portion of the trust with respect
to which a deduction would (but for this subpara-
graph) be allowable under this section; and
(ii) at the time of the transfer the value of such rever-
sionary interest exceeds 5 percent of the value of the
property constituting such portion of the trust.76
The regulation defines the term "reversionary interest" as:
[A] possibility that after the possession or enjoyment of property or
its income has been obtained by a charitable donee, the property or
its income may revest in the grantor or his estate, or may be subject
to a power exercisable by the grantor or a non-adverse party (within
the meaning of section 672(b)), or both, to revest in, or return to
72
1d. at § 1.170-1(d) (1958).
rId. at § 1.170-1(e) (1958).
4See, Schoellkopf v. United States, 124 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1942).
75Polster v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1960).
7
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VOL. 46
or for the benefit of, the grantor or his estate the property or income
therefrom.77
The subsequent paragraph of the regulation providing instruc-
tions for valuation of reversions and remainder interests refers to
the by now familiar estate tax actuarial tables."8
C. Severance of the Charitable Interest
The doctrine that the charitable interest must be severable from
its related noncharitable interests is dictated by logic; for without
such a rule, there is no acceptable formula for ascertaining the
value of the interest to be deducted. 79
A practical illustration of inability to sever is provided by a
gift to charity of a remainder interest in a trust in which the trustee
has power to invest in mutual funds and allocate capital gains to
income. A purchaser of mutual fund shares acquires rights in the
unrealized appreciation in securities held by the fund at the time of
his purchase. This appreciation will ultimately be realized and
distributed by the fund to its shareholders in the form of capital
gain dividends. An income beneficiary who is permitted to receive
these distributions will be eroding the trust corpus which was desig-
nated for charity, and there is no means of determining in advance
the rate at which this erosion will occur. There is, therefore, no
method to ascertain the deductible value of the charitable interest.
Comparable problems arise whenever the trustee is granted
broad discretion in the selection of investments and the determi-
nation of distributable trust income. A 1965 Tax Court decision,
James v. Darling,80 involves fractional remainder interests in num-
erous Denver real properties. In disallowing deductions for char-
itable contributions of the remainders, the court explicity declined
to address the issue as to whether or not "failure to provide for a
depreciation reserve in the trust renders the gifts of future interests
in depreciable properties unassured and unascertainable in amount."'"
Instead, the decision relied upon the fact that the powers
reserved to the trustee for the benefit of the life tenants were
entirely too broad to permit assurance that a gift of ascertainable
value had been conveyed to the charity.82 This case, which involved
77Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(d)(1) (1958).
78 1d. § 1.170-2(d)(2).
79Rev. Rul. 33, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 62, which states in part: "If there are non-
charitable income beneficiaries, a charitable remainder interest in corpus which is
subject to such power of investment, and diversion, cannot be severed from the
noncharitable income interest in the absence of an acceptable formula for ascertaining
the value of the remainder interest." Id. at 63.
8o43 T.C. 520 (1965).




a reservation by the donors of powers to control disposition of the
properties and reinvestment of the proceeds, includes a compre-
hensive review of the prior cases involving the ability to sever.
A similar result occurred in the case of Jones v. United States 3
involving an assignment of an endowment policy to charity. De-
duction of the present value of installment payments on matured
endowment policies was disallowed because assignment of the in-
stallments was conditioned by a provision that any installments
due after the death of the donor were to be paid to designated
survivors. The court denied deduction of the present values despite
the fact that the computations reflected the actuarial probability of
the donor being survived by the designated beneficiary.84
In a later tax court case85 the facts were distinguished from
those in the Darling and Jones decisions cited above, and the deduc-
tion was allowed for contributions to a trust even though the husband
and wife donors were also the trustees with broad powers to manage,
sell, and reinvest the trust corpus. The court found it "highly im-
probable that the petitioners in their fiduciary capacity will ever
perform an act which will defeat the charitable remainders they have
created in the trust."86 Important considerations were the donor's will
by which his residuary estate "poured over" into the charitable trust,
the meticulous records by which the donor segregated the trust assets
from his own, and his preesstablished favor for the charitable
remaindermen.
This trust instrument also provided that the contributions could
be recaptured by the donors if the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
did not allow an income tax deduction, but the court denied that
the Commissioner's administrative disallowance of the contribution
deduction had triggered recapture. Instead, it was decided that
possibility of recapture could not be determined without knowledge
of the final outcome of the litigation being decided.
The Commissioner has ruled, however, that no deduction
would be allowed for contributions to a trust with a savings pro-
vision calling for revocation of the trustee's powers to whatever
extent necessary to make the charitable remainder inovlved a sever-
able and ascertainable interest deductible for federal tax purposes.
8 7
8252 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
84 Id. at 267. The court said:
At the time of the assignments there existed a probability, variously esti-
mated by the parties to be either 6.8% or 11.1%, that the Miniger Founda-
tion would receive nothing as the result of these assignments, or that, having
taken something, it would receive nothing further, and that these chances
of not so taking were not so remote as to be negligible.
85 Id. William D. O'Brien, 46 T.C. 583 (1966).
86 Id. at 596.
87 Rev. Rul. 1944, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 442.
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This ruling considers such savings provisions contrary to public
policy and void. Therefore, the powers rendering the charitable
remainder nonseverable and not subject to ascertainment remain
effective.
The public policy considerations are found in the frustrating
effects of the described provisions on tax enforcement efforts and
in concern that no valid case or controversy would be presented to
a court deciding upon the the severance issue. All determinations,
at any level, in favor of the Internal Revenue Service would simply
defeat the gift.
There is another area in which the donor of a potentially de-
ductible charitable contribution of a future interest must exercise
caution. An income interest in stocks of a corporation controlled by
the donor or certain of his relatives may be found nonseverable
because the donor, through his stockholder voting powers to control
dividend distributions by the corporation, has effectively retained
a discretionary power to control distributions to the income
beneficiary.88
D. Tangible Personal Property
Before 1964 there existed a popular practice of donating
tangible personal property, most commonly art objects or rare books,
to a charitable institution with a life estate reserved to the donor.
This provided the donor with an income tax deduction for the fair
market value of the remainder irrespective of the amount of his
investment or basis in the object.
Establishing the market value of rare objects almost inevitably
involved the subjective determinations of a specialized appraiser
whose opinions were difficult to challenge and practically impos-
sible to disprove. Often the donee, a museum, library, or university,
offered the most authoritative source of expert appraisal advice;
but certainly the institution, being anxious to retain the favors of
its benefactors, could not be expected to provide completely im-
partial services when only the taxing authorities stood to lose by
its bias.
The result was generous income tax deductions for illusory
contributions, as the deduction could far exceed the total cost of the
object to the donor who was not even required to give up possession.
Congress reacted in the Revenue Act of 1964 with the addition
of Code Section 170(f) which says in part that:
[P]ayment of a charitable contribution which consists of a future
interest in tangible personal property shall be treated as made only
8 Elise McK. Morgan, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964) ; aff'd per curiam Morgan v. Commissioner,
353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965).
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when all intervening interests in, and rights to the actual possession
or enjoyment of, the property have expired or are held by persons
other than the taxpayer [or certain relatives] .... 89
In the typical case, of course, delaying the deduction until the
gift is completed means that only the estate tax will be affected by
the transaction.
CONCLUSION
Recent newspaper and magazine issues have dedicated extensive
space to the "taxpayer revolt" and to exposure of the myriad "tax
shelters" and "loopholes" in the federal income tax law. The press
has delighted in exploring the ingenious devices employed by those
millionaires who pay no income taxes. Only rarely, however, do
the popular media touch upon the vast area of tax intricacies which
this paper attempts to introduce.
But if future interests have been ignored by the press, they have
not been ignored in practice. Perhaps the inability of future interest
devices to arouse public outrage is a major advantage which accrues
from their use.
Only the most sophisticated tax practitioners are equipped to
totally avail their clients of these plans. The public apathy may stem
from ignorance; or, it may be that the typical future interest trans-
actions are so imbued with benevolent motives that the public
willingly overlooks the donor's tax advantages. The fact that the
taxpayer's death is frequently a prerequisite to his final reward
of tax savings could be another reason for the relative lack of
public concern.
This paper has to a degree deemphasized the factual distinc-
tions upon which the cases are often decided. The facts seem sig-
nificant in these cases primarily with regard to determination of the
taxpayer's intent. The courts seem inclined to construe the statutes
and regulations more liberally in favor of the taxpayer who can
show by the facts that his plan was motivated by benevolent con-
siderations which raise it above the status of a mere tax "gimmick."
Hopefully, the reader has become aware of the future interest
devices being used in tax law practice. A reader who could conceive
new applications in the areas of either income tax or estate and gift
tax plans would be welcomed with enthusiasm by the fraternity of
tax free millionaires.
Of more importance, though, is the prospect that the tax laws
in this area may be providing a framework which promotes the fi-
89 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f).
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TAXES - CORPORATE TAXATION - CLASSIFICATION OF PROFES-
SIONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES.* -
Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd,
406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
A GROUP of Colorado lawyers formed a professional service
corporation pursuant to a rule promulgated by the Colorado
Supreme Court.' Plaintiff Empey, a stockholder in this corporation,
applied for a tax refund allegedly due him. When the Internal
Revenue Service failed to take affirmative action on the refund
application, Empey brought suit in federal district court.2 The gov-
ernment argued that the organization to which Empey belonged was
not a corporation for federal income tax purposes. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that this
was a corporation for federal tax purposes and the regulation saying
that it wasn't, was contrary to the Internal Revenue Code, previous
case law, and previous regulations.
As a result of the decision in Empey, professional corporations
and associations have gained a stronger foothold for survival and
have become an important consideration in tax planning for pro-
fessional service people. These professional associations had traveled
an uncertain path; the developments up to Empey have formed into
a somewhat comical story of the battle between the Treasury and
the professional service taxpayer. The development and future of
the tax treatment problem for professional service taxpayers are
the subjects of this article.
The conflict on how to treat an organization for tax purposes
appeared in 1935 when the United States Supreme Court held in
Morrissey v. Commissioner3 that a trust set up to run a business
resembled an association enough to be treated for tax purposes like
a corporation. Thus, if an organization's characteristics resembled
* The Treasury officially abandoned its long opposition to corporate tax treatment for
professional service corporations in August 1969. Technical Information Release No.
1019 Aug. 8, 1969. The Release allows corporate tax treatment for those persons
incorporating under state laws professional service corporations. Currently, only four
states do not allow such corporations: Iowa, Nebraska, New York, and Wyoming.
56 TAXES ON PARADE No. 35, part 1, at 4, July 30, 1969.
1 On December 5, 1961, at the request of the Colorado Bar Association, the Colorado
Supreme Court promulgated rule No. 231, now rule 265 Colo. R. Civ. P.
2 Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 157
(10th Cir. 1969).
3296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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substantially those of a corporation, it would be classified as an
'association," associations being taxed as though they are in fact
corporations. The Court posed four questions in Morrissey, the
answers to which should be used to determine whether or not an
organization should be treated as an association for tax purposes:
(1) whether or not an organization has a centralized management;
(2) whether or not there is a continuity of enterprise; (3) whether
or not there is a means of transferability of interests without ending
continuity; and (4) whether or not limited liability exists. The
Court, however, did not limit the test to these four attributes. It
thought inquiry should be made as to who held title to the property
was title held by an entity separate from the principals of the
organization?4 In a close case, the Court seemed to think that an
important factor to consider would be how the organization repre-
sented itself to the public.'
In 1936 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued in
Pelton v. Commissioner6 that a clinic formed by a group of Illinois
physicians should be taxed as a corporation rather than as a partner-
ship, even though physicians could not form a corporation under
Illinois law. The court agreed with the argument that the clinic was
carrying on business for a profit and had substantial similarities to
a corporate organization sufficient to qualify the organization as
a corporation for tax purposes. To determine whether or not it
substantially resembled a corporation the court used the test set up
in Morrissey.7 The court also held that national uniformity required
that the title a state gave to an organization was not conclusive, but
that the court must examine actual form and characteristics in deter-
mining how the organization should be treated under federal tax
law.8
Some professional service taxpayers, however, wanted the ben-
efit of some of the tax advantages of the corporate form. Health,
retirement, and death benefits were far greater, at lower tax rates,
and the corporation was able to deduct payments into these funds
or plans as a proper business expense. In response to these taxpayers,
the government seemed to change its position. In United States v.
Kintner,9 it has argued that a group of Montana physicians should
be taxed as a partnership and not as a corporation. However, the
court found that although the physicians could not incorporate
4Id. at 345.
5 Id. at 360.
682 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
7 1d. at 476.
8 1d. See also Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935).
9 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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under Montana law, their organization more closely resembled a
corporation than any other type or form of organization. The organ-
ization was run by some rather than all of the former partners, it
incurred debts in the name of the association, it paid federal and
state corporate taxes, its members received their compensation from
the association and not from individual clients and death or retire-
ment of one or more members would not cause dissolution of the
organization. The resemblance hence was substantially that of a
corporation, even though the interest of a member was not assign-
able as is the normal corporate interest.
A few years later, in Galt v. United States,10 a group of Texas
physicians won corporate tax treatment even though they could not
legally incorporate under Texas law. The court said:
We think the association was entitled to be treated for tax
purposes as though it was a corporation and the act of a state can
neither raise nor lower the federal taxes that may be due by the
association by whatever name it may be called under the laws of
the particular state."
On December 23, 1959, the Treasury announced newly pro-
posed regulations to show its position on professional associations.
In 1956, as expected, the Department had announced that it would
not follow the Kintnef decision. 12 However, in 1960 the Depart-
ment adopted the strongly protested "Kintner Regulations."'18 Under
the "Kintner Regulations" an organization had to have the follow-
ing characteristics in order to qualify for corporate tax treatment:
(1) associates; (2) the objective of carrying on business for profit
with subsequent division of that profit; (3) continuity of life; (4)
limited liability; (5) centralization of management; and (6) free
transferability of ownership interests. The regulations go on to say
that items (1) and (2) are of lesser importance because they are
common to both corporations and partnerships and that to be
treated as a corporation for tax purposes an organization must have
more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.
These new regulations ignored previous case law which held
that general partnerships could be taxed as corporations even though
they were treated as general partnerships under local law 4 and
10 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
1Id. at 362.
12 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 598.
13 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
14 Burke-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); United States v.
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Wabash Oil & Gas Ass'n. v. Commissioner,
160 F.2d 658 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 843 (1947); Popular Bluff
Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Bert v. Helvering, 92
F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d
156 (8th Cir. 1937) ; Cincinnati Stamping Co., 45,258 P-H Mem. T.C. (1945).
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that local law did not control how an organization was treated for
federal tax purposes.' The "Kintner Regulations" also seemed in-
consistent or more strict than previous regulations which did not
even mention limited liability or free transferability of ownership
interests.' 6 In fact, these regulations specifically state that a part-
nership lacks one of the essential requirements of a corporation:
Accordingly, a general partnership subject to a statute corre-
sponding to the Uniform Partnership Act and a limited partnership
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act both lack continuity of life. 17
When it became apparent that to qualify for corporate tax
treatment a general partnership must incorporate under state law,
states sympathetic to professional taxpayers acted quickly. In 1961
and 1962 alone 18 states enacted laws to allow professional asso-
ciations or corporations.'
While the Treasury and professional service taxpayers were
battling, Congress was attempting to solve the root of the problem
- tax inequality between self-employed individuals and corporate
employees. The Keogh Bill, known as H.R. 10 or the Self-Employed
Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 was delayed time and
again in the Senate Finance Committee before it was finally passed
in 1962. The Treasury was strongly against the Keogh Bill in its
original form and it was only with Treasury sponsored changes
that the bill passed at all.' 9
Because of its amended form and the delay in its approval the
Keogh Bill only partially bridged the gap in tax treatment between
corporate and professional service taxpayers. Professional service
taxpayers had their expectations raised during the debates and were
severely disheartened by the result. One effect was an increased
desire on their part to achieve corporate tax status, which led ulti-
mately to an amendment to the Bill in 1966 which narrowed the
gap, but did not close it completely.
20
This amendment altered one of the features of the original
act, that the self-employed could deduct only half of the amount
is See Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
16 For an excellent discussion of the history of this problem, see Bye & Young, Law
Firm Incorporation in Colorado, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 427 (1962).
1 7 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(1)(3) (1960).
18See Bye & Young, supra note 16, at 434.
19 For an interesting discussion on H.R. 10's problems and battles, see Rapp, The
Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short History of the Jenkins-
Keogh Bill, 14 TAx L. REv. 55 (1958). The new law was to take effect for taxable
years after December 31, 1962.
20 The amendment was by a rider on the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Act of
November 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 204, 80 Stat. 1577. It still gives an in-
ferior treatment to professional service and other self-employed taxpayers when
compared to corporate benefits. Incorporation should be given serious consideration
by all professional service-self-employed taxpayers.
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contributed to retirement and profit-sharing plans with a maximum
of $1,250 being deductible. 1 The amendment provides that for
those years beginning after December 31, 1967, the entire contri-
bution for a self-employed person is deductible up to $2,500 or
10 percent of earned income, whichever is less. 2 Contributions for
employees are deductible in full up to a standard limitation of 15
percent of their compensation. If both pension and profit sharing
plans are in effect, then the standard limitation is 25 percent. The
corporation has no limit to how much more it may want to contribute
to the plans as long as the contribution is the feasonable actuarial
cost of funding benefits. If the 15 percent limitation is not reached
in any year the remaining contribution deduction may be carried
forward indefinitely. However, an employer cannot deduct in any
year more than 30 percent of participating employees' compen-
sation."3
Distribution of the benefits of an H.R. 10 plan cannot be made
to a self-employed person who is an owner-employee before he
reaches the age of 5912 unless he is permanently disabled, but
benefits must start before he reaches the age of 702.4 This limi-
tation is applicable evn if the plan is terminated.21 The only restric-
tion on when benefits can be distributed to an employee, defined
as one who is less than a 10 percent partner, is that payments must
start before the age of 70 .26 Thus, an employee may receive
benefits if he retires, is disabilitated, dies, is discharged, or quits
before he reaches the age of 701/2. Total distribution of the benefits
must be made within five years of death or can be used to buy an
immediate annuity payable on the life of a beneficiary. 7
H.R. 10 plans may be pension, profit sharing, or annuity plans
and are in the forms of Trusteed plans,2 8 Annuity plans,29 Custodial
Account plans,8" U.S. Government Bond plan,3' and Face-Amount
Certificate plans.3 2 H.R. 10 originally amended twenty sections
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to corporate retire-
ment arrangements and provided one additional section,33 which
21 




2 Rev. Rul. 65-21, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 174.




29Id. §§ 401(g), 403.
3
0ld. § 401(f).
31 id. § 405.
32 Id. §§ 4 01(g), 403.
33 Id. § 405.
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described newly created bonds for investments for H.R. 10 plans.
The key sections to H.R. 10 are the sections governing qualifica-
tion84 and deductions. 5 H.R. 10 plans are more restricted in types
of investments that can be made than are corporate plans. The
earnings from H.R. 10 funds are tax free like corporate fund
earnings,8 and both have the advantage of distributing the benefits
when the beneficiary is in a lower income tax bracket than he was
when he made the contributions.
Another difference between H.R. 10, even after amendment,
and corporate plans is in discrimination (discriminatory in giving
favored treatment to shareholders, officers, persons who are high
in management, and highly paid employees). A corporation may
discriminate to a far greater extent than H.R. 10 plans can.87
Health and accident, wage contribution plans, insurance plans,
and death benefits, for instance, do not come under corporate dis-
crimination prohibitions; and those prohibitions against discrim-
ination that do, can be easily avoided in a close corporation. H.R.
10 plans must include all employees with three or more years of
continuous service, while a corporate plan has no such limitation.8
The benefits going to a corporate executive, limited only by the
prohibition against discrimination in favor of stockholders, officers,
and highly salaried employees,89 can be far better and more com-
plete in coverage. H.R. 10 plans can not get capital gains treatment for
lump sum distributions, estate tax exclusions on death benefits,"'
gift tax exclusions4' nor the $5000 tax-free death benefit4" which
are all available under corporate plans. Thus, H.R. 10, even in its
34 Id. § 401.
35 Id. § 404.
36 Id. § 501 (a).
37 Id. §§ 401(a), 401(d)(3).
38 Id.
39 Id. § 4 01(a).
40 Id. §§ 2039(c), 2039(c) (2), 2037, 2038.
41 Id. §§ 2517, 2517(b).
-1d. §§ 101(b), 101(b)(3). There are other less important differences. H.R. 10
plans vest immediately while it may be possible for corporate plans not to vest at all.
Corporate profit sharing plans may take up to 10 years before vesting and 20 years
or more for pension plans. When the corporate employee leaves the corporation he
receives the percentage of his contribution vested. Contributions for self-employed
can't exceed one-third of the total contribution to social security. There is no such
restriction for corporate plans. A self-employed cannot borrow from trust plans,
cannot buy from or sell to trusts and cannot charge for his services for the trust.
Corporate employees can borrow from the trust if adequate security is given and a
reasonable interest rate is charged, employees can buy from or sell to trusts if adequate
consideration is given, and employees can charge for reasonable value of services to
the trust. The trustee for an H.R. 10 plan must be a bank, while corporate plans
have no such trustee restrictions. As mentioned before, the distribution of benefits
under corporate plans is free from restriction and has much broader limitations on
amount of deductions, providing the requirements of Int. Rev. Code of 1954. §§ 162,
212 are complied with See Id. §§ 404(a)(1), 404(a)(3).
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amended form, does not put the self-employed on equal ground
with corporate employees.4"
Before H.R. 10 was amended in 1966, some interesting de-
velopments occurred that probably gave some extra incentive to
pass the amendment. In 1964, it was held in Foreman v. United
States44 that a group of Florida physicians should be allowed cor-
porate status for tax purposes. As in the Kintner45 and Galt46 cases,
the organization met all the Morrissey47 requirements except limited
liability. Therefore, the court held that the organization's character-
istics were substantially those of a corporation.
At this time more and more states were making it possible for
professional service corporations to incorporate. This response by
states and the current of cases against the I.R.S. caused the Treasury
to promulgate a change in the regulations in 1965.48 The regula-
tions published by the Treasury in 1960, showing its position on
professional associations, had as its first example49 a situation quite
similar to the Kintner facts except that it set forth a modified form
of transferability of interests of its members. The example also
had a striking resemblance to the Galt factual situation. However,
the new regulations deleted this example and added an additional
requirement for professional service organizations5" that made it
43 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)'(2), 403(a)(2)(A).
44 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
45 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
46 Gait v. United States, 175 F.Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
47 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
48 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
49Id. § 301.7701-2(g) (1960), Example 1.
50 On February 2, 1965, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965) was added. The following
are the parts of 2(h) that the Empey court thought pertinent:
(h) Classification of professional service organizations. (1) (i) A
professional service organization is treated as a corporation (or as an
association and, therefore, taxable as a corporation) only if it has sufficient
corporate characteristics to be classifiable as a corporation under paragraph
(a) of this section, rather than as a partnership or proprietorship. For
purposes of determining the classification of an organization under these
regulations, the term "'professional service organization," as used in this
paragraph, means an organization formed by one or more persons to en-
gage in a business involving the performance of professional services for
profit which under local law, may not be organized and operated in the
form of an ordinary business corporation having the usual characteristics
of such a corporation. Thus, even if a professional service organization is
organized as an ordinary business corporation, this paragraph applies if
such corporation is subject to local regulatory rules which deprive such
corporation of the usual characteristics of an ordinary business corpora-
tion....
(2) . . .A business corporation has a continuing identity as an entity
which is not dependent upon a shareholder's active participation in any
capacity in the production of the income of the corporation. Furthermore,
the interest of a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation includes a
right to share in the profits of the corporation, and such right is not legally
dependent (determined without regard to any agreement among the share-
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almost impossible for a professional service organization to qualify
for corporate tax treatment. This set the stage for the Empey court
battle between the Treasury and the professional service organi-
zations. 5
The judicial challenge of the 1965 regulations by a legal or-
ganization in Denver culminated in 1967 in Empey v. United States.
The district court held for Empey and the Treasury Department ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.52 In
holders) upon his participation in the production of the corporation's
income. However, the interest of a member of a professional service organ-
ization generally is inextricably bound to the establishment and continuance
of an employment relationship with the organization, and he cannot share
in the profits of a professional service organization unless he also shares
in the performance of the services rendered by the organization. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, the term "employment relationship" is used to
describe such active participation by the member and is not restricted to
the common law meaning of such term. If local law, [or] applicable regu-
lations . . . do not permit a member of a professional service organization
to share in its profits unless an employment relationship exists between
him and the organization, and if in such case, he or his estate is required to
dispose of his interest in the organization if the employment relationship
terminates, the continuing existence of the organization depends upon the
willingness of its remaining members, if any, either to agree, by prior
arrangement or at the time of such termination, to acquire his interest or
to employ his proposed successor. . ..
(5) '(i) If the right of a member of a professional service organization
to share in its profits is dependent upon the existence of an employment
relationship between him and the organization, free transferability of
interests within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this section exists only if
the member, without the consent of other members, may transfer both the
right to share in the profits of the organization and the right to an employ-
ment relationship with the organization.
(ii) . . . [If the interest of a member of a professional service organ-
ization constitutes a right to share in the profits of the organization which
is contingent upon and inseparable from the member's continuing employ-
ment relationship with the organization, and the transfer of such interest
is subject to a right of first refusal, such interest is subject to a power
in the other members of the organization to determine not only the indi-
viduals whom the organization is to employ, but also who may share
with them in the profits of the organization. The possession by other
members of the power to determine, in connection with the transfer of the
power to determine, in connection with the transfer of such an interest,
whom the organization is to employ is so substantial a hindrance upon the
free transferability of interests in the organization that such power precludes
the existence of a modified form of free transferability of interests. There-
fore, if a member of a professional service organization who possesses such
an interest may transfer his interest to a qualified person who is not a
member of the organization only after having first offered his interest to
the other members of the organization at its fair market value, the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests does not exist.
Many anticipated that the new regulations would not change the court positions
already established.
Few if any new style professional organizations will be able to meet
the standards of the 1965 regulations, but since they are "interpretive" rather
than "legislative" regulations and were issued long after the statutory
provision they interpret, they will probably not weigh very heavily with
the flood of litigated cases that can be anticipated.
B. BrTTKER & S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 38 '(2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BIrrKER].
51272 F.Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
52 See 81 I-ARv. L. REv. 1356 (1968) for initial comments.
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the 1968 November term, the circuit court affirmed the district
court's invalidation of Treas. Reg § 301.7701-2(h).
53
To provide a background for the Empey case, it should be
stated that prior to 1962, the Treasury Department prohibited cor-
porate employees from practicing before it; but in that year, the
Department amended its requirements concerning those qualified
to engage in such practice. 54 The amendment allows professional
service corporation employees to carry on their tax practice before the
Treasury Department. In response to this amendment and due to
the fact that in Colorado lawyers are permitted to incorporate under
the General Business Corporation Act,55 a group of Denver at-
torneys who specialized in tax matters decided to incorporate.
53 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969). A review of the opposing arguments is informative.
The Treasury Department argued in Empey, as stated in its appellant brief, that
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(2) clearly permits an organization incorporated
under state law to be classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes, and that if
an organization more closely resembles a partnership than a corporation in its essen-
tial and relevant characteristics it must be taxed as a partnership even though it is
incorporated under state law. The Treasury further argued that Drexler and Wald
Professional Company more closely resembled a partnership since: (1) it did not
have free transferability of interests because the stock had to be offered first to the
company and if refused permission had to be obtained to sell to an outside lawyer; '(2)
lacked continuity of life since the state supreme court could cause the corporation to
cease being one; (3) lacked limited liability because members were jointly and sev-
erally liable; and (4) lacked centralized management in the manner that they actually
operated. Finally the Treasury argued that if the regulations were invalid, Drexler and
Wald still did not qualify under the 1960 regulations and by the standards stated in
Morissey.
Ellis J. Sobol, of Drexler and Wald Professional Company, argued in the
appellee's brief that the Treasury's 1965 regulations were unreasonable, plainly
inconsistent with the statute, and amounted to administrative legislation and thus
should be void; and if the 1965 regulations were not void, the professional company
still possessed the attributes of corporate resemblance as set forth in the regulations
and the decided cases. The amicus curiae brief filed by the Colorado Bar Association
argued that corporations validly chartered under state law are included in the term
"corporation" as used in the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(3), and are
excluded from the term "partnership" as used in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701 (a)
(2) ; that the resemblance test had no application to corporations that were incor-
porated under state statutes since they inevitably resemble corporations more than
partnerships; that if the 1960 regulations were applicable, Drexler and Wald would
qualify to be taxed as a corporation since it has more corporate than partnership
characteristics; and finally, that Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), which deals with
professional service organizations, is an unreasonable and improper interpretation
of the statute. (These two briefs should be read together to get Empey's full argu-
ment, since Drexler and Wald Professional Company and the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion purposely worked together in order that they wouldn't be redundant.)
4 Circular No. 230, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 394, 31 C.F.R. § 10.460 (1959) amended
Oct. 3, 1962, by CuM. BULL. 394.
5 Colorado is unique in that it is the only state where lawyers are permitted to
incorporate under the General Business Corporation Act by virtue of a rule of the
state supreme court. Supra note 1. The rule authorizes attorneys to form professional
service corporations under the Colorado Corporation Code. The pertinent parts of the
rule as as viewed by the 10th Circuit are as follows:
265. Professional Service Corporations and Joint Stock Companies.
Lawyers may form professional service corporations for the practice of law
under the Colorado Corporation Code, providing that such corporations are
organized and operated in accordance with the provisions of this Rule. The
articles of incorporation of such corporations shall contain provisions com-
plying with the following requirements:
A. The name of the corporation shall contain the words "professional
company" or "professional corporation" or abbreviations thereof ....
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The new corporation, called Drexler and Wald Professional
Company elected officers and began practicing law on November
1, 1962. Its shareholders signed employment contracts, as did its
nonshareholder lawyer employees. On the same date each share-
holder entered into a stock redemption contract. Cases were usually
referred to individual lawyer employees from outside sources. Routine
cases were normally handled by the individual to whom they were
referred and he would also set the fee to be paid by the client. If
the case was not a routine one or involved a major client, the board
of directors would decide what lawyer employee would handle the
case, and the board would set the fee to be paid by the client.
The Corporation performed all activities in the corporate name.
For example, it obtained short term loans in the corporate name,
entered into a ten-year lease for offices, had its corporate name
put on all stationery, office doors, and had its corporate name listed
in Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory.
In August 1963, one of the original stockholders left the cor-
poration and the corporation redeemed his stock. On November 1,
1965, one of the nonstockholder employees, Empey, purchased the
10 percent stock interest that had been redeemed. When Empey
filed his 1965 tax return he reported the salary he had received for
the first ten months before he purchased the stock and also reported
B. The corporation shall be organized solely for the purpose of con-
ducting the practice of law only through persons qualified to practice law
in the State of Colorado.
C. The corporation may exercise the powers and privileges conferred
upon corporations by the laws of Colorado only in furtherance of and subject
to its corporate purpose.
D. All shareholders of the corporation shall be persons duly licensed
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law in the State
of Colorado, and who at all times own their shares in their own right.
They shall be individuals who . . . are actively engaged in the practice of
law in the offices of the corporation.
E. Provisions shall be made requiring any shareholder who ceases to
be eligible to be a shareholder to dispose of all his shares forthwith either
to the corporation or to any person having the qualifications described in
paragraph D above.
F. The president shall be a shareholder and a director, and to the
extent possible all other directors and officers shall be persons having the
qualifications described in paragraph D above....
G. The articles of incorporation shall provide and all shareholders of
the corporation shall agree (a) that all shareholders of the corporation shall
be jointly and severally liable for all acts, errors and omissions of the
the employees of the corporation . . . except during periods of time when
the corporation shall maintain in good standing lawyers' professional liability
insurance which shall meet the following minimum standards:
1. The insurance shall insure the corporation against liability im-
posed upon the corporation by law for damages resulting from any claim
made against the corporation arising out of the performance of professional
services for others by attorneys employed by the corporation in their
capacities as lawyers.
2. Such policy shall insure the corporation liability imposed upon




10 percent of the corporation's income for the two months of 1965
that he held the stock, even though he did not receive this per-
centage of the corporation's income in any way or form. Empey then
filed his claim for refund for the tax difference between the 10
percent of corporate income he reported and his salary that he
actually received. After waiting six months with no action from the
Commissioner, Empey sued in the Federal District Court for the
District of Colorado.
The trial court held that the Treasury regulation which had
denied professional corporations corporate tax treatment 56 con-
stituted an inconsistent position with the Code, with the previous
administrative position, and with previous case law, and was an
exercise of a nondelegable legislative function by an administrative
agency. The trial court further stated that even if the new regu-
lations were valid, the organization met the requirements and there-
fore could be taxed as a corporation.5 7 As previously stated, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court, affirming the decision.5"
Since the landmark Empey decision, there have been other
cases in accord with the Empey interpretation of the 1965 regulation.
A group of physicians in Ohio obtained corporate tax treatment in
O'Neill v. United States.5 9 In that case, the court held that the
same regulation considered in Empey was an interpretive regulation,
not binding upon the court, and invalid. The court stated that the
only time that a corporation was not allowed to be taxed as a cor-
poration was when it failed to meet the "business purpose" test. 0
The court found that the physicians had the non-tax business pur-
pose of controlling a sizeable and unwieldy organization."' The
court cited Empey as support for invalidating the new regulation.
In Kurzner v. United States,6" a Florida medical association
won in its challenge to the validity of the new regulation. The court
held that it was unreasonable, discriminatory, and invalid and cited
Empey and O'Neill in support. In Holder v. United States, 8 a group
of Georgia physicians had like success challenging the same 1965
56 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
57 Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
58406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
59 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968), afi'd, P.H. 60,262 (6th Cir. 1969). The Sixth
Circuit said that the new regulation declared invalid in Empey was invalid only to
the extent it failed to follow the state's label of "corporation."
60 The "business purpose" test requires an organization to have a legitimate business
purpose or purposes to incorporate besides obtaining better tax consequences.
61 O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
62286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968), afljd P.H. 60,262 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth
Circuit based its invalidation of the new regulation on the ground that it was
discriminatory, not on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Code.
63 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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regulation. The court reached the same conclusions as in the pre-
viously mentioned cases and found that the organization had com-
plied with the proper qualification procedure optional to the tax-
payer. 4 It was held in Wallace v. United States6" that the same
regulations were unreasonable, discriminatory, and in conflict with
the previously decided cases. Thus, the Treasury seems to have lost
its battle with professional service organizations under the present
statutes. If, however, cases go against the professional service cor-
porations, it will probably be because they failed to incorporate
with full knowledge and understanding of the proper procedures
to follow and thus failed to "dot all the i's and cross all the t's."
For a professional service organization to qualify for cor-
porate tax treatment after Empey, it must incorporate under state
incorporation or association law, substantially meeting the require-
ments of having continuity of life, centralized management, trans-
ferability of interests, and limited liability. Under Empey, it is
wise to have articles of association, setting forth a clear agreement
of incorporation; the board of directors should meet regularly and
minutes of the meetings should be taken; there should be written
employment contracts with the employees paid by the corporation;
individual clients should pay the corporation; the corporation should
pay corporate income taxes; the corporation's property and debts
should be in the corporate name; all business forms should be cap-
tioned with the corporation's name; and the organization should
hold itself out to the public as being a corporation.
Since H.R. 10 has failed to close the gap completely between
professional service taxpayers and corporate employees, incorpora-
tion might very well provide the equalizer for professional service
people. However, incorporation may be the answer for some and
not for others; it should not be automatic. It is felt that for most,
incorporation is the answer for the self-employed since he has far
superior benefits than those offered by H.R. 10.
The first problem that the professional group must face is
whether or not it would be ethical to incorporate.66 On November
4 Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 897, states that Articles of Association, By-Laws,
Employment Contracts, a copy of the state professional association incorporation law,
and the Profit Sharing Plan, Pension Plan, etc., may be filed with the District
Director of Internal Revenue so that a determination of tax treatment can be made.
622 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5880 (D. Ark. 1968).
One leading case where the court refused to permit lawyers to incorporate is In the
Matter of Co-op Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). Ellis J. Sobol, stock-
holder in Drexler and Wald Professional Company and also the attorney who argued
Empey's case, disagrees strongly with the position that it is unethical for either a
large or small law firm to incorporate. Mr. Sobol contends that reasons for incor-
poration are limitation of liability, convenient transferability of shares, greater ease
in handling a large organization, and to attract and keep qualified employees through
retirement plans, and other increased fringe benefits. The weight of decisions and
the ABA are on Mr. Sobol's side.
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27, 1961, the American Bar Association expressed the view that it
would not be unethical to incorporate if the lawyer is (1) still
personally responsible to the client and (2) if the client is made
personally aware of the restrictions on liability as to the other
lawyers in the organization. 67 In states having similar requirements
to Colorado's, this would not be a problem since the members are
either subject to joint and several liability or must provide a large
amount of insurance.
The public image of lawyers and the legal profession might
be tarnished should there be a great stampede (there has been none,
yet) to incorporate to simply obtain tax benefits.6" While many may
pass this area over lightly, it was not taken lightly by the CPA
profession. The Council of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants was so concerned with the image of their profession
and the members in it that it adopted a resolution condemning CPA's
for even supporting this type of "tax gimmick." 0
The ethical problems are not the only things to be considered.
Forming the corporation involves the trouble, time, and expense of
filing for qualification and approval of health and retirement plans.
In addition it may be quite expensive for one member to withdraw as
the market for the members share may be quite limited. Even if
there is a right to have the organization repurchase the interest, the
fair market value or price would probably be small and the cash
might not be available. Also, one might have to forfeit his pension-
plan rights if he withdraws.
All tax problems are not solved by incorporation. The organi-
zation might have to contend with the extremely high personal
holding company tax rates. 70 Generally, a personal holding company
is one controlled by a limited number of shareholders and receives
most of its income from sources specified in the Code. Amounts
received from personal service contracts are personal holding com-
pany income, according to Code § 543 (a) (7), if "some person other
than the corporation has the right to designate (by name or by
description) the individual who is to perform the services, or if the
individual who is to perform the services is designated (by name
or by description) in the ocntract ...... Drexler and Wald Profes-
sional Company had clients execute a standard form of fee agree-
ment which solved the problem by having the corporation reserve
7 ABA Comment on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303, Nov. 27, 1961, 48 A.B.A.J. 159
(1962).
6 Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HAxv. L. REV. 776, 789 (1962).
69 Editorial: Professional Association or Incorporation, J. ACCOUNTANCY 39-40 (Nov.
1961).
7 0 Note, supra note 69 at 791. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 542(a), 543(a)(7);
§ 541 imposes the high personal holding company tax rate.
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the right to designate who would perform the services and not
having the contract specify who would perform the services.
Another tax problem that the organization might meet is the
problem of reasonableness of compensation; compensation must
be reasonable in order to qualify as a deduction. 7' To avoid as much
double taxation as it possibly can, the organization will attempt to
distribute as much of its earnings as it possibly can. Also, a law
firm needs only a small cash reserve to operate. Partners of large,
well known law firms normally receive greater salaries than can be
supported by their billing time to clients. This is not to imply that
these partners are not worth what they are paid. These partners
surely draw clients to the firm and keep clients simply by their name
and reputation. Also, they fulfill administrative duties and other
services that cannot be billed to clients. Their name and reputation
may allow the organization to charge higher fees. The Commissioner
might label some of these attributes good will, and good will, if
purchased, must be capitalized7 2 and is not subject to depreciation
or amortization. Upon liquidation, the Commissioner could claim
an additional value for good will.
Concurrent with the problem of the Treasury arguing that some
salaries are unreasonable is the problem with the assignment of
income theory.7 3 The Treasury may attempt to attribute income
received by the corporation to the stockholder-employee who earned
it. The fact that he did not receive such income makes no difference.
If a legal corporation accumulates earnings for a reserve for
redemption of any withdrawing member's stock, that accumulation
may be subject to the accumulated earnings tax74 (an unsettled
point at this time). Unlike physicians and dentists, who could argue
that the reserve is needed for purchase of new or more equipment,
lawyers have little reason for such a large accumulation. It can be
argued that the business purpose for keeping a large amount of
accumulated earnings is in fact the constant, real threat or pos-
7
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1).
7Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
7See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Victor Borge, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d § 69-
320 (2nd Cir. 1968).
74 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531-37. The accumulated earnings tax on a corporation's"accumulated taxable income" is at the rate of 271/2 percent of the first $100,000 of
accumulated taxable income and 381/2 percent of any accumulated taxable income
in excess of $100,000. This tax is in addition to the usual corporate tax and is aimed
at preventing corporations from accumulating income so that stockholders won't be
taxed on dividends. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 535*(c) allows an accumulated earnings
credit in "an amount equal to such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable
year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business." Section 535(c)(2)
says the credit allowed to accumulation "shall in no case be less than the amount by
which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation
at the close of the preceding taxable year." Thus the first $100,000 accumulated
won't be subject to the accumulated earnings tax.
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sibility that one or more members will withdraw from the organi-
zation. Many of the smaller firms that would incorporate may not
have to worry about the accumulated earnings tax, since they would
not need to accumulate earnings in excess of $100,000, and prob-
ably could not if they wanted to. Large and small professional
service corporations can also argue that it is reasonable to ac-
cumulate earnings to buy an outside business for investment pur-
poses, and could point out that office equipment and furnishings
are not cheap and replacements will not be any cheaper.
If a small professional service organization decides to elect
under Subchapter S,75 it will throw itself into a not impossible
situation, but a somewhat complicated one. This maze of Code and
regulations has been tried before by professional service people
and has not been found to be very practical. 76 However, it is not
as complicated as one might at first think and this election could
be an answer to accumulated income and personal holding company
problems.
If a sole practitioner decides to incorporate and be a one-man
corporation he will have problems of qualification.77 The Code,78
regulations, 79 and Morrissey lean toward requiring more than one
person in an "association." 80 The main problem with a one-man
association is continuity of life,8 ' but Empey said that if incorporated
under state law, continuity of life would not be a problem. The
real problem areas are (a) centralized management, (b) assign-
ment of income, and (c) personal holding company treatment if
Subchapter S is not elected.82
In conclusion, before a professional service organization de-
cides to incorporate it should weigh carefully all the advantages
and disadvantages, as well as the ethical problems.
H.R. 10 is a pale substitute for a corporate plan. Incorporation
75Id. §§ 1371-77.
76 See Greene, Practitioners' Experiences with Subchapter S Reveal Many Doubts, Fears;
Use Is Limited, 10 J. TAXATION 130 (1959).
7 See BITTKER, supra note 50, at 39.
78 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a)(3).
79
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1965).
80 But see Lombard Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1943).
81 A.A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 385 (1937).
82 There also may be problems in incorporating a cash basis partnership, as shown in
Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). In this case petitioner tried to fall within the
provisions of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351 by incorporating with a tax free exchange
of his property for stock in the new corporation. Petitioner ran afoul of statute
when he received stock plus an unsecured promissory note. The court found that the
corporation assumed liabilities over the petitioner's adjusted basis of property
transferred. Thusly, Code § 357(c) was applicable via Code § 351(d) (1) and peti-
tioner should be taxed on this excess of liabilities assumed. The court also found
that the petitioner should be taxed on the amount of the note received since it was
within the meaning of "other property" received besides stock under Code § 351(b).
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for most professional service taxpayers is the best answer now
available. There are professional service people who are now being
pushed too quickly and are being ill advised by mutual funds and
insurance groups (who are the ones who stand to benefit from the
corporate form through retirement plans). Incorporation must take
place only after careful investigation and planning. The best answer
would be federal legislation that would put self-employed and cor-
porate employees on equal footing and thus end the journey into
the unknown regions and pitfalls of professional service people
incorporating. This legislation appears to be only a wish as it is




CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - BIFURCATED TRIAL - THE RIGHT TO
SEPARATE TRIALS ON THE ISSUES OF GUILT AND PUNISHMENT -
People ex rel. McKevitt v. District Court, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
C LARENCE English was charged, by direct information, with the
crime of murder in the first degree. The public defender submitted
a "Motion for Bifurcated Trial" on behalf of English, requesting
separate trials before separate juries on the issues of guilt and of
punishment. The Denver District Court ordered separate trials on
the issues of guilt and punishment but before the same jury. There-
after, on behalf of the People, the district attorney instituted an
original proceeding on a writ of prohibition against the district
court and against the judge who issued the order alleging that the
Colorado statute concerning trials for murder in the first degree'
had been misinterpreted.' The Supreme Court of Colorado, after
issuing to the district court a rule to show cause, held the rule ab-
solute and directed the trial court to reverse its order that English
be given separate trials before the same jury. The language used
81The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Randolph W. Thrower, has indicated that
the I.R.S. might attack professional service corporations through the administration's
legislative tax proposals. These proposals could be to force all Subchapter S Corpora-
tions to use "Keogh" or H.R. 10 plans rather than corporate plans. See P.H. FED.
TAx REPORT BULLETIN § 60,293-94.
1 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3(1) (1963) provides:
The jury before which any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall,
if it find such person guilty thereof, designate by its verdict whether it be
murder of the first or second degree, and if murder of the first degree, the
jury shall in its verdict fix the penalty to be suffered by the person so con-
victed, either at imprisonment for life at hard labor in the penitentiary, or
at death; and the court shall thereupon give sentence accordingly (emphasis
added).
2 People ex rel. McKevitt v. District Court, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
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by the statute "clearly negates the concept of separate verdicts
resulting from separate trials on the issues of guilt and punishment,
regardless of whether the separate trials be before the same or
different juries.'' 8
This Comment addresses itself to an analysis of the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision in People ex tel. McKevitt v. District Court
in light of the arguments surrounding (1) the power of a judge
to order a split trial on the issues of guilt and punishment, (2) the
defendant's constitutional right to allocution, and (3) the con-
stitutional impact of the equal protection and self-incrimination
questions, with a view toward legislative amendment of the present
procedure.
I. THE JUDGE'S POWER TO ORDER
THE TRIAL TO BE DIVIDED INTO Two STAGES
The brief for the intervenor, Clarence R. English, represented
by the public defender, sets forth as its main contention that a trial
judge has the power to order a two-step trial in a capital case.4
As precedents for this contention, the brief cites the cases of United
States v. Curry,' and State v. Raskin.' In Curry, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated:
[TJhe unitary trial can be highly unsatisfactory. The most serious
problem arises when the trial judge is compelled either to exdude
evidence relevant to an intelligent disposition of the sentence in
question, or to admit such evidence knowing that the trial of guilt
is thereby open to matters prejudicial and otherwise inadmissible....
Since the unitary trial possesses these fundamental problems,
we do not interpret the silence of Congress on this question as
precluding the trial judge from confining the first presentation
to the jury to the issue of guilt when the defendant's right to a
fair trial would be jeopardized by a unitary trial.
7
The Curry case involved a federal homicide statute which states
in part that: "Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree, shall
suffer death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by adding thereto
'without capital punishment' in which event he shall be sentenced
3 Id. at 206.
4 Brief for Intervenor at 5, People ex rel. McKevitt v. District Court, 447 P.2d 205
(Colo. 1968). See generally 1 WIGMORE, Evidence § 194(b) (1940). Professor
Wigmore lends some support to this view when he states:
The only way to avoid injustice in such cases is to reserve the evidence of
former convictions until after a finding of guilt on the evidence in a par-
ticular case . . . . It is to be regretted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
did not handle the verdict procedure flexibly, and introduce this method
without waiting for legislative authority. (Our Courts are too prone to wait
for legislative interference before altering their procedure, which ought to
be exclusively within their own control.)
5 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1965), rehearing denied 387 U.S. 949 (1967), 392 U.S. 917
(1968).
6 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
7 358 F.2d 904, 914 (2d Cir. 1965).
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to imprisonment for life .. 8 Although the Colorado and federal
statutes are similar in their effect, intervenor's citing of the Curry
case in support of the judge's power to order split trials is some-
what misleading. The portion of the opinion quoted supra is
essentially dictum, since the appellate court held that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in conducting a unitary trial.
The court continued:
[W]e think it unwise to require the twro-stage trial in every case
under § 2113(e) [allowing the jury in a felony murder case to de-
cide if the defendant should suffer the death penalty] and related
statutes. . . . Moreover, it has been suggested that the two-stage
trial does not always work to the defendant's advantage, and we
are loath to compel unwilling defendants to submit to a procedure
which is devised for their benefit but which may be prejudicial in
its application to a particular case.9
This decision lends some weight to the proposition that the trial
judge may order split trials when he deems it unfair not to do so.
However, the fact that the opinion concerns a statute permitting a
trial judge to order, in his discretion, a bifurcated trial, and the fact
that the portion of that opinion concerned with the bifurcation
question is dictum, leads to the conclusion that such a statute must
be in effect before judicial discretion can be asserted.
Intervenor's second major argument for the inherent judicial
power to order split trials rests on analogy. The brief states: "In
a somewhat different context to a murder case but involving the
precise principle applicable herein, the power of a trial court to
so control the order of proof as to have presented sequentially to
the jury the question of guilt first and then, if necessary, another
collateral issue has been clearly recognized.''10 As authority in support
of this contention, intervenor's brief cites State v. Raskin. However,
the facts in Raskin differ on one important point from those in
McKevitt; in the former, the question of a bifurcated trial ensued
from a motion to separate the issues of insanity from guilt, while
in McKevitt, insanity was not at issue.
The brief of the intervenor analogizes that since bifurcated trials
have been established on the question of insanity in capital cases,
they should also be established on the issues of guilt and punish-
ment in capital cases where "the unfairness is greater . "...12 Thus,
a person who makes no insanity plea should have two separate trials
- the first on the issue of his guilt and, if he is found guilty, the
8 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1964).
9 358 F.2d 904, 914 (2d Cir. 1965) (footnote omitted).
10 Brief for Intervenor at 9, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
11 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
12 Brief for Intervenor at 11, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
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second on the issue of punishment. It can be inferred from this line
of reasoning that a person who makes an insanity plea should have
three trials - the first on the issue of his mental soundness (was
he mentally capable of committing the act?), the second on the
issue of his guilt (did he commit the act?), and the third on the
issue of his punishment.
In the Raskin case the issue was whether inculpatory statements
made during a compulsory medical examination could be used in
a trial on the issue of guilt. The court found that they could not,
but that such statements could be used in a trial on the issue of
insanity.13 The analogy to the circumstance of Clarence English,
where defendant sought to voluntarily present evidence of mitigation
in the trial on punishment, is not conclusive. First, the compulsory
nature of defendant's testimony is not present, as in Raskin, and
second, the Colorado Supreme Court has already held that evidence
for mitigation purposes may be presented by testimony in a unitary
trial.14 While the Raskin case is somewhat analogous to McKevitt,
such differences as have been previously delineated make it not
dispositive of the question of a trial judge's inherent power to order
a bifurcated trial.
Probably the strongest argument advanced against the power of
the trial judge to split the trial is found in the brief of the petitioner-
district attorney, which argument was adopted by the Colorado
Supreme Court:
Petitioner has found no statutory or case authority in the State
of Colorado for the use of the two-step trial. Rather, we find the
language which is found in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-3(1)
(1963) to be most compelling .... 15
... The Court will note with care that the language of the statute
clearly indicates that the same verdict is to be used for [sic] to
indicate the penalty imposed as is used to find the defendant
guilty of murder in the first degree ...
In conclusion, we feel that the order of the trial judge neither
accomplishes what the Defendant sought by his motion nor accords
to the People the opportunity to present its case in the manner
which has long been a matter of tradition in this State and
which has long received judicial approval. We would submit that
the proper forum for a change of procedure would be the General
Assembly which has the authority to institute such change. 16
13 34 Wis. 2d 607, 624, 150 N.W.2d 318, 328 (1967).
14Segura v. People, 431 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Colo. 1967). The court stated:
Admittedly the Colorado statute requires the defendant to choose whether
he will take the stand himself in an attempt to mitigate the crime, or to
decline to testify. There is nothing in the statute which prevents the intro-
duction of relevant evidence to establish mitigating circumstances. Such cir-
cumstances can be shown by witnesses other than the defendant.
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3(1) (1963).
1f Memorandum Brief in Support of Complaint for Writ of Prohibition at 3-4, 447
P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
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II. THE RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION
Allocution refers historically to the procedure by which
the judge asks the defendant who has been found guilty why
sentence should not be imposed. The defendant may then provide
information toward possible mitigation of punishment, which the
judge may take into account when imposing sentence. Statutes in
many states have codified the common law requirement of allocu-
tion. 17 Colorado statutes provide for allocution in noncapital cases."'
The Colorado Supreme Court, in the McKevitt opinion, con-
sidered the question of a constitutional right to allocution. The exis-
tence of such a right was denied by citing the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Segura v. Patterson
that "the right to a pre-sentence report or other means of allocution
has not risen to the dignity of a constitutional requirement ... "19
Thus, while it may be desirable at times to allow the defendant
to speak for himself in mitigation of the crime of which he has been
convicted, it has been held that omission of allocution is not a
ground for reversal." The United States Supreme Court has even
held that noncompliance with the requirement of allocution in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure2 1 is not an error of constitu-
tional magnitude. 2 The right to have a bifurcated trial, therefore,
cannot be predicated on a constitutional right to allocution.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
If there is no constitutional right to allocution, is there none-
theless a violation of basic constitutional rights inherent in the
Colorado unitary trial procedure? Attorney for intervenor argued
that there was such a violation,2 3 citing the Colorado statute al-
lowing a presentence investigation of defendant's background in
17 For a general treatment of the right to allocution, see: Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1292;
for an historical treatment of bifurcation see: Besharou and Mueller Bifurcation: TheTwo Phase System of Criminal Procedure in the United States, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 613
(1969).
18 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-8 (1963).
19 402 F.2d 249, 252 (10th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted).
2Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891), citing the rule but recognizing opposing
authority.
21 FED. R. CRAM. P. 32(a), which provides:
(a) Sentence
(1) Imposition of Sentence. Sentence shall be imposed without un-reasonable delay. Pending sentence the court may commit the defendant or
continue or alter the bail. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford
counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall addressthe defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement inhis own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.
22 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
-3 Brief for Intervenor at 21, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
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cases where the court has discretion as to the penalty to be inflicted. 4
Another Colorado statute pertinent to the question of equal protec-
tion but not cited by intervenor relates to applications for probation.25
Both statutes provide for a report prepared by a probation of fi-
cer concerning the background of defendant, his prior criminal
record, his characteristics, his financial condition, and such infor-
mation about his behavior as would be helpful in imposing sentence.
Neither statute applies to a charge of murder in the first degree
where the defendant pleads not guilty, because in such a case the
court has no discretion as to penalty, and probation may not be
granted. 7 Hence, there exists the incongruous situation that in all
crimes except murder in the first degree there is afforded to the
sentencing authority an opportunity to receive evidence in allocution.
In a first degree murder case, however, where the penalty is poten-
tially the most severe and the issue of penalty is closely related to
the issue of guilt, no such presentencing procedure is provided. Cer-
tainly the incongruity of such a situation is a strong argument for
its revision. However, the question remains: Is such an incon-
gruity a denial of equal protection of the laws?
One argument asserting such a denial is that since a person
who pleads guilty to a charge of first degree murder may receive
a presentence hearing under the Colorado statute, 28 while a person
24 COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-16-2 (1963).
Presentence investigation. - Whenever any person shall be adjudged guilty
of any felony, where the court has discretion as to the penalty, the court,
before the imposition of sentence, shall cause a probation officer to make
an investigation of the background of such person including any prior
criminal record and such information about his characteristics, his financial
conditions and circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in
imposing sentence and such other information as may be required by the
court, in order that the court may be fully informed concerning said person.
The probation officer, after completing said investigation, shall make a
written report to the court.
25 Id. at § 39-16-3.
Application - deferment - ineligibles. - Any person after conviction of a
felony or misdemeanor, or after a plea of guilty to a felony or misdemeanor,
except murder of the first or second degree, may make application to the
court to be released on probation. Whenever such application is made, the
court shall defer sentence and cause a probation officer to make an investiga-
tion of the background of the applicant including any prior criminal record
of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial
condition and circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in
determining the advisability of granting probation and such other informa-
tion as may be required by the court, and of the facts of the offense of said
applicant. The probation officer within such time as the court may prescribe
shall make a written report to the court of said investigation, together with
his recommendation as to whether or not probation should be granted. A
person, having been twice convicted of a felony in this state or elsewhere
prior to the case on which his application for probation is based, shall not
be eligible for probation.
16ld. at § 40-2-3(1).
271d. § 39-16-3.
ts Id. §§ 39-16-2, 39-16-3.
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who pleads not guilty receives no opportunity for allocution,"9 there
is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In support of this con-
tention, intervenor's brief cites the case of United States v. Jackson.30
In that case, defendant was charged with a violation of the Federal
Kidnaping Act which provides that interstate kidnapers shall be
punished: "(1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been lib-
erated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend,
or (2) by imprisonment by any term of years or for life, if the
death penalty is not imposed."'" Thus, a person charged under the
Act could plead guilty (waiving a jury trial) and be assured of not
having the death penalty imposed. However, if he pled not guilty,
thereby asserting his right to a jury trial, he would incur the pos-
sibility of the death sentence. The United States Supreme Court
held that the clause authorizing capital punishment was invalid as
imposing an impermissible burden upon the accused's exercise of
his fifth amendment right to not plead guilty and his sixth amend-
ment right to demand a trial by jury, but upheld the remaining
clauses of the statute."
The Jackson decision presents an interesting question of
whether the Colorado procedure is a violation of an accused's fifth
and sixth amendment rights. On the surface, the defendant in a
murder trial in Colorado is presented with a dilemma similar to the
defendant in Jackson. Under the Colorado statute, the accused must
choose between foregoing the benefits of a presentence hearing by
pleading not guilty and thereby running the risk of a greater
penalty; before Jackson, the accused was faced with a similar risk
by pleading not guilty to the kidnaping charge and possibly being
sentenced to death. In summary, by analogizing the Colorado pro-
cedure to that of the Federal Kidnaping Act, it would appear that
since the former is, the latter may be, violative of an accused's con-
stitutional rights.
Unfortunately, however, the issue of constitutionality in Mc-
Kevitt was not framed in the same context as in Jackson. In McKevitt,
the constitutional issue was limited to the question of a bifurcated
trial. The United States Supreme Court, in Jackson, expressly denied
the government's contention that a second trial on the issue of
penalty could ensue in kidnaping cases. It said: "Thus, when such
a jury has been convened, the statutory reference is to that jury alone,
not to a jury impaneled after conviction for the limited purpose of
29 Id. at § 39-16-2.
30 390 U.S. 570 '(1968).
31 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
3
2 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968).
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determining punishment. ' 33 The effect of this reasoning is that, al-
though the portion of the Federal Kidnaping Act relating to the
death penalty is violative of the Constitution, the bifurcation issue
is separate, and bifurcated trials were specifically excluded from the
meaning of the federal statute by the Court's holding in Jackson.
34
Considering the manner in which the bifurcation issue was
raised in McKevitt, and also the Colorado statutory pronouncement
denying bifurcation, it is probable that the constitutional questions
concerning the Colorado procedure for imposing the death penalty
were not controlled by the Jackson decision. To have ruled on such
questions, the Colorado court would have had to exceed the bounds
of the issues presented by the case before it.
The accused under the Colorado procedure is confronted with
an additional dilemma having possible constitutional ramifications.
The defendant in a unitary trial must choose between presenting
mitigating evidence to the jury on the issue of punishment, or main-
taining his privilege against self-incrimination on the issue of guilt.
However, the courts have not found this dilemma to be of constitu-
tional status. The Colorado Supreme Court in Segura v. People
stated:
Admittedly the Colorado statute requires the defendant to choose
between taking the stand himself in an attempt to mitigate the
crime, or declining to testify. There is nothing in the statute which
prevents the introduction of relevant evidence to establish mitigating
circumstances. ... We know of no jurisdiction in which it has been
held that this practice [unitary trials] purports to deny constitutional
rights. 35
The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit likewise found that:
It is always the case that in exercising the constitutional right to
remain silent, the individual is forced to forego his opportunity
to personally appeal to the jury. Whether such an appeal relates
to the determination of guilt or punishment or both, it cannot
be denied that the inducement not to remain silent and thus to
forego a specific constitutional right does not arise from any un-
necessary burden imposed by the State. We conclude that the
33 Id. at 577 (footnote omitted).
34 The Court in Jackson went on to say:
The Government would have us give the statute this strangely bifur-
cated meaning without the slightest indication that Congress contemplated
any such scheme. Not a word in the legislative history so much as hints
that a conviction by a court sitting without a jury might be followed by
a separate sentencing proceeding before a penalty jury.
It is one thing to fill a minor gap in a statute - to extrapolate from its
general design details that were inadvertently omitted. It is quite another
thing to create from whole cloth a complex and completely novel procedure
and to thrust it upon unwilling defendants for the sole purpose of rescuing
a statute from a charge of unconstitutionality.
Id. at 578-80.
35 431 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Colo. 1967).
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single-verdict procedure does not "needlessly chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights."
3 6
The Supreme Court of the United States has also ruled on the
constitutionality of split trials:
To say that the two-stage jury trial ... is probably the fairest, as
some commentators and courts have suggested, and with which
we might well agree were the matter before us in a legislative or
rule-making context, is a far cry from a constitutional determination
that this method of handling the problem is compelled by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Two-part jury trials are rare in our juris-
prudence; they have never been compelled by this Court as a
matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal pro-
cedure.3
7
While the Court did not address itself directly to the self-incrim-
ination issue in this case, it can be inferred that notions of due
process do not compel a split trial to preserve the right against self-
incrimination.
Thus, there is authority, as represented by the aforementioned
cases, for the proposition that the unitary trial system is not violative
of the constitutional rights protecting a defendant in a criminal trial
against compulsory self-incrimination.
IV. LEGISLATIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE BIFURCATION ISSUE
As the Court in Spencer intimated, although the unitary trial
system is not unconstitutional, the bifurcated trial system may well
be more equitable.38 Since courts seem to be reluctant to change the
unitary trial procedure to the bifurcated procedure, any modifications
must come from the legislature in the tradition of judicial deference
to that body.
Four states have already taken this step through legislative
enactments. California, 9 Connecticut,4 ° New York,4 and Pennsyl-
vania 42 have enacted bifurcated trial procedures for first degree
murder cases. The California statute is representative:
The guilt or innocence of every person charged with an offense
for which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment
for life shall first be determined, without a finding as to penalty.
If such person has been found guilty of an offense punishable
by life imprisonment or death, and has been found sane on any
36 Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted).
37 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1967) (footnote omitted).
38 Even the Colorado Court in Segura acknowledged this fact when it said: "It may well
be that a better method of determining punishment could be devised [other than the
unitary system]."
39 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1959).
40 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10 (Supp. 1963).
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a(2) (McKinney 1967).
42 PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
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plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, there shall thereupon be
further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact
shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be presented at the further pro-
ceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding
the crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any
facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.
43
The Model Penal Code also provides for a two-step trial in its
recommendations for the sentencing procedure in murder cases."
Some examples of admissible evidence at California penalty
trials are: prior acts of misconduct; " comments by prosecution of
defendant's recidivist character;46 wife's testimony as to defendant's
violent acts; 47 and the fact that murder victims were innocent chil-
dren.4" Examples of inadmissible evidence in California at the
penalty trial are: confession tapes including mention of prior
43 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190-1 (West 1959) (emphasis added).
4 4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1962 Draft).
(2) Determination by Court and jury.
Unless the Court imposes sentence under Subsection (1) of this Section,
it shall conduct a separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced for a felony of the first degree or sentenced to death.
The proceeding shall be conducted before the Court alone if the defendant
was convicted by a Court sitting without a jury or upon his plea of guilty
or if the prosecuting attorney and the defendant waive a jury with respect
to sentence. In other cases it shall be conducted before the Court sitting
with the jury which determined the defendant's guilt or, if the Court for
good cause shown discharges that jury, with a new jury empanelled for the
purpose.
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that
the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature
and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background,
history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section.
Any such evidence which the Court deems to have probative force may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity
to rebut any hearsay statements. The prosecuting attorney and the defendant
or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence
of death.
The determination whether sentence of death shall be imposed shall
be in the discretion of the Court, except that when the proceeding is con-
ducted before the Court sitting with a jury, the Court shall not impose
sentence of death unless it submits to the jury the issue whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or to imprisonment and the jury
returns a verdict that the sentence should be death. If the jury is unable
to reach a unanimous verdict, the Court shall dismiss the jury and impose
sentence for a felony of the first degree.
The Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the jury, in
determining upon its verdict, shall take into account the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) and any
other facts that it deems relevant, but it shall not impose or recommend
sentence of death unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in Subsection (3) and further finds that there are no miti-
gating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. When the
issue is submitted to the jury, the Court shall so instruct and also shall
inform the jury of the nature of the sentence of imprisonment that may be
imposed, including its implication with respect to possible release upon
parole, if the jury verdict is against sentence of death.
45 People v. Tahl, 65 Cal. 2d 719, 423 P.2d 246, 56 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1967).
46 People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966).
47 People v. Mathis, 63 Cal. 2d 416, 406 P.2d 65, 46 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1965).
48 People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d. 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963).
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crimes;" photographs of deceased where defendant admitted crime ;50
evidence of prosecution's willingness to plea bargain and defendant's
unwillingness. 51
The limits of admissible evidence at the penalty trial are not
boundless. The rules of evidence are not relaxed because the second
trial is solely on the issue of penalty, but many of the same questions
as to admissibility at the trial on guilt pertain to the trial on
punishment. 52 Accordingly, incompetent58  or irrelevant 4  evidence
can not be introduced at either trial. The test of admissibility is
weighing the probative value of the evidence against its inflam-
matory effect.55
Thus, it seems that there is substantial legislative authority for
the Colorado legislature to amend its present murder statute to
include the bifurcated trial provisions. The public defender in Den-
ver prepared and introduced such a bill in the 47th General As-
sembly of Colorado.56
CONCLUSION
At this point, in view of the zealous efforts to promote the bi-
furcated trial procedure in Colorado by the public defender and the
equally zealous efforts to oppose it by the district attorney, it should
be pointed out that the bifurcated trial procedure is a two-way street.
While the defense may introduce evidence at the trial on punish-
ment in mitigation of the offense, the prosecution may introduce
counterbalancing evidence in aggravation. In California, the evi-
49 People v. Hines, 61 Cal. 2d 164, 390 P.2d 398, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1964).
50/d.
51 People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964).
52 Handler, Background Evidence in Murder Cases, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 317, 326
(1960).
" People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959).
54 People v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 426 P.2d 908, 58 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967).
s See Handler, supra note 52 at 325.
56S. 318, 47th General Assembly of Colorado (1969). The substance of the bill, which
passed the senate but was not reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, reads:
Every person charged with first degree murder as defined in this article
may petition the court prior to trial for an order that the issue of guilt and
the issue of penalty shall be tried separately because prejudice may otherwise
ensue to the defendant. If the court shall find that one trial on both issues
may be prejudicial to the defendant he shall then order that the guilt or
innocence of the person charged with first degree murder shall first be
determined without his finding as to penalty. If such person shall be found
guilty of first degree murder then there shall thereupon be further pro-
ceedings before the court or the same jury on the issue of penalty. Evidence
may be presented at the further proceeding on the issue of penalty, of the
circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and
history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. The
determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be in the
discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence pre-




dence in aggravation is even permitted to the introduction of prior
crimes not admissible in the trial on the issue of guilt.57 Hence,
it would appear that both prosecution and defense attorneys would
favor the bifurcated procedure.
Having determined that the bifurcated trial procedure is pre-
cluded by the present Colorado statute, and that the unitary procedure
is not constitutionally violative, it is apparent that the McKevitt
decision is proper within these guidelines. Nevertheless, the bifurcated
procedure, having advantages for both the prosecution and the de-
fense sides, seems to be more equitable. Normally inadmissible evi-
dence or evidence withheld from admission because of its privileged
nature is admissible in the second portion of the bifurcated proceed-
ing. Such admission is proper since the jury in a murder case is
permitted to hear evidence concerning bad character of the defendant
as well as his good character. Where relevant, both types of evidence
should be presented to the jury so that their sentence may be deemed
more just and proper. The legislative bill proposed by the Denver
public defender would be the realization of this procedure and should
be given serious consideration.
Richard F. Mauro
57 People v. Tahl, 65 Cal. 2d 719, 423 P.2d 246, 56 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1967). The court
in interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1959) upheld the view that prior
acts of misconduct by a defendant at a penalty trial are admissible even if he has
never been prosecuted for them.
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